Opinion
ID No. 0410014041.
Submitted: December 6, 2005.
Decided: February 28, 2006.
Upon Consideration of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. DENIED.
Victoria R. Witherell, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Delaware.
Thomas A. Foley, Esquire, Attorney for the Defendant, Ernest Washington.
The Defendant, Ernest Washington ("Washington"), was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court, New Castle County. On November 7, 2005, Washington filed with this Court a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. He claims that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction for Assault First Degree. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove that the victim, Corporal Eric Huston ("Huston"), suffered a "serious physical injury." Upon consideration of the briefs by the parties, the Court concludes that the jury could reasonably find from the evidence presented that Huston's hand injury constituted a "serious physical injury." Based on the reasoning below, Washington's Motion is hereby DENIED.
On November 1, 2005, Washington was tried by jury, for the crimes of Assault First Degree (two counts), Resisting Arrest, Driving A Vehicle While Under The Influence of Alcohol Or With A Prohibited Alcohol Content, Disregarding A Police Officer's Signal, Driving While License Is Suspended, No Proof Of Insurance, and Displaying A Fictitious Registration Plate. Following the State's case, Washington moved to dismiss the Assault First Degree charges on the grounds that there was not enough evidence, as a matter of law, to support the element of "serious physical injury." The Court denied that Motion.
Washington does not contest his convictions on the charges of Resisting Arrest, Driving a Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol Or With A Prohibited Alcohol Content, Disregarding A Police Officer's Signal, Driving While License Is Suspended, No Proof Of Insurance, and Displaying A Fictitious Registration Plate. However, as to the Assault First Degree charges, Washington argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. Specifically, he asserts that the State failed to prove that Huston suffered a "serious physical injury," a necessary element of Assault in the First Degree.
Superior Court Criminal Rule 29(c), which governs the consideration of this Motion, provides in pertinent part:
[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty . . . a motion for jument of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. If a verdict of guilty is returned the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of acquittal.
Under this Rule, a Motion for Acquittal should only be granted when the State has offered insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty. In considering such a motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State including all inferences which may reasonably be adduced from such evidence.
State v. Biter, 119 A.2d 894 (Del.Super.Ct. 1955).
Vouras v. State, 452 A.2d 1165 (Del. 1982).
As to the charge of Assault First Degree, one element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the victim suffered "serious physical injury." Delaware law defines serious physical injury as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ . . ."
Washington's claim that the injury suffered by Huston was not serious enough to support a conviction of Assault First Degree is without merit. During the trial, Huston testified that once the excitement of the chase wore off he experienced pain and swelling in his arm and abrasions and contusions to other areas of his body. Therefore, he went to the hospital and had his arm x-rayed. Although no fractures or breaks were initially detected at the hospital, Huston later visited a specialist who reviewed the same x-rays and found that his right arm was broken in two places. He wore a hard cast for approximately eight weeks and missed several weeks of work. When he returned to work he was placed on light duty for approximately three months. Huston testified that prior to his encounter with Washington he could fully extend and use his right hand. During the trial, however, he demonstrated to the jury that he could still no longer fully open the fingers of his right hand. He testified that he still experienced occasional pain and loss of strength and feeling in his right hand. He stated that recently while trying to hold his daughter he nearly dropped her due to this problem. Huston's testimony, that he had difficulties in the use of his hand as a result of the assault, including lifting his daughter, established sufficient evidence in the jury's mind of a "prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ." This Court is satisfied that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Huston's hand injury constituted a prolonged impairment of the function of a bodily organ.
See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2005) (defining "hand" as "the terminal part of the vertebrate forelimb when modified (as in humans) as a grasping organ").
For the above stated reasons the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal is DENIED.