Consequences such as the revocation of driving privileges following a conviction for driving under the influence, or loss of the right to possess a firearm following the conviction of violent felonies, serve to protect the public from a potentially dangerous class of persons and are collateral, not direct, consequences of the sentences imposed. See, e.g., State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App. 1999).See, e.g., State v. Rodriquez, 590 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn.App.), rev. denied (Minn.
One is the district court's interest in preserving the finality of convictions. State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App. 1999). Another is the defendant's diligence when seeking withdrawal.
See 10 U.S.C. § 504 (2012) (disallowing persons convicted of felony offenses from enlisting in the armed services); Minn. Stat. § 609A.03(c) (2018) (identifying factors for a district court to address an expungement petition that includes difficulties caused by the conviction with securing employment, housing, and other necessities); Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266-67 (Minn. 1989) (recognizing employment consequence as a potential consequence from a guilty plea); Sames v. State, 805 N.W.2d 565, 565 (Minn. App. 2011) (recognizing loss of firearm as a potential collateral consequence to a guilty plea); State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn. App. 1999) (recognizing loss of driving privileges as a potential consequence to a guilty plea); see also Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart, Piling On: Collateral Consequences and Community Supervision, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 1871, 1875-80 (2015) (identifying a wide-array of economic, physical, and social consequences imposed on criminal defendants). Those charged with a crime but who were given a stay of adjudication and that have successfully completed probation, leading to a clean criminal record, do not suffer the "Sisyphus Syndrome" that those with a criminal record must overcome.
2002) (classifying sex-offender registration as collateral consequence); see also Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 569 (“[T]he risk of becoming ineligible to possess a firearm is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.”); State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App.1999) (classifying revocation of driving privileges following DWI conviction as collateral consequence). It is well settled that “ignorance of a collateral consequence does not entitle a criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea.” Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 568 (quotation and alteration omitted).
Id. at 904 n. 6. Collateral consequences, on the other hand, “are not punishment” but, rather, “are civil and regulatory in nature and are imposed in the interest of public safety.” Id. at 905 (classifying sex-offender registration as collateral consequence); see also State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App.1999) (classifying revocation of driving privileges following DWI conviction as collateral consequence). The distinction between direct consequences and collateral consequences is relevant not only to the requirements of a valid guilty plea but also to the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Sept. 29, 2009); cf. Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 579 — include restraints on civil privileges such as drivers licenses and firearms ownership. See State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn. App. 1999); State v. Rodriguez, 590 N.W.2d 823, 825-26 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. May 26, 1999).
Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 17, 162 N.W.2d 698, 701 (1968). The factors to be considered when determining whether a motion for plea withdrawal is timely are: (1) the district court's interest in preserving the finality of convictions, see State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App. 1999); (2) the defendant's diligence in seeking withdrawal, see Doughman v. State, 351 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn.App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 1984); and (3) whether the delay causes undue prejudice to the state's prosecution of the case, State v. Byron, 683 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Minn.App. 2004), review denied (Minn.
A plea is not considered intelligent if the defendant does not understand the charges against him, his legal rights, and the direct consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App. 1999). A conditional-release term is considered a direct consequence of pleading guilty.
The decision of the probation office to classify appellant's conviction as a crime of violence is a collateral consequence of appellant's conviction. It has been held that the decisions of entities separate from the courts are collateral consequences. See State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App. 1999) (because revocation of driving privileges depends on action by Minnesota Department of Public Safety, court held that revocation of license is collateral consequence of pleading guilty to driving under the influence); see also Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578 (holding deportation is a collateral consequence of guilty plea because deportation is neither definite, immediate, nor automatic and before a resident alien can be deported, the INS must exercise its discretion to commence deportation proceedings). Ramsey County Community Corrections and not the district court, decided to treat appellant's conviction as a "crime of violence" for the purposes of its probationary supervision.
Finally, Williams never claimed innocence, and both his testimony at the plea hearing and his post-arrest statements conclusively demonstrate his guilt. See State v. Hayes, 276 Minn. 384, 389, 150 N.W.2d 552, 555 (1967) (considering defendant's admissions of guilt in holding that motion to vacate judgment of conviction entered pursuant to guilty plea properly denied); State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App. 1999) (considering fact that defendant did not assert existence of new evidence tending to prove his innocence). On this record, it is extremely unlikely that counsel would have been more effective in persuading the court to grant Williams's plea-withdrawal motion.