It is a right essential to the preservation and enjoyment of all other rights, providing a necessary means of safeguarding personal liberties against government oppression." Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring), cited in State v. Walker, 80 Conn. App. 542, 554, 835 A.2d 1058 (2003). As Justice Douglas so astutely observed, "Since . . . [the jury] is of and from the community, it gives the law an acceptance which verdicts of judges could never do."
We subsequently declined similar invitations to address this issue in two recent cases. See State v. Dixon, supra, 318 Conn. at 507–508, 122 A.3d 542; State v. Osimanti, supra, 299 Conn. at 38–39 n. 32, 6 A.3d 790; see also State v. Walker, 80 Conn.App. 542, 557 and n. 8, 835 A.2d 1058 (2003) (discussing Rhodes and collecting cases), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 902, 845 A.2d 406 (2004). This court applied the Remmer presumption in numerous cases of jury misconduct or tampering through the 1989 decision in State v. Rodriguez, supra, 210 Conn. at 319–27, 554 A.2d 1080, which held that the state had rebutted the presumption of prejudice arising from a sexual assault defendant's act of approaching a known juror at a food truck outside the courthouse before the trial began.
Relying primarily on Remmer, which had imposed a rebuttable presumption of juror prejudice in cases of improper communication, contact or tampering with jurors, the defendant contends perfunctorily that we should overrule the long line of case law following Rhodes, which puts the burden of proving actual prejudice on the defendant, rather than the state. See, e.g., State v. Walker, 80 Conn. App. 542, 557 n. 8, 835 A.2d 1058 (2003) (collecting cases from Supreme and Appellate Courts), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 902, 845 A.2d 406 (2004). In State v. Rhodes, supra, 248 Conn. 48, we declined to address the identical claim, namely, that under Remmer, "we should reconsider our precedent that places the burden on the defendant to show that he or she was actually prejudiced by the juror misconduct when the trial court is in no way responsible for the impropriety.
Decided February 18, 2004 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 80 Conn. App. 542 (AC 23974), is denied. Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, in support of the petition.
The defendant's 2001 convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by this court. See State v. Walker , 80 Conn. App. 542, 835 A.2d 1058 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 902, 845 A.2d 406 (2004). On April 27, 2001, prior to the sentencing hearing, defense counsel filed a "Motion for Order to Remove the State's Synopsis of the Facts from the Presentence Investigation."
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walker, 80 Conn. App. 542, 556-57, 835 A.2d 1058 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 902, 845 A.2d 406 (2004). On the facts of this case, the term "juror misconduct" is somewhat misleading.
References to individual jurors will be made by use of initials so as to protect their legitimate privacy interests. See, e.g., State v. Walker, 80 Conn. App. 542, 544 n.2, 835 A.2d 1058 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 902, 845 A.2d 406 (2004). Immediately following the voir dire examination of J, the following colloquy in relevant part occurred between the court, defense counsel, William Schipul, and the prosecutor, C. Robert Satti, Jr.:
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walker, 80 Conn. App. 542, 557 n. 8, 835 A.2d 1058 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 902, 845 A.2d 406 (2004). We also conclude that the court acted well within its discretion by denying the defendant's motion to suppress the victim's one-on-one identification.
In doing so, the court fulfilled its duty to ensure that the defendant received a fair and impartial trial and was shielded from any negative impact from the incident. See State v. Walker, 80 Conn. App. 542, 559-60, 835 A.2d 1058 (2003) (court conducted timely and thorough inquiry of jurors to determine whether each juror could base his or her decision on evidence and law), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 902, 845 A.2d 406 (2004). Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial.