The Appellate Court had concluded that because the trial court did not address the defendant personally during the dispositional phase of the probation revocation proceedings to inquire whether he wanted to speak before being sentenced, he was denied the right of allocution provided by the rules of practice ( 43-10). Held that this court having decided in State v. Valedon ( 261 Conn. 381) that 43-10 (3) does not impose an affirmative duty on the trial court to address a defendant personally to inquire whether the defendant wishes to address the court before sentence is imposed in a probation revocation hearing, the defendant was not denied his right to allocution by the trial court's failure so to inquire here; accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed and the case was remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Argued March 15 2002

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Valedon, 261 Conn. 381, 386, 802 A.2d 836 (2002). The exercise of our supervisory powers is "an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only when circumstances are such that the issue at hand, while not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole."

In both instances, the question faced by the defendant essentially is tactical in nature, and in both instances the truth seeking function of the criminal trial trumps the propriety vel non of the ruling on the defendant's motion. Second, in our view, the dissent's reliance on our supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice is misplaced and, in fact, that authority, which is designed to protect the integrity of the judicial system and "the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole"; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Valedon, 261 Conn. 381, 386, 802 A.2d 836 (2002); counsels for, rather than against, the waiver rule. We often have stated that the "fundamental purpose of our criminal justice system [is] to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent."

Practice Book § 43–10 provides in relevant part: “Before imposing a sentence or making any other disposition after the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or upon a verdict or finding of guilty, the judicial authority shall ... conduct a sentencing hearing as follows ... (3) The judicial authority shall allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to make a personal statement in his or her own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence....” In State v. Strickland, 243 Conn. 339, 349–54, 703 A.2d 109 (1997), our Supreme Court concluded that the predecessor to Practice Book § 43–10(3), Practice Book § 919(3), applied to both original sentencing hearings and the dispositional phase of probation revocation hearings. In State v. Valedon, 261 Conn. 381, 387, 802 A.2d 836 (2002), that court first noted that the plain language of Practice Book § 43–10(3) “does not direct the trial court to address the defendant personally to inquire whether the defendant wishes to speak....” In reviewing the history of the adoption of the rule, the court stated that “[l]anguage directing the trial court to ‘address the defendant personally’ could easily have been included in the original text of [Practice Book] § 43–10(3) had that been the intention of the judges of the Superior Court in adopting the rule. Instead, in clear distinction to both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, [Practice Book] § 43–10(3) includes no requirement that the court make personal inquiry of the defendant whether he wishes to speak before sentencing. Although it is the better practice for the trial court to inquire of each defendant whether he or she wishes to make a personal statement before being sentenced for violation of probation, and we encourage

(3) . . . allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to make a personal statement in his or her own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence . . ." State v. Valedon, 261 Conn. 381, 381 n. 1 (2002).

We generally deem it significant when a term that is omitted in one rule is included in related rules. See, e.g., State v. Valedon, 261 Conn. 381, 387, 802 A.2d 836 (2002); Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 440–41, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002). Although there may be no need to distinguish between the two mechanisms elsewhere in the rules, there is a logical basis to do so in § 61–10(b).

some additional evidence indicating that the witness is not wholly reliable or that he expects some benefit from this testimony. It is well settled that “[a]ppellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice.... Supervisory powers are exercised to direct trial courts to adopt judicial procedures that will address matters that are of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.... Under our supervisory authority, we have adopted rules intended to guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process.... State v. Valedon, 261 Conn. 381, 386, 802 A.2d 836 (2002). We ordinarily invoke our supervisory powers to enunciate a rule that is not constitutionally required but that we think is preferable as a matter of policy.

It extends to the supervision of the manner in which proceedings are conducted in our trial courts. Thus, although this court exercises its supervisory authority sparingly; e.g., State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 241, 881 A.2d 160 (2005); it nevertheless has "adopted rules intended to guide lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process"; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Valedon, 261 Conn. 381, 386, 802 A.2d 836 (2002); and in the civil arena, as well. See, e.g., Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 231-32, 789 A.2d 431 (2002) (exercising supervisory authority to establish burden of proof in nonparent visitation cases); Ireland v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413, 429, 432-33, 717 A.2d 676 (1998) (exercising supervisory authority to adopt factors to be considered in determining best interests of child in cases involving parental relocation); Bennett v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 230 Conn. 795, 806, 646 A.2d 806 (1994) (exercising supervisory authority to direct that, in cases involving insurance disputes, insurers raise certain issues of policy limitation by way of special defense).

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Valedon, 261 Conn. 381, 386, 802 A.2d 836 (2002). We ordinarily invoke our supervisory powers to enunciate a rule that is not constitutionally required but that we think is preferable as a matter of policy.

Accordingly, our review is plenary. See State v. Valendon, 261 Conn. 381, 385, 802 A.2d 836 (2002). "At common law, [a] defendant in a felony case had a right called `allocution' to be asked formally whether he had any reason to offer why judgment should not be awarded against him. . . . To place this right in its correct historical perspective, it must be considered that under the ancient English common law a person on trial for a felony was not allowed counsel and was not a competent witness in his own behalf.