[¶ 7] In revocation-of-probation appeals, we first review the district court's factual findings and then review the district court's decision to revoke probation. State v. Wardner, 2006 ND 256, ¶ 17, 725 N.W.2d 215. When a violation is contested, the State need only prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

State v. Stavig, 2006 ND 63, ¶ 6, 711 N.W.2d 183; State v. Nordahl, 2004 ND 106, ¶ 11, 680 N.W.2d 247; State v. Causer, 2004 ND 75, ¶ 30, 678 N.W.2d 552. "First, we review the district court's factual finding of a probation violation under the clearly erroneous standard." State v. Wardner, 2006 ND 256, ¶ 19, 725 N.W.2d 215; Stavig, at ¶ 6; Causer, at ¶ 31. "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, when there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire evidence, the court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Wardner, at ¶ 19 (quoting State v. Oien, 2006 ND 138, ¶ 11, 717 N.W.2d 593). Second, we determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it decided that revocation of probation was warranted.

Those rights, however, are limited because probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution and because of the State's "overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial. . . ." State v. Wardner, 2006 ND 256, ¶ 18, 725 N.W.2d 215. The minimum rights afforded to a probationer include: written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation.

[¶9] Secondly, we review the district court's determination the violation warranted revocation of probation under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Wardner, 2006 ND 256, ¶ 26, 725 N.W.2d 215. "A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious manner, or misinterprets or misapplies the law."

[¶6] Brown argues the district court erred by revoking his probation and resentencing him without providing him notice of the alleged violations and by making inadequate findings. We review the district court's factual finding of a probation violation under the clearly erroneous standard and its decision that revocation of probation was warranted under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Wardner, 2006 ND 256, ¶¶ 19, 26, 725 N.W.2d 215. "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, when there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire evidence, the court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. at ¶ 19.

[¶11] In an appeal of a probation revocation, we first review the district court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and then review the court’s decision to revoke probation under the abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Wardner , 2006 ND 256, ¶¶ 17, 19, 26, 725 N.W.2d 215. Dockter admitted she engaged in the conduct constituting the probation violations, and we consider whether the court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. A court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, unconscionable, or capricious manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.

Our review of a sentence focuses on determining whether the district court acted within the limits prescribed by statute, or substantially relied on an impermissible factor. State v. Wardner , 2006 ND 256, ¶ 27, 725 N.W.2d 215. A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. Id. at ¶ 26.

[¶ 14] The State argues the district court properly applied the manifest injustice standard. The district court cited State v. Wardner , 2006 ND 256, ¶ 13, 725 N.W.2d 215, to apply the manifest injustice standard because "[b]y definition, sentencing is prior to resentencing." Wardner involved statutory interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02(11) on whether a presentence investigation must occur before the district court may revoke a defendant's probation.

We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(4) and (7). See State v. Wardner, 2006 ND 256, ¶ 11, 725 N.W.2d 215 (quoting Davis v. State, 2001 ND 85, ¶ 11, 625 N.W.2d 855 (“ ‘Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1–32–07(6), a trial court is authorized to resentence a defendant who violates a condition of probation to any sentence that was initially available....’ ”)). See also Wardner at ¶ 27 (quoting State v. Ennis, 464 N.W.2d 378, 382 (N.D.1990) (“[A]ppellate review of the sentence itself focuses only on whether the district court ‘acted within the limits prescribed by statute, or substantially relied on an impermissible factor.’ ”

[¶ 23] “[A] district court is allowed the widest range of discretion in sentencing, and appellate review of the sentence itself focuses only on whether the district court ‘acted within the limits prescribed by statute, or substantially relied on an impermissible factor.’ ” State v. Wardner, 2006 ND 256, ¶ 27, 725 N.W.2d 215 (quoting State v. Ennis, 464 N.W.2d 378, 382 (N.D.1990)). [¶ 24] Before trial, Jennewein was ordered to participate in the 24/7 sobriety program as a condition of his bond, which was within the district court's discretion.