Opinion
November 17, 1950. Rehearing Denied December 21, 1950.
Earl D. Farr, Punta Gorda, for relators.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Burns, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John O. Jackson, Jacksonville, for respondents.
This is an original proceeding in mandamus brought by Charlotte County, hereinafter referred to as the County, to require the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commissioner, hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner, to pay debt service taxes for the year 1949 and both debt service taxes and general county operating taxes for the year 1949 on lands held by them in their official capacity. We are confronted with a motion for peremptory writ notwithstanding the motion to quash and a return to the alternative writ.
The question for determination is whether or not lands held and used by the Commission for the propagation of game and fish are subject to taxation for County debt service and general operating expenses.
The answer to this question turns on the interpretation of Sections 372.12 and 372.19, F.S.A. as affected by Section 192.06, F.S.A., as amended, Section 192.08, F.S.A. and Section 30, Article IV of the State Constitution, F.S.A. Sections 372.12 and 372.19, F.S.A., derives from Sections 6 and 67, Chapter 13644, Acts of 1929. They relate to the authority of the Commission to acquire lands for the protection and propagation of game, fish, non-game birds and fur-bearing animals, the acquisition of lands for game refuges, shooting grounds, hatcheries, breeding grounds and other purposes authorized by the Commission. Both statutes provide in terms that no property acquired for said purposes shall be exempt from state, county or district taxes.
Subsequent to the enactment of Chapter 13644, Acts of 1929, Sections 372.12 and 372.19, F.S.A., the legislature enacted Chapter 15639, Acts of 1931, Section 192.08, F.S.A., which provides in part that "No taxes or special assessments shall be levied by any taxing district, special taxing district, or other governmental unit or agency created for purposes of taxation, against lands or other property of the State of Florida, except for the purpose of improving the actual physical condition of such lands or other property, and for such purpose, only upon the approval of such levy by that state agency or department in which title to such lands or other property is vested, or having jurisdiction over such lands or other property."
The overall purpose of Chapter 15639, Acts of 1931, was to set out the circumstances and conditions under which state lands and properties may be taxed. This purpose was further supplemented by Chapter 21742, Acts of 1943, Section 192.06, the pertinent part of which provides that "All property, real and personal, of the United States and of this state, except such property of the United States as shall be subject to taxation * * * under any law of the United States" shall be exempt from taxation. Section 30, Article IV of the State Constitution is pertinent in that it requires that all lands and other property acquired by the Commission shall be held by it for and in behalf of the State. It further provides that all funds acquired or provided for the Commission shall be used by it to carry out the purposes of the Commission and for no other purpose. It was given no authority implied or otherwise to use its funds for the payment of taxes.
From this it follows that Chapter 15639, Acts of 1931, Section 192.08, F.S.A. and Chapter 21742, Acts of 1943, Section 192.06, F.S.A., were in direct conflict with Chapter 13644, Acts of 1929, Sections 372.12 and 372.19, F.S.A., they were later expressions of the legislature dealing with the same subject matter and must be construed as a repeal of the former act. Hills borough County Commissioners v. Jackson, 58 Fla. 210, 50 So. 423; Lykes Brothers v. Bigby, 155 Fla. 580, 21 So.2d 37.
We are therefore of the view that there is no legal authority for imposing debt service and general operating taxes of the County on lands held for the state in the name of the Commission. Motion for peremptory writ of mandamus is accordingly denied and the alternative writ is quashed.
It is so ordered.
CHAPMAN, THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
ADAMS, C.J., and ROBERTS, J., dissent.
SEBRING, J., not participating because of illness.
This is an original proceeding in mandamus whereby the Relators seek to compel the Respondents to pay certain taxes levied against the property of the Respondents. The Relators are Charlotte County, and the Board of County Commissioners, the Clerk of the Circuit Court, and the Tax Collector of said County, and the Respondents are the members of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission of the State of Florida.
During the year 1941, the Commission purchased in excess of 50,000 acres of land in Charlotte County for the purpose of the propagation of game, particularly quail. It appears that such lands have subsequently been leased by the Commission for grazing purposes at an annual rental of 10 cents per acre. The taxes herein sought to be collected were levied by Relators against such lands for the years 1948 and 1949. The 1948 tax levy was for the payment of interest and principal on bonds of Charlotte County issued prior to the acquisition of the lands by the Commission, which tax amounted to $1,120.02, and the 1949 tax levy, in the sum of $6,160.11, was for general operation purposes as well as debt service requirements.
The principal question before us, on Respondent's Motion to Quash Amended Alternative Writ and Relator's Motion for Peremptory Writ, is as follows: Have the provisions of Sections 372.12 and 372.19, Florida Statutes 1941, same F.S.A., providing for the assessment and collection of taxes against "state game lands", been repealed?
At the outset, it may be noted that this court held, in Price v. City of St. Petersburg, 158 Fla. 705, 29 So.2d 753, and in Beck et al. v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission et al., 160 Fla. 1, 33 So.2d 594, that the constitutional provision, Article 4, Section 30, F.S.A., creating a Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, and vesting in it exclusive power to regulate the game and fresh water fish industry in this state, divested the Legislature of the power to regulate or control the taking of fresh water fish in the state. The desirability of having a uniform system of control of this large and valuable industry throughout the state, together with the necessity of having a state-wide program for the protection and conservation of game and fresh-water fish, were undoubtedly the impelling motives behind the proposal by the Legislature, and adoption by the people, of the constitutional provision in question. See Sylvester v. Tindall, 154 Fla. 663, 18 So.2d 892, 898.
We do not think, however, that because the Legislature and the people determined to divest themselves in this instance of their sovereign power to control the game and fish in this state, it necessarily follows that they intended, at the same time, to divest themselves of their sovereign power of taxation. Such an intention must clearly and expressly appear, and cannot be read into the provision of Section 30, Article 4, that the State Game Fund "shall be used by the Commission as it shall deem fit in carrying out the provisions [of the said constitutional amendment] and for no other purposes."
It is our opinion, therefore, that Section 30 of Article 4 of the Constitution did not operate to divest the Legislature of its power to subject "state game lands" to taxation, nor did such constitutional amendment operate to repeal the previous expressions of the Legislature respecting the taxation of such lands, viz., Sections 372.12 and 372.19, Florida Statutes 1941, same F.S.A.
Such sections were originally enacted as Sections 6 and 67 of Chapter 13644, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1929. Section 372.12 authorizes the Commission to acquire, by purchase, lease, gift, or otherwise, lands and waters suitable for the protection and propagation of game, fish, etc., or for game farms or game refuges, to be known as "state game lands." This section expressly provides that "no property acquired under this section shall be exempt from state, county or district taxation." Again, in Section 372.19, it is expressly provided that the property acquired "as state game lands," or any private lands used as game refuges, etc., shall be subject to taxation by the state, county or district. However, by the provisions of said Section 372.19, when the Commission uses land already owned by the state (and thus exempt from taxation under Section 192.06, Florida Statutes 1941, same F.S.A.) for the protection of game, fish, etc. by establishing them as game refuges, etc., such land shall retain its tax-exempt status.
It is apparent, therefore, that the Legislature saw a distinction between "state-owned" land, as such, and lands acquired by the Commission as "state game lands." In the case of the latter, it may be inferred that the Legislature determined to retain such lands on the tax rolls in order not to disrupt the economic and fiscal programs of the taxing units wherein such lands were located. And we see no inconsistency or conflict between a Legislative determination that "state game lands" must bear their proportionate part of the tax burden and another determination to vest in the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission the exclusive power to provide for the protection and propagation of game, fish, etc.
We hold, therefore, that Sections 372.12 and 372.19 were not repealed by Article 4, Section 30, and it follows that such statutes are still in full force and effect unless repealed by other acts of the Legislature.
It is contended by Respondents that the Legislature impliedly repealed Sections 372.12 and 372.19 in the enactment of Chapter 15639, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1931, now appearing as Section 192.08, Florida Statutes 1941, same F.S.A., which section provides as follows: "No taxes or special assessments shall be levied by any taxing district, special taxing district, or other governmental unit or agency created for purposes of taxation, against lands or other property of the State of Florida, except for the purpose of improving the actual physical condition of such lands or other property, and for such purpose, only upon the approval of such levy by that state agency or department in which title to such lands or other property is vested, or having jurisdiction over such lands or other property. * * * The provisions of this section shall not apply to state lands or property now subject to taxes or assessments in any taxing district or special taxing district created prior to June 26, 1931."
We have heretofore noted, parenthetically, that there was in existence at the time of the enactment of Chapter 13644, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1929, a general tax-exemption statute, now appearing as Section 192.06, Florida Statutes 1941, same F.S.A. Subsection (1) of Section 192.06 exempts from taxation "all property, real and personal, of the United States and of this state", which exemption first appeared on our statute books in the year 1895, Chapter 4322, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1895. The provisions of Chapter 13644, authorizing the taxation of "state game lands," thus amounted to an exception to the general tax-exemption statute, Section 192.06(1). Similarly, when the Legislature in 1931 enacted Chapter 15639, Section 192.08, Florida Statutes 1941, same F.S.A., which, in effect, authorized a special assessment against state-owned lands for improvements thereof, it again provided for an exception to the general tax-exemption statute. It cannot be contended that the Legislature intended to repeal Section 192.06(1) and substitute therefor said Chapter 15639, since Section 192.06(1) was recognized as being in existence by the Legislature in the 1941 revision of the statutes, and also in 1943 when it enacted Chapter 21742, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1943, amending said Section 192.06(1) with respect to the taxation of the property of the United States in this state.
When we construe together the abovementioned portions of our statutes, we conclude that Sections 372.12 and 372.19, as well as Section 192.08, were alike intended by the Legislature as exceptions to the general tax-exemption statute, the former authorizing the taxation of "state game lands" and the latter authorizing the levy of special assessments for improvements to state-owned land. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that Section 192.08 is in conflict with Sections 372.12 and 372.19 and, accordingly, Section 192.08 did not impliedly repeal Sections 372.12 and 372.19.
Similarly, we cannot sustain the contention that, by enacting the 1943 amendment to Section 192.06(1), the Legislature repealed by implication Sections 372.12 and 372.19. The purpose of the amendatory Act, being Chapter 21742, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1943, was, in part, to authorize the taxation of that property of the United States within this state which, by federal law, has been made amenable to taxation. If we hold that Sections 372.12 and 372.19 were repealed by the 1943 amendatory Act, we must also hold that Section 192.08 was repealed, as well as any other statute subjecting particular state property to a particular tax. We do not think that the Legislature, simply by amending Section 192.06(1) and in the absence of clear and express language, can be said to have intended to disrupt the whole scheme of taxation of state-owned property which it had previously determined to be for the best interests of the state as a whole.
It is also contended on behalf of Respondents that the payment of the taxes here involved would violate the provisions of Section 4 of Article 9 of the Florida Constitution that "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made by law." We cannot agree with this contention. By paragraph 6 of Section 30 of Article 4, the State Game Fund was, in effect, appropriated to the use of the Commission in carrying out their duties as prescribed by such constitutional amendment or by legislative enactments not inconsistent therewith. Since we have held that Sections 372.12 and 372.19 were not repealed by Section 30 of Article 4, it is just as much the duty of the Commission, in the control and management of the lands owned or otherwise acquired by it as "state game lands," to pay the taxes lawfully levied against such lands as it is their duty to use the lands so acquired in those ways best calculated to provide for the protection and propagation of the birds, game, fur bearing animals, and fresh water fish of the State of Florida.
For the reasons stated, the motion to issue a peremptory writ, notwithstanding the return, should be granted and the writ awarded.
ADAMS, C.J., concurs.