Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1337-12T1
07-16-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MARIO VALLE, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Alan I. Smith, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Gaetano T. Gregory, Acting Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephanie Davis-Elson, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Maven and Hoffman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 06-12-2150.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Alan I. Smith, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Gaetano T. Gregory, Acting Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephanie Davis-Elson, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Mario Valle appeals from an order of June 29, 2012, denying his first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without oral argument or an evidentiary hearing. We reverse and remand for compliance with the requirement of State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 282 (2012), that the court either hold oral argument on defendant's petition or explain why oral argument is not warranted.
On December 12, 2006, a Hudson County grand jury returned a thirteen-count indictment against defendant charging him with criminal contempt, burglary, carjacking, and ten other related offenses, all arising out of defendant's alleged violation of a domestic violence restraining order on July 31, 2006. After defendant failed to appear in court on March 3, 2008, he was charged with bail jumping, in a separate indictment.
On April 16, 2009, defendant appeared before the trial court and, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2, under the first indictment, and third-degree bail jumping, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-7, under the later indictment. In exchange for the guilty pleas, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the first indictment and to recommend an aggregate maximum sentence of five years imprisonment, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
On June 5, 2009, the trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on August 31, 2009, but then withdrew his appeal. On April 26, 2011, defendant filed the PCR petition under review, his first application for PCR, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level. The trial judge denied defendant's petition, without oral argument, on June 29, 2012. The judge found that defendant's contention, that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient, was without merit. Because defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR judge determined he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed, with defendant raising the following issue:
THE ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE PCR COURT MISAPPLIED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S PETITION WITHOUT AFFORDING DEFENDANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ORAL ARGUMENT OR SECURING A CERTIFICATION FROM PCR COUNSEL WAIVING ORAL ARGUMENT.
Defendant argues that the PCR judge should have heard oral argument on his PCR application, citing Parker, supra, 212 N.J. 269, and State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. Super. 382, 387 (App. Div. 2001). In Parker, decided more than three months after the PCR court denied defendant's petition without oral argument, the Court outlined the considerations governing whether a PCR court should entertain oral argument. Parker, supra, 212 N.J. at 279-80. Noting the Court Rules do not explicitly require oral argument, id. at 280, the Court held a trial court nonetheless should approach a PCR petition "with the view that oral argument should be granted." Id. at 282. The Court agreed with our statement in Mayron that "there is a strong presumption in favor of oral argument in connection with an initial petition for post-conviction relief." Id. at 283 (citing Mayron, supra, 344 N.J. Super. at 387). The Court held that in deciding whether to hear oral argument, "facts should be viewed through the same generous lens" used to decide whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 282.
As a procedural matter, "when the trial judge does reach the determination that the arguments presented in the papers do not warrant oral argument, the judge should provide a statement of reasons that is tailored to the particular application, stating why the judge considers oral argument unnecessary." Ibid. The Court should consider "'the apparent merits and complexity of the issues . . . , whether argument of counsel [would] add to the written positions . . . , and in general, whether the goals and purposes of the post-conviction procedure are furthered by oral argument.'" Id. at 282 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayron, supra, 344 N.J. Super. at 387). Although trial courts exercise a "residuum of discretion" in weighing these factors, it is not enough for a trial court to deny argument by stating summarily that the issues are not complex. Id. at 282-83.
Here, the court decided defendant's first PCR petition on the papers and provided no explanation for not allowing oral argument. In view of Parker, we are constrained to reverse and remand this matter for the trial court to reconsider defendant's petition after oral argument, or alternatively, to provide a written statement of reasons, in accordance with the specific directive in Parker, explaining why the court concluded oral argument was not warranted.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION