Opinion
Cr. A. No. VN97-08-0797-01, ID# 9708000219.
Submitted: June 29, 2000.
Decided: July 11, 2000.
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE ON VIOLATION OF PROBATION. DENIED.
James A. Rambo, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Andrew G. Ahern, III, Joseph W. Benson, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant.
ORDER
This 5th day of July, 2000, upon review of the Motion to Vacate Sentence for Violation of Probation filed by Defendant, it appears that:
(1) On December 1, 1997, Defendant, John Wallace, entered a guilty plea to Trafficking in Cocaine, which Wallace understood normally carried a minimum mandatory sentence of three years Level 5 incarceration. The plea agreement specified that Wallace was eligible for boot camp. The Court deferred sentencing until Wallace had completed the boot camp Program.
(2) Wallace successfully completed boot camp and was returned to the Court for sentencing on October 23, 1998. The Court sentenced Wallace to three years Level 5 incarceration, suspended for two and one-half years Level 3 probation due to his successful completion of boot camp.
(3) On December 18, 1998, the Department of Probation and Parole filed a violation report and capias request for Wallace. On December 1, 1999, the Court found Wallace guilty of the violation of probation. The Court revoked Wallace's probation and imposed the minimum mandatory three year sentence for the underlying Trafficking in Cocaine conviction pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 67 12(h).
(4) Wallace has now filed the above-captioned motion to vacate his violation of probation sentence. Wallace argues that, pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 6711, Wallace was under parole supervision, rather than probation. Therefore, according to Wallace, it is up to the Board of Parole to determine the appropriate sanction for violation of his supervised release. Wallace argues that, as a result, the Court erred by imposing a sentence for violation of probation.
(5) The State responds that 11 Del. C. § 6711 is not applicable to defendant's such as Wallace. The State argues that 11 Del. C. § 6711 refers to boot camp inductees who are "designated" from the inmate population pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 6705. The State argues that defendants, such as Wallace, who are "diverted" under 11 Del. C. § 6712, on the other hand, are subject to probation.
(6) Eleven Del. C. § 6705 provides that the Court, before or at the time of sentencing, may designate an offender as "boot camp eligible." The selection of boot camp participants is then made by the Bureau of Prisons from those offenders designated eligible for boot camp. Section 6711 specifies that a person who has successfully completed the boot camp program shall be placed under parole supervision. The State argues that it logically follows that offenders who participate in boot camp pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 6705 be placed on parole because they would not have "maxed out" their original sentences after completing boot camp.
(7) In contrast, § 6712 sets forth the requirements for the First Offender Boot Camp Diversion Program. Pursuant to this section, offenders have sentencing deferred and are diverted to the boot camp program. Clearly, Wallace's guilty plea was entered into and he was diverted to boot camp pursuant to this statute. As the State points out, those defendants who are diverted under § 6712 are referenced throughout the statute as subject to "supervision or probation." The State argues that this is also logical because, unlike boot camp designees under § 6705, their sentences at Level 5 will have been completed after completion of the program. As a result, parole supervision would be inappropriate for boot camp diversion graduates.
(8) Upon review of the pertinent statutory provisions, the Court finds that the State's interpretation of those provisions is correct. As a result, Wallace was sentenced appropriately to probation upon his successful completion of boot camp. Having violated the terms of his probation, Wallace was therefore legally sentenced for that offense.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Wallace's Motion to Vacate is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.