Opinion
I.D. ##9702013762 9907017204
Submitted: October 27, 2000
Decided: November 27, 2000
UPON DEFENDANT'S SECOND PRO SE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF. SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 27th day of November, 2000, upon consideration of Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief it appears to this Court that:
1. William J. Webb, Jr. (Defendant) has filed this second pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief on October 10, 2000 pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. Defendant essentially alleges that his conviction was primarily the result of "coercion" and "defraudment of plea-agreement." For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief at 3.
2. Defendant was arrested on July 26, 1999 for Assault First Degree, Burglary First Degree, and Endangering the Welfare of a Child. On March 16, 2000 Defendant entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e)(1)(B). Defendant plead guilty to Assault First Degree (Cr.A. # IN 99-08-2482), Burglary First Degree (Cr.A.#IN 99-08-0767), and Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Cr.A.# IN 99-08-0768). The State agreed to recommend no more than twenty years of prison at Level V.
On June 23, 2000 Defendant was sentenced by this Court to 12 years of Level 5 imprisonment for Burglary First Degree, suspended after serving 5 years for 7 years at Level 4, suspended after serving 1 year at Level 4, followed by Level 3 or Level 2 probation. On the Assault First Degree charge Defendant was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment at Level 5, suspended after serving 24 months at Level 5 followed by 6 months at Level 3 or Level 2. On the charge of Endangering the Welfare of a Child Defendant was sentenced to 12 months at Level 5 suspended for 12 months at Level 2 probation. Additionally, Defendant was found guilty of Violation of Probation for which he was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment at Level 5.
On October 27, 2000 Defendant filed a series of related submissions. Subsequently, Defendant filed other submissions. Defendant asserts grounds previously adjudicated by this Court and new grounds not raised in his initial Motion for Postconviction Relief. This Court deems all these filings to be amendments to his second Motion for Postconviction Relief as a request to amend the Rule 61 petition. The Court will deem the second Motion for Postconviction Relief as being so amended. Nonetheless, Defendant's Motion is Summarily Dismissed.
The hand-written, related submissions are entitled, "Motion to Appoint Counsel by the Court", "Motion to Waive the Aver of Particulars", "Memorandum", "Motion for Court to Appoint Counsel", "Memorandum", "Motion for Recussal" and lastly a type-written set of interrogatories for the New Castle County Police Department and each defendant to answer.
On Oct. 31, 2000 Defendant filed a Memorandum demanding an evidentiary hearing. On Nov. 8, 2000 Defendant requested "a declaratory judgment against the plaintiff". Defendant also filed three subsequent documents, one of which was a "waiver of Immunity Motion".
3. Before addressing the merits of any claim raised in a motion seeking postconviction relief, the Court must first apply the rules governing the procedural requirements of Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) states "[a]ny ground for relief not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding is thereafter barred, unless consideration for the claim is warranted in the interest of justice. This includes claims that were previously considered and rejected but are now raised in a "refined or restated" claim. Super. Ct. Cnn. R. 61(i)(4) provides that "[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice." "The interest of justice [exception under Rule 61(i)(4)] has been narrowly defined to require the movant to show that the trial court lacked the authority to convict or punish him."
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990) ( citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)).
Riley v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 719 (1990).
Super Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
State v. Wright, Del Super., 653 A.2d 288, 298 (1994) (citing Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., No. 164, 1994, Berger, I (Mar. 1, 1995)(Order) at 3).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4) provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified.
4. Defendant's Second Motion for Postconviction Relief asserts several new grounds for relief in conjunction with previously asserted grounds. This Court will not address the merits of these claims as they are procedurally barred pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) and (4). Defendant's first and second ground asserted are procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(4). These issues have been previously resolved and are therefore barred by Rule 61(i)(4). Furthermore, this court finds that consideration is not "warranted in the interest of justice" and Defendant has offered no reasons for this Court to believe that "subsequent legal developments have revealed that the trial court lacked the authority to convict or punish him." Thus, grounds one and two of Defendant's motion are summarily dismissed.
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief at 3 (stating under the second ground "In my last post-conviction [sic] relief I mentioned this ground. . . .")
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief at 3 (stating "Coercion" and "Defraudment of plea agreement — sentence").
See Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 746 n. 11 (1990) ( cited in Slater v. State, Del. Supr., No. 164, 1994 Berger, J. (Mar. 1, 1995) (Order) at 3).
This Court will not address the merits of Defendant's claims as they have been previously adjudicated by this Court and are procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4). To the extent Defendant raises new grounds, the new grounds are procedurally barred pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
5. For the above stated reasons, Defendant's second Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.