State v. Vandergrift

Full title: STATE OF MISSOURI, RESPONDENT, v. JARRAD RYAN VANDERGRIFT, APPELLANT.

Court: Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District, Third Division

Date published: Dec 13, 2022

No. WD84462 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2022)

Opinion

WD84462

12-13-2022

STATE OF MISSOURI, RESPONDENT, v. JARRAD RYAN VANDERGRIFT, APPELLANT.

Attorneys: Richard Anthony Starnes, Jefferson City, MO for respondent. Jedd Christian Schneider, Columbia, MO for appellant.

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge.

Appeal From: Callaway County Circuit Court The Honorable Jeff Harris, Judge Appellate Judges:

Attorneys: Richard Anthony Starnes, Jefferson City, MO for respondent.

Jedd Christian Schneider, Columbia, MO for appellant.

Karen King Mitchell, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge, Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judge 1

OPINION

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge.

Jarrad Ryan Vandergrift appeals following his conviction of three counts of child molestation in the first degree and three counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree. Vandergrift's notice of appeal was filed within ten days of the oral rendering of judgment and imposition of sentence, though a written judgment of conviction satisfying the requirements of Rule 29.07(c) was not entered of record until nearly eight months after the appeal was filed. Following sua sponte review, we would conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction to entertain Vandergrift's appeal. On the merits, we would reject Vandergrift's contentions that the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected his amended motion for new trial and committed plain error when it failed to exclude expert witness testimony.

TRANSFER TO MISSOURI SUPREME COURT ON ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS PURSUANT TO RULE 83.02.

Division Three holds:

1. Pursuant to Rule 30.01(a), the right of appeal in a criminal case is triggered upon the rendition of final judgment. We would conclude that the rendition of a final judgment occurs upon the oral rendition of judgment and imposition of sentence in the defendant's presence as required by Rule 29.07(b), and that an appeal filed within ten days of this date invokes appellate jurisdiction.

2. The entry of a written judgment of conviction comporting with Rule 29.07(c) is required, but is a ministerial act to be performed by the circuit clerk. We would conclude that appellate jurisdiction is not determined or affected by when a Rule 29.07(c) judgment of conviction is entered. And we would conclude that the failure to include a Rule 29.07(c) judgment of conviction in the legal file, even if explained by the circuit clerk's failure to enter a Rule 29.07(c) judgment of conviction, does not deprive a 2 court of appellate jurisdiction, but at best supports dismissal of an appeal on procedural grounds pursuant to Rule 30.14.

3. We would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vandergrift's request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence because the newly discovered evidence does not establish an extraordinary circumstance that would require us to remand to avoid manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.

4. We would conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to sua sponte strike as unqualified expert witness testimony about delayed reporting of sexual abuse.

5. Because the procedural and jurisdictional issues in this case involving when the right to appeal from a criminal conviction is triggered, and whether a Rule 29.07(c) judgment of conviction is required to invoke appellate jurisdiction, involve questions of general interest and importance, we exercise our authority to transfer this matter to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 83.02 for final disposition.

This summary is UNOFFICIAL and should not be quoted or cited. 3