State v. Vansant

9 Citing cases

  1. State v. Brown

    333 Ga. App. 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)

    Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it called the instant case for trial, the State contends, the judgments of acquittal must be vacated. See Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357, 767 S.E.2d 24 (2014) ; State v. Vansant, 208 Ga.App. 772, 776(2), 431 S.E.2d 708 (1993), reversed in part on other grounds, Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 443 S.E.2d 474 (1994) ; State v. Fly, 193 Ga.App. 190, 191(2), 387 S.E.2d 347 (1989) ; State v. Warren, 133 Ga.App. 793, 795–796, 213 S.E.2d 53 (1975). See also State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33(2), 728 S.E.2d 171 (2012) (“The State does not have the right to appeal decisions in criminal cases unless there is a specific statutory provision granting the right.”) (citation omitted).

  2. State v. Brown

    333 Ga. App. 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)

    Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it called the instant case for trial, the State contends, the judgments of acquittal must be vacated. See Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357, 767 S.E.2d 24 (2014); State v. Vansant, 208 Ga.App. 772, 776(2), 431 S.E.2d 708 (1993), reversed in part on other grounds, Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 443 S.E.2d 474 (1994); State v. Fly, 193 Ga.App. 190, 191(2), 387 S.E.2d 347 (1989); State v. Warren, 133 Ga.App. 793, 795–796, 213 S.E.2d 53 (1975). See also State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33(2), 728 S.E.2d 171 (2012) (“The State does not have the right to appeal decisions in criminal cases unless there is a specific statutory provision granting the right.”) (citation omitted).

  3. Vansant v. State

    264 Ga. 319 (Ga. 1994)   Cited 416 times
    Holding that when the evidence pertaining to a motion to suppress is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court's application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review

    RECONSIDERATION DENIED JULY 1, 1994. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 208 Ga. App. 772. Vansant, Corriere, McClure Dasher, Alfred N. Corriere, K. Alan Dasher, for appellant.

  4. State v. Brown

    No. A15A0456 (Ga. Ct. App. Jun. 12, 2015)

    Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction when it called the instant case for trial, the State contends, the judgments of acquittal must be vacated. See Tolbert v. Toole, _ Ga. _ (767 SE2d 24) (2014); State v. Vansant, 208 Ga. App. 772, 776 (2) (431 SE2d 708) (1993), reversed in part on other grounds, Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319 (443 SE2d 474) (1994); State v. Fly, 193 Ga. App. 190, 191 (2) (387 SE2d 347) (1989); State v. Warren, 133 Ga. App. 793, 795-796 (213 SE2d 53) (1975). See also State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33 (2) (728 SE2d 171) (2012) ("The State does not have the right to appeal decisions in criminal cases unless there is a specific statutory provision granting the right.") (citation omitted).

  5. Tedford v. State

    444 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 3 times

    ) [Cits.]" State v. Vansant, 208 Ga. App. 772, 774-775 ( 431 S.E.2d 708) (1993). "`What is demanded of the police officer, as the agent of the state, is a founded suspicion, some necessary basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing. . . . "Where no circumstances at all appear which might give rise to an articulable suspicion (less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice) that the law has been violated, the act of . . . detaining [an individual] and its occupants must be judged as an impermissible intrusion on the rights of the citizen.

  6. Moon v. State

    287 Ga. 304 (Ga. 2010)   Cited 24 times
    Explaining that the end-of-term rule, "which comes from the pre-Revolution English common law, seems outdated, but this Court probably lacks the authority to change it," because our Code requires us to follow the English common law unless otherwise displaced by law

    Contrary to the trial court's order, any supersedeas during the State's appeal from the suppression order did not affect the time for filing a motion for reconsideration. Where the State files an immediate, direct appeal as of right from a trial court's grant of a motion to suppress evidence illegally seized, the filing of the notice of appeal generally acts as a supersedeas. State v. Vansant, 208 Ga. App. 772, 776 (2) ( 431 SE2d 708) (1993), aff'd in relevant part, Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 321 (3) ( 443 SE2d 474) (1994). However, this is an application of the general rule in OCGA § 5-6-45.

  7. State v. Morrell

    281 Ga. 152 (Ga. 2006)   Cited 15 times

    Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 461-462 ( 591 SE2d 774) (2003); Georgia Television v. Castellani, 257 Ga. 549 ( 361 SE2d 381) (1987); Crowell v. State, 234 Ga. 313 ( 215 SE2d 685) (1975); Merrill v. State, 128 Ga. App. 403, 403-404 ( 196 SE2d 876) (1973). Contrary to the State's contention, State v. Vansant, 208 Ga. App. 772, 776 ( 431 SE2d 708) (1993), affirmed in part and reversed in part by Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319 ( 443 SE2d 474) (1994), is not contrary to the foregoing cases, as Vansant did not address the issue of whether an oral order is appealable. The legislature enacted OCGA § 5-7-1 and granted the State the right to an immediate appeal of suppression orders "so that an error committed by a trial judge, which otherwise might work a miscarriage of justice, can be corrected on appeal, and before attachment of jeopardy" Given that the State cannot appeal after an acquittal and thus can never seek to rectify an incorrect suppression order if a defendant is acquitted, a trial court's refusal to put an order suppressing evidence into writing defeats the heart of the legislature's intent of granting the State a limited right of appeal and has the potential to exact grave injustices.

  8. State v. Vansant

    447 S.E.2d 348 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)

    BEASLEY, Presiding Judge. On certiorari, the Supreme Court has reversed our holding in Division 1 of State v. Vansant, 208 Ga. App. 772 ( 431 S.E.2d 708) (1993), which was that the superior court erred in granting Vansant's motion to suppress. See Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319 (2) (___ S.E.2d ___) (1994).

  9. Carr v. State

    815 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 2018)   Cited 11 times
    Acknowledging that hospitalization "may reasonably promote the government’s purpose of accurate evaluation" in cases "where the defendant’s diagnosis is truly uncertain"

    See OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) (explaining that after an application for interlocutory appeal is granted, the applicant may file a notice of appeal as provided in OCGA § 5-6-37, which acts as a supersedeas). See also OCGA § 5-6-45 ("In all criminal cases, the notice of appeal filed as provided in Code Sections 5-6-37... shall serve as supersedeas in all cases ... where the defendant is admitted to bail."); State v. Vansant, 208 Ga.App. 772, 776, 431 S.E.2d 708 (1993) (explaining "the general rule in both civil and criminal cases that the filing of a notice of appeal serves as supersedeas"), reversed in part on other grounds, 264 Ga. 319, 443 S.E.2d 474 (1994). Thus, it may be that Carr should have been returned to release on bond at that point.