Opinion
Case I.D. No. 85006215DI.
Submitted: August 25, 2008.
Decided: November 19, 2008.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief. CR. A. No., IN77-12-0104R1, 0105R1.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.John A. Ward, Defendant, Pro se.
Richard Andrews, State Prosecutor.
OPINION
INTRODUCTION
Defendant collaterally attacks his convictions for Robbery in the First Degree and Assault in the Third Degree. Defendant argues he is entitled to relief on numerous grounds, including: (1) he was denied his constitutional right to be indicted by a grand jury; (2) the trial judge improperly amended the indictment; and (3) the State failed to prove the elements of the robbery charge. He claims these errors denied him his right to Due Process in violation of the Delaware and United States Constitutions. Defendant's claims are procedurally barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i). Accordingly, Defendant's motion for postconviction relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 4, 1978, a jury convicted the Defendant of Robbery in the First Degree and Assault in the Third Degree. Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender to life imprisonment for the robbery conviction plus one year incarceration at Level V for the assault conviction. On April 7, 1980, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. On May 1, 1980, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its mandate to the Superior Court directing the affirmance of Defendant's convictions and sentences. The Defendant filed this motion on August 11, 2008.
Docket Item ("D.I.") 4.
D.I. 11.
Ward v. State, 414 A.2d 499 (Del. 1980).
D.I. 19 — 20.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must first address the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) ("Rule 61") before considering the substantive merits of the Defendant's claims. If the Defendant's claims are procedurally barred under any subsection of Rule 61(i)(1)-(4), the Court should not address the merits of the individual claims. The procedural requirements set forth in Rule 61(i)(1)-(4) are as follows: (1) the motion must be filed no more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final; (2) any ground for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding is thereafter barred unless consideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice; (3) any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is thereafter barred unless the movant shows (A) cause for relief from the procedural default and (B) prejudice from violation of the movant's rights; and (4) any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991). See also State v. Stokes, 2008 WL 3312809 at *1 (Del.Super. Aug. 11, 2008); State v. Benson, 2008 WL 4140767 at *2 (Del.Super. Aug. 26, 2008).
See Stokes, 2008 WL 3312809 at *1; Benson, 2008 WL 4140767 at *2. See also DeShields v. Snyder, 829 F. Supp. 676 (D. Del. 1993).
Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(i)(1). On July 1, 2005, the legislature reduced the time period for filing a motion for postconviction relief from three years to one year. A motion for postconviction relief must be filed within three years from the date the final order of conviction occurred if the final order occurred prior to July 1, 2005. If the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005, the motion for postconviction relief must be filed within one year. In this case, the final order of conviction was filed prior to July 1, 2005, therefore Defendant was required to file his motion for postconviction relief within three years from the date the final order of conviction was filed. See also, Benson, 2008 WL 4140767 at *2 (Del.Super. Aug. 26, 2008); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Sup. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
Sup. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
Sup. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
The procedural bars set forth in Rule 61(i)(1)-(3) are inapplicable, pursuant to Rule 61(i)(5), "to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." Referred to as the "fundamental fairness" exception, Rule 61(i)(5) applies in limited circumstances, such as when the right relied upon has been recognized for the first time after the direct appeal.
Sup. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Younger, 580 A.2d at 555.
ANALYSIS
The Defendant's claims are procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(1). The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that the period under Rule 61(i)(1) "begins to run when the direct appeal process is complete, which for this Court, is the date of the issuance of the mandate under Supreme Court Rule 19." In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its mandate to the Superior Court directing the affirmance of Defendant's convictions and sentences on May 1, 1980. The Defendant had three years from that date to file any motion for post-conviction relief. Defendant filed the instant motion on August 11, 2008, more than twenty-eight years after the mandate was issued, therefore Defendant's claims are time-barred under Rule 61(i)(1).Furthermore, all of Defendant's present claims are procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) because he failed to assert those grounds for relief in the direct appeal of his conviction. Defendant's claim that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict and that the trial judge improperly amended the indictment have already been adjudicated in a prior postconviction proceeding, and are, therefore, barred under Rule 61(i)(4).
See Ward, 414 A.2d 499. In his appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court the Defendant's sole argument was that the habitual offender statute was arbitrarily and capriciously applied to him in violation of his due process and equal protection rights. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected his argument and affirmed his conviction.
See Ward v. State, 900 A.2d 101 (Del. 2006). On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of the Defendant's motion for correction of a sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35. In the Superior Court motion, Defendant argued, inter alia, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction and that the trial judge improperly amended the indictment. The Supreme Court held that no relief was available to Defendant under Rule 35(a) for those claims.
The Court will not consider the merits of Defendant's claims because they are barred under Rule 61(i). The Defendant has produced no evidence that "subsequent legal developments have revealed that the trial court lacked the authority to convict or punish him," and, therefore, he cannot invoke the "interest of justice" provision under Rule 61(i)(4). Lastly, the "fundamental fairness" exception, Rule 61(i)(5), does not apply.
State v. Flamer, 585 A.2d 736, 746 (Del. 1990).
Jackson, 654 A.2d at 833.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's claims are time-barred, were not asserted as grounds for relief in the direct appeal of his conviction, or have already been adjudicated in a prior postconviction proceeding. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for postconviction relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.IT IS SO ORDERED.