Pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-38-4-2(4), the State initiated an appeal upon a reserved question of law, and the Court of Appeals determined that the evidence of prior false allegations should not have been admitted. State v. Walton, 692 N.E.2d 496, 503 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998). Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that although evidence of prior false accusations of rape is admissible as an exception to the Rape Shield Rule, the evidence presented by Defendant was insufficient to prove that the prior accusation was "demonstrably false."
K.R. did not admit to making prior false accusations, and therefore, the accusations must be demonstrably false. The Indiana Supreme Court observed that "[t]he Court of Appeals pointed out that while 'no bright line rule can be established' for determining whether a prior accusation is demonstrably false, the demonstrably false standard is 'more stringent than a mere credibility determination.'" Id. at 828 (citing State v. Walton, 692 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998), vacated on trans.).
White v. State, 687 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. 1997) (motions in limine do not preserve errors for appeal and objection must be reasserted at trial, otherwise issue is waived); Kelley v. State, 566 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991) (after trial court excluded testimony about prior false representation of sexual molestation, defendant failed to make offer to prove at trial, thereby waiving any error for appeal). Considering the State's presentation of evidence on the prior molestation allegation at trial, and its failure to otherwise object, we find that the question of whether the trial court should have admitted the evidence is waived. We note that in State v. Walton, 692 N.E.2d 496, 499 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998), trans. granted State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. 1999), the defendant contended that the State had waived the right to raise the reserved question of law regarding the admissibility of the victim's prior allegations of rape because the State did not make a timely and specific objection to its admission; without resolving that issue, this court elected to consider the admissibility issue on the merits.
In this case, however, the testimony Graham sought to elicit was purportedly evidence of a prior false rape allegation, which is the common-law exception rather than one of the express exceptions to the Rape Shield Rule. Therefore, we must address whether a party offering such evidence must comply with the procedural provisions of subsection (b). Although we have found no caselaw addressing that specific issue, an inference may be drawn from the language used by both this court and the Indiana Supreme Court in Walton that the provisions of subsection (b) do indeed apply.See State v. Walton, 692 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998) ("Prior to trial, and in accordance with Indiana Rule of Evidence 412(b), Walton notified the court of his intent to present evidence that the alleged victim had made demonstrably false prior allegations of rape."), trans. granted; Walton, 715 N.E.2d at 825 ("Before trial, Defendant filed a Rape Shield Notice, indicating his intent to present evidence that the complaining witness had made demonstrably false prior allegations of rape.").