Opinion
No. 3-823 / 02-1036.
Filed December 24, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Kristin L. Hibbs and Larry J. Conmey, Judges.
Michael Watson appeals from his convictions for possession of methamphetamine, child endangerment, and possession of precursors with intent to manufacture. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia Johnston, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney General, and Brent Heeren, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Michael Watson appeals from his convictions for possession of methamphetamine, child endangerment, and possession of precursors with intent to manufacture. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On March 30, 2001, Deputy Rhoads of the Tama County Sheriff's department applied for a warrant to search Michael Watson's residence in Montour for evidence of controlled substance use, dealing or manufacturing. Deputy Rhoads attached an affidavit in support of his application detailing Watson's criminal history for the last five years, Watson's observed interactions with people in the drug trade, suspicious and paranoid behavior at the Montour property, and the fact that Watson had tested positive for methamphetamine use on March 20, 2001. The application was granted.
Watson's Montour residence was searched that evening. When police arrived, they found Watson, his girlfriend, and their two-year old daughter asleep in one of the bedrooms. In the search, police discovered evidence indicative of methamphetamine manufacture, including twenty-eight baggie corners, some with residue of methamphetamine; pseudoephedrine tablets; a coffee grinder; a hollow pen tube; muriatic acid; Coleman lantern fuel; a converted air tank containing anhydrous ammonia; aluminum foil balls; digital scales; and stripped lithium battery casings.
Watson was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance, manufacturing a controlled substance in the presence of a minor, possession of methamphetamine, child endangerment, and possession of precursors. Watson filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered in the March 30 search. Watson argued the search warrant was not supported by probable cause and that the evidence supporting the warrant was stale. The district court denied this motion. After a trial, the district court granted Watson's motion for judgment of acquittal on the manufacturing charges. The jury found Watson guilty of the three remaining charges.
Watson appeals, alleging the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. He also contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object properly to a video entered into evidence by the State.
II. Motion to Suppress.
Watson argues that the evidence included in the application for the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause to grant the application. He specifically argues that most of the evidence contained in the application is stale, including Watson's criminal background and his positive urine test.
Because Watson alleges a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, our review is de novo. State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1993). However, reviewing courts are obliged to give great deference to a magistrate's finding of probable cause to search. State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Iowa 1986). Although our review is de novo, our task is not to make an independent determination of probable cause, but only to determine whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d at 558. A magistrate makes this determination based upon the "totality of the circumstances." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983). Close cases must be resolved in favor of upholding warrants, as public policy is promoted by encouraging officers to seek them. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d at 558. Furthermore, "courts should not invalidate . . . warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331, 76 L. Ed.2d at 547.
Our review of the record convinces us there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause and the district court committed no error by denying Watson's motion to suppress. Although much of the evidence contained in the affidavit supporting the application for the search warrant is between one and five years old and would not establish probable cause by itself, that background information establishes a pattern of behavior which is corroborated by the more recent evidence. Within the month before applying for the search warrant, Deputy Rhoads observed four different known drug dealers at Watson's Montour residence. On March 5, 2001, someone from Watson's residence called the sheriff's office, without prompting, to explain that they were painting just in case police detected any chemical odors coming from inside the trailer. On March 20, 2001, Watson submitted a urine sample to his probation officer which tested positive for methamphetamine. Deputy Rhoads had observed frequent nightly activity at the Montour residence although Watson had told his probation officer that he lived in Marshalltown. In addition, Rhoads observed that Watson kept his property tightly guarded with multiple motion detectors and lights, two Rottweiler dogs and a chain link fence. Again, none of these facts alone would support a finding of probable cause, but put together, and "drawing all reasonable inferences to support a magistrate's determination of probable cause," State v. Padavich, 536 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Iowa 1995), we conclude there was a substantial basis to support the magistrate's determination of probable cause. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Watson's motion to suppress.
In fact, one of the visitors, Tim Stufflebeam, was stopped leaving Watson's residence and tested positive for methamphetamine use.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
During Watson's trial, the State played an instructional video for the jury entitled "Nazi Dope." This video, created by the Drug Enforcement Agency, demonstrated the "Nazi" method of manufacturing methamphetamine. Watson's counsel objected to the tape as hearsay, and his objection was overruled. Watson now argues that this tape was highly prejudicial and his counsel should have objected to its admission pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Watson.
To succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Watson must establish both that his trial counsel failed in an essential duty and that prejudice resulted. State v. Hischke, 639 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Iowa 2002). Ordinarily, we prefer to leave ineffective assistance of counsel claims for postconviction relief proceedings. Id. We will review such claims on direct appeal if the record is clear and trial counsel's actions cannot be explained by plausible strategic or tactical considerations. Id.
After our de novo review of the record, we conclude the record is sufficient to resolve Watson's claim on direct appeal. The information contained in the video is relevant to inform the jury of the way in which the ingredients of methamphetamine are combined in the methamphetamine manufacturing process. The overall tone of the tape is instructional and even-handed. Although we agree with Watson that the title sequence featuring scenes of burning buildings, suspects being arrested, and emotive music are unnecessary, we disagree that the inclusion of these brief scenes renders the tape more prejudicial than probative. If Watson's counsel had objected under rule 5.403, we conclude it is highly unlikely the objection would have been sustained. Watson has failed to show his counsel had a duty to object, and we therefore determine the ineffective assistance claim is without merit.