(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vlasak, 52 Conn. App. 310, 315, 726 A.2d 648, appeal dismissed, 252 Conn. 228, 746 A.2d 742 (2000). The defendant claims that the prosecutor "attacked [the defendant] for vigorously cross-examining witnesses and for suggesting alternative origins for the fire."
Additionally, the defendant's ban, although longer than suggested in the guidelines, is aligned with the overall purpose of the security guards to keep the peace at the mall, which supports the inference that Bozso had the implied authority to act. See State v. Vlasak, 52 Conn. App. 310, 317-18, 726 A.2d 648 (1999) (police held to have authority as agents where general purpose of police presence was to keep trespassers off private property), appeal dismissed, 252 Conn. 228, 746 A.2d 742 (2000). This court has found that when the agent's act is in the interest of the principal, it is likely that he has implied authority to act.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vlasak, 52 Conn. App. 310, 315-16, 726 A.2d 648 (1999), appeal dismissed, 252 Conn. 228, 746 A.2d 742 (2000). "Our case law recognizes the right of a defendant to introduce evidence that indicates that another person, not the defendant, committed the crime with which the defendant is charged. . . . The defendant must, however, present evidence that directly connects a third party to the crime with which the defendant has been charged. . . . It is not enough to show that another had the motive to commit the crime . . . nor is it enough to raise a bare suspicion that some other person may have committed the crime of which the defendant is accused. . . . The rules of relevancy govern both the initial presentation of third party culpability evidence, and the admissibility of particular evidence in that regard. . . . Whether third party culpability evidence is direct enough to be admissible is ultimately a matter of the discretion of the trial court."