Next, we turn to the defendant's claim that the court improperly admitted the victim's July 21, 1999 written statement to the police. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court could not properly admit the statement under any of the state's three asserted theories, which included (1) a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S.Ct. 597, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), and State v. Wearing, 46 Conn. App. 741, 701 A.2d 41, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 937, 702 A.2d 645 (1997), (2) past recollection recorded or (3) pursuant to footnote 19 of Troupe. Consequently, the defendant argues that the admission of the statement violated his right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution.
Decided October 22, 1997 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 46 Conn. App. 741 (AC 15214), is denied. Lawrence R. Pellett, special public defender, in support of the petition.
Even if we held that the investigator's testimony was improperly excluded, its exclusion was harmless because the testimony would have been cumulative. See State v. Wearing, 46 Conn. App. 741, 756, 701 A.2d 41, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 937, 702 A.2d 645 (1997) (factor to be considered in determining whether improper ruling on evidence harmless is whether testimony was cumulative). Accordingly, we reject the defendant's claim that the court's ruling that the defendant could not present an offer of proof regarding evidence was harmful.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wearing, 46 Conn. App. 741, 752, 701 A.2d 41, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 937, 702 A.2d 645 (1997). A
"One factor to be considered in determining whether an improper ruling on evidence is a harmless error is `whether the testimony was cumulative' . . . ." State v. Wearing, 46 Conn. App. 741, 756, 701 A.2d 41 (1997), quoting State v. Milner, 206 Conn. 512, 529, 539 A.2d 80 (1988). James Merikangas, a medical expert who testified to the defendant's brain damage and offered his opinion regarding whether the circumstances surrounding the shooting affected the defendant's capacity for self-control, testified on cross-examination to his knowledge of prior assaultive conduct by the defendant against both the victim and the defendant's ex-wife.