Opinion
No. 2019-KK-1398
12-20-2019
STATE of Louisiana v. Chris WALLACE
Writ denied.
The state does not dispute the district court's finding on June 13, 2019, that the defendant remained incompetent to stand trial notwithstanding the defendant's commitment for treatment and subsequent release from treatment under the auspices of the Department of Health. Moreover, the district court specifically asked the state whether the state believed the defendant "needs to be in the care and custody of the Department of Hospitals," and counsel for the state replied, "Not at this time." Inasmuch as the finding of present incompetence to stand trial forms the predicate for the state's writ application, given the state's concession that the defendant's competence could not be restored by any further commitment, we can discern no abuse of discretion by the district court. See State v. Odenbaugh , 2010-0268, p. 8 (La. 12/6/11), 82 So.3d 215, 228 ("An appellate court owes the trial court's determinations as to the defendant's competency great weight, and the trial court's ruling thereon will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.").
Crichton, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
CRICHTON, J., concurs and assigns reasons
Defendant is charged with armed robbery, a serious and violent felony. He was remanded to the custody of the Department of Health and Hospitals, treated, and released from treatment. The parties agree, however, that he is incompetent, he cannot be restored to competency, and that he will not benefit from additional inpatient treatment at this time. Thus, the district court had no other option under Code of Criminal Procedure article 648(B) but to order him released. See State v. Santacruz , 19-0328 (La. 5/6/19), 268 So.3d 1026. Therefore, I concur in this Court's denial of the State's writ application. However, I write separately to urge the legislature to reexamine Article 648(B) and enact a middle-ground between involuntary inpatient treatment and unsupervised release into the community for persons who, while deemed to be insusceptible to being restored to competence, are not at present a danger to self or others or gravely disabled, but remain accused of a violent felony.
In fact, Article 648(B) previously contained a middle ground in the form of probation. Article 648(B)(2), now repealed by Acts 2008, No. 861, § 2, eff. July 9, 2008, had provided:
If, after the hearing, the court determines the defendant is, and will in the foreseeable future be, incapable of standing trial and may be released without danger to himself or others, the
court shall release the defendant on probation. The probationer shall be under the supervision of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, division of probation and parole, and subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the court.
This Court, which was bound by United States Supreme Court precedent in Jackson v. Indiana , 406 U.S. 715, 731, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), found that Article 648(B)(2) violated the Due Process Clause because it required that a defendant, who has not been convicted of any crime, "be held in state custody after it has been determined that he or she is incapable of standing trial in the foreseeable future, solely on account of his or her incapacity to stand trial." State v. Denson , 04-0846, p. 10 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So.2d 805, 811. That finding likely contributed to the ultimate repeal of Article 648(B)(2), but which now severely limits the district court's options. Nonetheless, while mindful of the limitations imposed by due process, I believe the legislature can and should revisit this issue and craft some intermediate form of supervision that can exist between the extremes of involuntary inpatient treatment and complete release, which would protect the liberty interests of the accused while also protecting the community from the risk of further violence. In the absence of a legislative solution to this frustrating and potentially dangerous situation, I am forced to concur in the writ denial, which leaves intact the district court's order releasing the defendant.