Gutierrez, 50 Wn. App. at 589 (emphasis omitted). The State contends the closer precedent is State v. Walker, 129 Wn. App. 258, 118 P.3d 935 (2005), review denied, 157 Wn.2d 1014 (2006). There, defendant Garrison was interrogated on suspicion of child molestation.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980).State v. Aten, 130 Wn.2d 640, 665-66, 927 P.2d 210 (1996) (citing State v. Robtoy, 98 Wn.2d 30, 39, 653 P.2d 284 (1982)); State v. Radcliffe, 139 Wn. App. 214, 224, 159 P.3d 486 (2007), review granted, 163 Wn.2d 1021, 180 P.3d 1293 (2008); State v. Walker, 129 Wn. App. 258, 274-76, 118 P.3d 935 (2005), review denied sub nom., State v. Garrison, 157 Wn.2d 1014, 139 P.3d 350 (2006). Here, the State essentially concedes that it failed in its burden to prove the adequacy of Miranda warnings given to William Lance after he was taken into custody.
However, the Supreme Court substantially limited the applicability of Edwards in Davis, 512 U.S. 452. After Davis, Robtoy no longer correctly states the law. State v. Walker, 129 Wn. App. 258, 275 n. 46, 118 P.3d 935 (2005), review denied sub nom. State v. Garrison, 157 Wn.2d 1014 (2006).
Allowing the State to present the fact of complaint in its case in chief dispels this inference. State v. Bray, 23 Wn. App. 117, 121-22, 594 P.2d 1363 (1979) (citations omitted); accord State v. Murley, 35 Wn.2d 233, 236-37, 212 P.2d 801 (1949); State v. King, 131 Wn. App. 789, 795 n. 3, 130 P.3d 376 (2006), review denied, 160 Wn.2d 1019 (2007); State v. Walker, 129 Wn. App. 258, 266, 118 P.3d 935 (2005). The confrontation clause "does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted."
¶26 Most recently, Division One recognized that Davis controls equivocal references to an attorney. State v. Walker, 129 Wn. App. 258, 275, 118 P.3d 935 (2005), review denied, 157 Wn.2d 1014 (2006). The Walker court noted that Robtoy "has continued to appear in Washington case law in spite of the Davis Court's clear directive," and it considered this court's statement in Jones to interpret Aten as a rejection of the Davis rule. Walker, 129 Wn. App. at 275 n. 46. But the court declined to assume that our Supreme Court would reject a directive from the United States Supreme Court without explanation and looked to Davis for guidance on the issue before it: an equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. Walker, 129 Wn. App. at 275 n. 46.
n him and that he thought the defendant was going to kill him held nontestimonial; statements were "made to an individual who had no relationship to the prosecution" and not in the presence of police); Herrera-Vega v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2004), 888 So.2d 66 (statement by victim to her parents describing how defendant sexually abused her held nontestimonial); State v. Staten (S.C.Ct.App. 2005), 610 S.E.2d 823, 836 (statements by murder victim, made a day prior to his murder, to his cousin indicating that the defendant had pulled a gun on him held nontestimonial under any of Crawford's formulations); State v. Blackstock (N.C.Ct.App. 2004), 598 S.E.2d 412, 420 (statements by hospitalized murder victim made to his daughter and wife before he died, describing in detail the armed robbery that culminated with the victim's being shot, held nontestimonial because "it is unlikely that [the victim] made the statements under a reasonable belief that they would later be used prosecutorially"); State v. Walker (Wash.Ct.App. 2005), 118 P.3d 935, ¶¶ 34-35 (statements by victim of sexual assault describing the incident, identifying the perpetrator and given in response to questioning by her mother held nontestimonial; "the exchange between [mother] and [daughter] was that of a conversation between a concerned parent and an upset child, nothing more"); State v. Moses (Wash.Ct.App. 2005), 119 P.3d 906, ¶ 22 (statements by victim of domestic abuse made to a treating physician and describing the beating and identifying the perpetrator held nontestimonial because victim did not have "reason to believe that her statements to Dr. Appleton would be used at a subsequent trial").
. State v. Walker, 129 Wn.App. 258, 274, 118 P.3d 935 (2005).
The invocation of the right to remain silent must be clear and unequivocal. State v. Walker, 129 Wn.App. 258, 276, 118 P.3d 935 (2005).
"[T]he invocation of the right to remain silent must be clear and unequivocal (whether through silence or articulation) in order to be effectual; if the invocation is not clear and unequivocal, the authorities are under no obligation to stop and ask clarifying questions, but may continue with the interview." State v. Walker, 129 Wn.App. 258, 276, 118 P.3d 935 (2005). "The test as to whether a suspect's invocation of his right to remain silent was unequivocal is an objective one, asking whether 'a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement' to be an invocation of Miranda rights."
Br. of Appellant at 26 (citing State v. Walker, 129 Wn.App. 258, 273-74, 118 P.3d 935 (2005)).