(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vlasak, 52 Conn. App. 310, 315, 726 A.2d 648, appeal dismissed, 252 Conn. 228, 746 A.2d 742 (2000). The defendant claims that the prosecutor "attacked [the defendant] for vigorously cross-examining witnesses and for suggesting alternative origins for the fire."
After examining the record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we have determined that the appeal in this case should be dismissed on the ground that certification was granted improvidently. We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court; State v. Vlasak, 52 Conn. App. 310, 726 A.2d 648 (1999); limited to the following issue: "Whether the Appellate Court properly held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the pro se defendant from testifying about a lawsuit filed against him by a pivotal witness for the state?" State v. Vlasak, 249 Conn. 912, 733 A.2d 232 (1999).
Decided June 9, 1999 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 52 Conn. App. 310 (AC 17222), is granted, limited to the following issue: "Whether the Appellate Court properly held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the pro se defendant from testifying about a lawsuit filed against him by a pivotal witness for the state?
Additionally, the defendant's ban, although longer than suggested in the guidelines, is aligned with the overall purpose of the security guards to keep the peace at the mall, which supports the inference that Bozso had the implied authority to act. See State v. Vlasak, 52 Conn. App. 310, 317-18, 726 A.2d 648 (1999) (police held to have authority as agents where general purpose of police presence was to keep trespassers off private property), appeal dismissed, 252 Conn. 228, 746 A.2d 742 (2000). This court has found that when the agent's act is in the interest of the principal, it is likely that he has implied authority to act.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vlasak, 52 Conn. App. 310, 315-16, 726 A.2d 648 (1999), appeal dismissed, 252 Conn. 228, 746 A.2d 742 (2000). "Our case law recognizes the right of a defendant to introduce evidence that indicates that another person, not the defendant, committed the crime with which the defendant is charged. . . . The defendant must, however, present evidence that directly connects a third party to the crime with which the defendant has been charged. . . . It is not enough to show that another had the motive to commit the crime . . . nor is it enough to raise a bare suspicion that some other person may have committed the crime of which the defendant is accused. . . . The rules of relevancy govern both the initial presentation of third party culpability evidence, and the admissibility of particular evidence in that regard. . . . Whether third party culpability evidence is direct enough to be admissible is ultimately a matter of the discretion of the trial court."
"`Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.' Blakeney v. Commissioner of Correction, 47 Conn. App. 568, 586, 706 A.2d 989, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 913, 713 A.2d 830 (1998)." State v. Vlasak, 52 Conn. App. 310, 315, 726 A.2d 648, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 912, 733 A.2d 232 (1999). In his objection to the committee's motion to approve the sale, the defendant claimed that (1) the cost of the sign advertising the sale listed in the report as $265 exceeded the "mandated" amount by $15, and that the cost of $310 for liability insurance for one day was unreasonable, (2) the sale price of $38,000 was more than 20 percent below the appraisal of $50,000 and (3) possession should not be ordered because of his objections to the acceptance of the committee report and to the approval of the sale, fees and costs.
A reading of the statute and P.B. ยง 2-44A clearly indicates, at least to the court, that in advancing the motion Mr. Mucha sought to represent Debra Mucha's interest in advancing the appeal and this constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. As the court said in State v. Brown, 256 Conn. 291, 303 (2001), quoting from another case: "Although we allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law," see State v. Vlasak, 52 Conn.App. 310, 315 (2000), cf. State v. Kung, 52 Conn.App. 121, (1999), Cerosimo v. Cerosimo, 188 Conn. 385, 394 (1982), Oakland Heights Mobile Park v. Simon, 40 Conn.App. 30, 33 n. 1 (1995); Shockley v. Okeke, 92 Conn.App. 76, 85, n. 9 (2005). In DiLieto v. County Obstetrics the motion to substitute was made not only by the party who did not in fact have standing but also by the party who had standing and wished to be substituted as plaintiff.