Opinion
No. 1 CA-SA 17-0236
10-31-2017
STATE OF ARIZONA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE DANIELLE J. VIOLA, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of MARICOPA, Respondent Judge, LARRY GRANT GENTRY, Real Party in Interest.
COUNSEL Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Lisa Marie Martin Counsel for Petitioner Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Mesa By Vernon E. Lorenz, Jr., Laura Anderson Counsel for Real Party in Interest
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2016-127930-001 DT
The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge
JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
By Lisa Marie Martin
Counsel for Petitioner
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Mesa
By Vernon E. Lorenz, Jr., Laura Anderson
Counsel for Real Party in Interest
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
CATTANI, Judge:
¶1 This is a criminal case in which the defendant (Real Party in Interest Larry Gentry) has been charged with manslaughter. The State seeks special action review of the superior court's ruling under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) permitting Gentry to proffer evidence of the victim's prior acts. We accept special action jurisdiction because the State has no remedy by appeal. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a); see also State v. Hansen, 237 Ariz. 61, 65, ¶ 9 (App. 2015). For reasons that follow, we deny relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 The victim and Gentry's stepdaughter have an infant child together. On June 12, 2016, Gentry and his wife noticed bruises on the infant's face and back; the victim claimed the bruises were caused when he kissed the infant. Later that day, Gentry saw the victim shove his stepdaughter to the ground, and he told the victim to leave. The victim did so, but later returned to confront Gentry. Gentry shot and killed the victim, and the State subsequently charged him with manslaughter.
¶3 Gentry moved under Rule 404(b) to admit evidence of several violent acts by the victim, all of which were known to Gentry, arguing that the victim's violent demeanor was relevant to Gentry's assertion of self-defense. Over the State's objection, the court ruled that evidence of all but one of the requested acts could be presented at trial: (1) the victim threw a table and struck Gentry's stepdaughter in the face; (2) the victim punched a hole in Gentry's wall and struck and dented his freezer; (3) on two occasions the victim shoved Gentry's stepdaughter to the ground; and (4) the victim bruised his infant's face and back and attributed the bruises to kissing the infant. The court precluded Gentry from proffering evidence that his stepdaughter was pregnant when the victim assaulted her.
DISCUSSION
¶4 The State argues that the victim's prior acts are not relevant to Gentry's justification defense because the acts did not involve use of deadly force and were not directed at Gentry. The State further asserts that, even if relevant, the evidence should be precluded as unduly prejudicial and needlessly confusing under Rule 403. We review the superior court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 114, ¶ 8 (App. 2009).
I. Relevance of the Prior Acts
¶5 Under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 13-405, a homicide is justified, inter alia, when a reasonable person would believe deadly force is necessary to "protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly physical force." To demonstrate the reasonableness of such a belief, a defendant may "introduce evidence of specific acts of violence by the deceased if the defendant either observed the acts himself or was informed of the acts before the homicide." State v. Taylor, 169 Ariz. 121, 125 (1991). Here, the State does not contest that Gentry was aware of the prior acts at the time of the homicide. The State contends, however, that the prior acts are not relevant because they were neither lethal, nor directed at Gentry. But there is no requirement that the prior violent acts be lethal. See id. Whether lethal or not, the prior acts may be proffered to attempt to demonstrate the reasonableness of Gentry's belief, and the State, in turn, may argue that such non-lethal prior acts should be given little weight and do not establish that a reasonable person would have believed the victim intended to use deadly force. Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the prior acts are relevant to the charged offense.
II. Rule 403
¶6 The State also contends that the prior acts should be excluded under Rule 403, which provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."
¶7 The superior court reasonably concluded that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by a concern that the jurors will be misled or by the danger of unfair prejudice. The evidence is not misleading because Gentry's awareness of the victim causing marks on his infant's face, assaulting Gentry's stepdaughter, and punching holes in
walls is probative of Gentry's belief that the victim had the potential to cause serious physical harm to another if confronted. And, the fact that the prior acts did not involve lethal force diminishes their prejudicial nature. Moreover, the danger of prejudice or that the jurors may be misled can be addressed through a limiting instruction, if requested, explaining that the purpose of the evidence is to show only that Gentry reasonably believed the victim was going to attempt to use deadly force. Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the State's Rule 403 argument.
CONCLUSION
¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction but deny relief.