State v. Vermilya

4 Citing cases

  1. Indus. Contractors, Inc. v. Taylor

    2017 N.D. 183 (N.D. 2017)   Cited 5 times

    It is a well-established rule of statutory interpretation that the use of the term "includes" in a statutory definition is a non-exclusive word of enlargement and not a term of limitation. See Elken , 2007 ND 107, ¶ 8, 735 N.W.2d 842 ; Amerada Hess Corp. v. State , 2005 ND 155, ¶ 13, 704 N.W.2d 8 ; Hilton v. N.D. Educ. Ass'n , 2002 ND 209, ¶ 12, 655 N.W.2d 60 ; Estate of Leier , 524 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D. 1994) ; Americana Healthcare Ctrs. v. N.D. Dep't of Human Servs. , 510 N.W.2d 592, 594 (N.D. 1994) ; State v. Vermilya , 423 N.W.2d 153, 154-55 (N.D. 1988) ; Lucke v. Lucke , 300 N.W.2d 231, 234 (N.D. 1980). See also North Dakota Legislative DraftingManual 91 (2017) ("[a]n exhaustive definition uses the word means while a partial listing uses the word includes [;] ...‘[i]ncludes' is not a term of limitation").

  2. In re Estate of Elken

    2007 N.D. 107 (N.D. 2007)   Cited 27 times

    E.g., City of Belfield v. Kilkenny, 2007 ND 44, ¶ 8, 729 N.W.2d 120; In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶ 15, 711 N.W.2d 587. [¶ 8] Use of the term "includes" in a statutory definition is a word of enlargement and not a term of limitation. Amerada Hess Corp., 2005 ND 155, ¶ 13, 704 N.W.2d 8; Hilton v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 2002 ND 209, ¶ 12, 655 N.W.2d 60; Estate of Leier, 524 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D. 1994); Americana Healthcare Ctrs. v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Servs., 510 N.W.2d 592, 594 (N.D. 1994); State v. Vermilya, 423 N.W.2d 153, 154-55 (N.D. 1988); Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 234 (N.D. 1980). See also North Dakota Legislative Drafting Manual 95 (2007) ("[a]n exhaustive definition uses the word `means' while a partial definition uses the word `includes'[;] . . . `[i]ncludes' is not a term of limitation"). Under our rules of construction, the definition of reasonably ascertainable creditor to "include" a creditor who regularly submits billings to the decedent and to whose billings the personal representative has had access is a definition of enlargement and not of limitation.

  3. A.P.E. v. People

    20 P.3d 1179 (Colo. 2001)   Cited 7 times

    In State v. Vermilya, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that intent to use an instrument as a weapon may be inferred when an instrument is "peculiarly suitable for use as a weapon." State v. Vermilya, 423 N.W.2d 153, 155 (N.D. 1988). As discussed, in section II.D. supra, all daggers, dirks, and stilettos are particularly suitable for use as a weapon.

  4. Peterson v. McKenzie County School D. 1

    467 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1991)   Cited 7 times
    In Peterson v. McKenzie County School Dist. No. 1, 467 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1991), we construed a variety of statutes to allow a school board to transfer funds from its general fund to its building fund. Somehow, the majority tries to justify its unsound construction of section 57-19-06, NDCC, by relying on Peterson, which, of course, did not involve section 57-19-06, NDCC, at all and did not involve the question at issue here, whether there may be unrestricted use of special reserve funds.

    Section 1-02-02, N.D.C.C. The ordinary sense of the word "including" is that it is not a word of limitation, but of enlargement. See State v. Vermilya, 423 N.W.2d 153 (N.D. 1988); Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231 (N.D. 1980). Thus, "general expenses" may include costs not listed in § 57-15-14.