Opinion
ID No. IN 9703028601.
Submitted: January 11, 2004.
Decided: April 6, 2005.
On Defendant's Third Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.Stephen P. Wood, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
ORDER
This 6th day of April 2005, upon consideration of the third motion for postconviction relief filed by William J. Webb, Jr. ("Defendant"), it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant has filed this pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. Defendant alleges 1) that "failure of Court to give specific performance of plea-agreement violated the Double Jeopardy Clause," 2) ineffective assistance of counsel at pre-trial and trial, and 3) that "[r]eliance of false information and [a] new United States Supreme Court ruling, both render [Defendant's] enhanced sentence unconstitutional."
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief.
2. Defendant was arrested on July 26, 1999 for Assault First Degree, Burglary First Degree, and Endangering the Welfare of a Child. On March 16, 2000, Defendant entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e)(1)(B). Defendant plead guilty to Assault First Degree (Cr.A. # IN 99-08-2482), Burglary First Degree (Cr.A.#IN 99-08-0767), and Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Cr.A.#IN 99-08-0768). The State agreed to recommend no more than twenty years of prison at Level V.
On June 23, 2000, Defendant was sentenced by this Court to 12 years at Level 5 for Burglary First Degree, suspended after serving 5 years for 7 years at Level 4, suspended after serving 1 year at Level 4, followed by Level 3 or Level 2 probation. On the Assault First Degree charge Defendant was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment at Level 5, suspended after serving 24 months at Level 5 followed by 6 months at Level 3 or Level 2. On the charge of Endangering the Welfare of a Child Defendant was sentenced to 12 months at Level 5 suspended for 12 months at Level 2 probation. Additionally, Defendant was found guilty of Violation of Probation for which he was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment at Level 5.
3. On August 21, 2000, Defendant filed his first motion for postconviction relief alleging three grounds; Defendant alleged that his conviction was the result of 1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) "odium"; and 3) "defrauding of plea agreement-sentence." Defendant's allegations of "ineffective assistance of counsel," "odium," and "defrauding the Superior Court of plea-agreement-sentence" were found to be conclusory; Defendant had proffered no factual support for the allegations. The Court held that because these contentions were vague and entirely conclusory, they warranted summary dismissal.
State v. Webb, 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 343.
Defendant filed his second pro se motion for postconviction relief in October 2000; Defendant essentially alleged that his conviction was primarily the result of "coercion" and "defraudment of plea-agreement." Subsequently, Defendant filed a series of related submissions and later Defendant filed further submissions. Defendant asserted grounds previously adjudicated by this Court and new grounds not raised in his initial Motion for Postconviction Relief. This Court deemed all these filings to be amendments to his second Motion for Postconviction Relief. The Court did not address the merits of those claims as they were procedurally barred pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) and (4).
State v. Webb, 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 428.
The hand-written, related submissions are entitled, "Motion to Appoint Counsel by the Court", "Motion to Waive the Aver of Particulars", "Memorandum", "Motion for Court to Appoint Counsel", "Memorandum", "Motion for Recussal" and lastly a type-written set of interrogatories for the New Castle County Police Department to answer.
On Oct. 31, 2000 Defendant filed a Memorandum demanding an evidentiary hearing. On Nov. 8, 2000 Defendant requested "a declaratory judgment against the plaintiff". Defendant also filed three subsequent documents, one of which was a "waiver of Immunity Motion."
State v. Webb, 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 428 *6-7.
4. Before addressing the merits of any claim raised in this third motion seeking postconviction relief, the Court must first apply the rules governing the procedural requirements of Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) states "[a]ny ground for relief not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding is thereafter barred, unless consideration for the claim is warranted in the interest of justice." This includes claims that were previously considered and rejected but are now raised in a "refined or restated" claim. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) provides that "[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice." "The interest of justice [exception under Rule 61(i)(4)] has been narrowly defined to require the movant to show that the trial court lacked the authority to convict or punish him."
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990) ( citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
Riley v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 719 (1990).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
State v. Wright, Del. Super., 653 A.2d 288, 298 (1994) (citing Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., No. 164, 1994, Berger, J. (Mar. 1, 1995) (Order) at 3).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4) provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified."
5. Defendant's first and second grounds asserted are procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(4). These issues have been previously resolved and are therefore barred by Rule 61(i)(4). Furthermore, this court finds that consideration is not "warranted in the interest of justice" and Defendant has offered no reasons for this Court to believe that "subsequent legal developments have revealed that the trial court lacked the authority to convict or punish him." Thus, grounds one and two of Defendant's motion are summarily dismissed. To the extent that Defendant's first two claims raise new grounds, the new grounds are procedurally barred pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief at 3 (stating "Coercion" and "Defraudment of plea agreement — sentence".
See Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 746 n. 11 (1990) ( cited in Slater v. State, Del. Supr., No. 164, 1994 Berger, J. (Mar. 1, 1995) (Order) at 3).
6. In his third ground for postconviction relief, Defendant claims that his sentence was "enhanced" by "false and unreliable information." Defendant argues that this Court improperly sentenced him to the maximum sentence for his Burglary First conviction. Defendant has already raised the argument in a prior motion for postconviction relief that his sentence was incorrect in that he had been sentenced to more than 10 years at Level V (the then existing statutory maximum), suspended after serving 5 years. The Delaware Supreme Court remanded the matter to this Court, which then corrected Defendant's sentence.
Webb v. State, 788 A.2d 529, 529 (Del. 2001).
Defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Blakely v. Washington is applicable to his claim and as newly decided law, his claim is not barred by Rule 61(i). In Blakely, the trial judge found that the defendant's actions amounted to "deliberate cruelty" and the judge imposed an "exceptional" sentence greater the statutorily defined maximum. The Supreme Court, in reversing and remanding the case, held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (U.S. 2004).
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (U.S. 2004) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (U.S. 2000).
Even if this Court were to hold that Defendant's third ground for relief was not barred by Rule 61 because Blakely was decided after defendant's previous motions for postconviction relief had been decided, Defendant's third claim is still summarily dismissed. The Delaware Supreme Court held in Benge v. State that " Blakely does not impact Delaware's sentencing scheme because the SENTAC guidelines are voluntary and non-binding." Quoting its decision in Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79 (Del. 1997), the Supreme Court explained that
Benge v. State, 2004 Del. LEXIS 506 *2.
On September 15, 1987, this Court issued Administrative Directive Number Seventy-Six. That directive implemented the sentencing guidelines that had been developed by SENTAC, and provided that:
2. Any judge who finds a particular sentencing standard inappropriate in a particular case because of the presence of aggravating or mitigating or other relevant factors need not impose a sentence in accordance with the standards but such judge shall set forth with particularity the reasons for the deviation. . . .
3. The sentencing standards are considered voluntary and nonbinding; thus no party to a criminal case has any legal or constitutional right to appeal to any court a statutorily authorized sentence which does not conform to the sentencing standards.
Benge v. State, 2004 Del. LEXIS 506 *2-3.
Further, unlike Blakely, Defendant's sentence was not "enhanced"; instead, Defendant was sentenced to the statutory maximum. Therefore, Defendant's claim that Blakely is applicable to his motion for postconviction relief is without merit and is also summarily dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's third motion for postconviction relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.