State v. Kua Vang

8 Citing cases

  1. State v. Barnett

    A17-2052 (Minn. Ct. App. Sep. 10, 2018)

    Because the state did not argue, and the district court did not find, that another exception to the warrant requirement applied here, the full search of appellant was illegal and all evidence obtained as a result was inadmissible. See State v. Vang, 636 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Minn. App. 2001) ("If no exception applies, then the fruits of the warrantless search must be suppressed."). Thus, the district court improperly admitted the heroin.

  2. State v. Reynolds

    A14-1952 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015)

    But gestures and actions that are reasonably understood to invite entry objectively imply consent. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990) (reiterating that factual determinations made by police need not always be correct, but must always be reasonable); State v. Vang, 636 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Minn. App. 2001) (finding that appellant's son's habit of answering the door, leaving the first door ajar, and retreating into the home implied his consent). The contested omnibus testimony illustrates that each investigator independently understood from J.T.'s conduct that she had either invited them in or, at minimum, allowed them to come inside on that December morning.

  3. McCarroll v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety

    A13-1405 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2014)

    See State v. Howard, 373 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn. 1985) (holding that the act of completely opening a door to a police officer and then stepping back can "only be interpreted as constituting limited consent to enter"); State v. Vang, 636 N.W.2d 329, 332, 333 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding that act of opening a door to a police officer and then walking back into the apartment constituted consent to enter). McCarroll relies on two cases in support of his argument that his testimony is insufficient to establish consent.

  4. State v. Naumann

    A12-0175 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2012)

    See State v. Howard, 373 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn. 1985) (concluding a person consented by opening the door completely and then stepping back to make room for the officers); State v. Vang, 636 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Minn. App. 2001) (concluding a person consented by opening the door and turning around to go back into the residence). Whether consent is voluntary is a question of fact that turns on the totality of the circumstances.

  5. State v. Hannam

    No. A08-0473 (Minn. Ct. App. May. 12, 2009)   Cited 1 times
    Remanding for resentencing

    "Under the [F]ourth [A]mendment, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall under an established exception." State v. Vang, 636 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Minn.App. 2001) (quotation omitted). Under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, law enforcement may "seize an item in plain view if 1) police were lawfully in a position from which they viewed the object, 2) the object's incriminating character was immediately apparent, and 3) the officers had a lawful right of access to the object."

  6. STATE v. ELAM

    No. A08-0422 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2009)

    In a case involving nonverbal consent, the issue is typically whether the person engaged in actions, gestures, or movements demonstrating that police were free to enter. See, e.g., State v. Vang, 636 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Minn.App. 2001) (finding consent based on nonverbal gesture); Carlin v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 413 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Minn.App. 1987) (finding consent where person opened door for officer and turned around without interacting with officer). Failure to object does not constitute consent, and consent cannot be inferred solely from a person's acquiescence to police authority. Deszo, 512 N.W.2d at 880 (failure to object does not constitute consent); State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Minn.

  7. Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety

    No. A05-756 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2006)

    In a case involving nonverbal consent, the issue is typically whether the person engaged in actions, gestures, or movements demonstrating that police were free to enter. See, e.g., State v. Ulm, 326 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1982) (upholding finding of consent based on a gesture that denoted an invitation); State v. Vang, 636 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Minn.App. 2001) (finding consent based on nonverbal gesture). State v. Howard, 373 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn.

  8. State v. Zimmer

    642 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times

    "Under the fourth amendment, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall under an established exception." State v. Vang, 636 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Minn.App. 2001) (quotation omitted). Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.