(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vargas, 80 Conn. App. 454, 461, 835 A.2d 503 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1175(2004). The court's statement that it believed that it was "plain that the defendant had possession of the narcotics, but then discarded [them]," clearly was improper.
Decided January 13, 2004 The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 80 Conn. App. 454 (AC 23158), is denied. Frederick W. Fawcett, supervisory assistant state's attorney, in support of the petition.
As we have noted, "[c]entral to a defendant's right to a fair trial is the right to have issues of fact and credibility decided by the jury." State v. Vargas, 80 Conn. App. 454, 462, 835 A.2d 503 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004); see also Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 555, 102 A.2d 352 (1954) ("[i]t must always be borne in mind that litigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by the jury"). Credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the fact finder, into which no expert may venture.
We conclude that they did not. See State v. Vargas, 80 Conn. App. 454, 462, 835 A.2d 503 (2003), ("[c]entral to a defendant's right to a fair trial is the right to have issues of fact and credibility decided by the jury"), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004). It is well settled that jury instructions are to be reviewed in their entirety.
State v. Davis, 61 Conn. App. 621, 633, 767 A.2d 137, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 951, 770 A.2d 31 (2001). We also note that the court instructed the jury immediately after Bonilla testified that Rivera's statement was not being offered for the truth of the matter, but merely as evidence of his state of mind. Unless there is some indication to the contrary, a jury is presumed to follow the court's instruction.State v. Vargas, 80 Conn. App. 454, 468, 835 A.2d 503 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004). The defendant argues that the state ignored this instruction by arguing Rivera's statement for its truth during final argument.
The complaint sounds in six counts, and its allegations arise from the plaintiff's acquittal on charges that he sexually assaulted a daughter of the defendants in October, 2000. The plaintiff was tried twice on these charges. The first trial resulted in a conviction, which was reversed on appeal. State v. Vargas, 80 Conn. App. 454, 835 A.2d 503 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1174 (2004). The second trial resulted in the plaintiff's acquittal, after which he filed this civil action, alleging in part that the defendants have accused falsely various individuals, including the plaintiff, of sexually molesting their children.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vargas, 80 Conn. App. 454, 469-70, 835 A.2d 503 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004). "In making such a determination, this court must conduct an in camera inspection of the sealed records."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walsh, 52 Conn. App. 708, 722, 728 A.2d 15, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 911, 733 A.2d 233 (1999); see also State v. Vargas, 80 Conn. App. 454, 469-70, 835 A.2d 503 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004). In the present case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to perform the requested in camera review of the victim's records.
It is well known that a jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary. State v. Vargas, 80 Conn. App. 454, 468, 835 A.2d 503 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004). As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[J]urors are well equipped to analyze the evidence.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vargas, 80 Conn. App. 454, 468, 835 A.2d 503 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004). If the jury followed the judge's instructions, as it was supposed to do, then to convict the defendant of burglary in the first degree, it would had to have determined that he had intended to commit the inchoate crime of attempted assault.