defendant argues that the court was obligated to inquire into a possible conflict of interest as a result of the grievance complaint that he filed against McKay. "The sixth amendment to the United States constitution as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment ... guarantee[s] ... a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel.... Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our [s]ixth [a]mendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.... This right requires that the assistance of counsel be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests.... Moreover, one of the principal safeguards of this right is the rule announced by this court that [a trial] court must explore the possibility of conflict ... when it knows or reasonably should know of a conflict ...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega , 259 Conn. 374, 386, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S.Ct. 152, 154 L.Ed. 2d 56 (2002). "To safeguard a criminal defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel, a trial court has an affirmative obligation to explore the possibility of conflict when such conflict is brought to the attention of the trial [court] in a timely manner."
It is axiomatic that a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel includes the right to counsel that is free from conflicts of interest. State v. Vega , 259 Conn. 374, 386, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S. Ct. 152, 154 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2002). It is a "fundamental principle ... that an attorney owes an overarching duty of undivided loyalty to his [or her] client.
In Connecticut, our Supreme Court already has recognized what has been termed battered women's syndrome. In State v. Vega , 259 Conn. 374, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S. Ct. 152, 154 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2002), our Supreme Court concluded "that evidence of the defendant's prior incidences of violence toward the victim was relevant to the prosecution's case in that it demonstrated the manifestation of the battered women's syndrome as it affected the victim" and, "therefore, that the evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct substantiates the theory that there existed a system of criminal activity on the part of the defendant." Id., at 398, 788 A.2d 1221 ; see also State v. Borrelli , 227 Conn. 153, 172–73, 629 A.2d 1105 (1993).Thus, it appears that we already have come part of the way toward allowing prior misconduct in domestic violence cases as propensity evidence without explicitly acknowledging we are doing so.
Both cases addressed whether a conflict of interest posed by the filing of a grievance was sufficient to prove prejudice for purposes of determining whether counsel's assistance was rendered ineffective. See State v. Vega , 259 Conn. 374, 388–91, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S.Ct. 152, 154 L.Ed.2d 56 (2002) ; Morgan v. Commissioner of Correction , 87 Conn.App. 126, 127–28, 866 A.2d 649 (2005). In Vega , the court considered in a criminal case whether the defendant had been denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution as a result of the trial court's denial of counsel's motion to withdraw after the defendant had filed a grievance against him.
He asserts that the court did so by failing to inquire into the nature of three grievances that he filed against his habeas attorney with the statewide grievance committee prior to the habeas proceedings. In accord with State v. Vega, 259 Conn. 374, 388, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S. Ct. 152, 154 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2002), the petitioner does not claim that the filing of a grievance in and of itself is sufficient to establish a per se conflict of interest and a violation of an individual's due process rights. The petitioner claims that the court's failure to inquire into the nature of the grievances denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega , 259 Conn. 374, 396–97, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S. Ct. 152, 154 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2002) ; see, e.g., State v. Crenshaw , supra, at 85, 95 A.3d 1113 (evidence from both informations "would have been admissible to establish the complete story of what had happened to the victim"); State v. Vega , supra, at 396–98, 788 A.2d 1221 (evidence of defendant's prior misconduct substantiated theory that there existed system of criminal activity on part of defendant). Finally, uncharged misconduct evidence is also admissible to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony.
Id., at 167, 629 A.2d 1105. Reliance, therefore, on an expert such as Stark in a case such as this one was well warranted. See State v. Vega, supra, 259 Conn. [374] at 393, 788 A.2d 1221 [(2002)]. We conclude therefore that the court properly determined that Stark's testimony concerning battered woman syndrome was relevant to assist the jury in understanding whether LeJeune's conduct was consistent with the pattern and profile of a battered woman and to the issue of her credibility.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega, 259 Conn. 374, 384 n.15, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S. Ct. 152, 154 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2002); accord Correia v. Rowland, 263 Conn. 453, 469 n.15, 820 A.2d 1009 (2003) (" Geisler explicitly states tools that the bench and bar should use to construe the contours of our state constitution and reach reasoned and principled results" [internal quotation marks omitted]). The plaintiff has not recognized, nor has he applied the six Geisler factors, with the exception of his discussion of federal law under issue one and arguably applying prong two by addressing three decisions of this court bearing on this issue.
Therefore, we limit our review to his federal constitutional claim. State v. Vega, 259 Conn. 374, 384 n. 15, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S. Ct. 152, 154 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2002). The defendant fully preserved this claim at trial by moving to compel the state to elect which of the two counts alleging the vaginal penetrations it would proceed on, by moving for judgment of acquittal on those counts at the end of the state's case, and by moving for arrest of judgment after the jury's verdicts on those counts.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega, 259 Conn. 374, 392, 788 A.2d 1221, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 836, 123 S.Ct. 152, 154 L.Ed.2d 56 (2002). In the present case, the record reflects that the trial court considered the probative value of K's testimony and its prejudicial effect.