ation of time in confinement after a declaration of delinquency or revocation of parole, if either of those events actually took place. If a defendant on parole is arrested for an offense committed while on parole, and while so held is declared delinquent on parole for that offense, is his subsequent confinement until sentence creditable to the term owing on the original sentence, under or by analogy to N.J.S.A. 30: 4-123.22? Or does the credit run rather against the sentence on the subsequent conviction, pursuant to R. 3:21-8? That the first of these alternatives is the correct one would appear supported by Chernachowicz v.State, 39 N.J. Super. 571, 575 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b. 22 N.J. 83, cert. den. 352 U.S. 897, 77 S.Ct. 136, 1 L.Ed.2d 89 (1956), relying on the statute last above cited. But see, for the view that that enactment applies only where the arrest and imprisonment arise from a declaration of parole delinquency, Lipschitz v. State, 43 N.J. Super. 386, 389 (App.Div. 1957) and State v. Van Dorn, 43 N.J. Super. 406, 413 (App.Div. 195 7). Cf. State v. Beatty, 128 N.J. Super. 488 (App.Div. 197 4). We think it preferable not to arrive at a considered judgment on this precise point in advance of a hearing on the facts, the rendition of findings and conclusions thereon by a hearing judge in the first instance, and an appeal of the consequent judgment.
Parole becomes effective only when accepted by the prisoner. Ex parte Snyder, 81 Okla. Cr. 34, 159 P.2d 752 (1945); 67 C.J.S. Pardons § 21. He has a right to reject an offer of parole, but once having elected to accept it he is bound by the express terms of the conditions of release. Burgess v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 623, 139 S.E.2d 110 (1964); Application of Kimler, 37 Cal.2d 568, 233 P.2d 902 (1951), cert. den. 342 U.S. 898, 72 S.Ct. 233, 96 L.Ed. 672; Rider v. McLeod, 323 P.2d 741 (Okla.Cr. 1958); State v. Van Dorn, 43 N.J. Super. 406, 128 A.2d 871 (1957); Woods v. State, 264 Ala. 315, 87 So.2d 633 (1956). There is no question but that appellant accepted parole and therefore he is estopped from denying that he agreed to its terms and conditions.
It has been held that a defendant is not entitled to credit on a parole violation for the period of time spent in custody between arrest and conviction and sentence for a subsequent crime committed while on parole. Lipschitz v. State, supra and State v. Van Dorn, 43 N.J. Super. 406, 128 A.2d 871 (App.Div. 1957). The Supreme Court expressly declined to consider the issue in State v. Bryant, 68 N.J. 532, 348 A.2d 786 (1975) setting forth its preference that an adversary hearing be conducted with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
If he had been acquitted rather than convicted of the three new charges, the basis for revocation would have been substantially impaired. See State v. Van Dorn, 43 N.J. Super. 406, 412-413 (App.Div. 1957). This transitional period has now been over for some time.
But time spent in custody is required to be credited only against the sentence on the charge which brought about that custody. Cf. State ex rel. Kincaid v. State Parole Bd., 53 N.J. Super. 526 (App.Div. 1959); Lipschitz v. State, 43 N.J. Super. 522 (App.Div. 1957); State v. Van Dorn, 43 N.J. Super. 406 (App.Div. 195 7); Bauers v. Yeager, 261 F. Supp. 420 (D.N.J. 1966). However, due process does not mandate that time spent in custody must be credited against a sentence resulting from another conviction for an unrelated offense.