Ineffective assistance claims are generally reserved for postconviction proceedings. State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 1987). However, when the record adequately presents the issue, we resolve it on direct appeal.

See State v. Langdeaux, Sup. Ct. No. 88-852, at *8, 455 N.W.2d 301 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1989) (unpublished table decision). The court of appeals noted that, although ineffective assistance claims are generally reserved for postconviction proceedings, State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 1987), Langdeaux's claims could be resolved on direct appeal because the record adequately presented them. Langdeaux, Sup. Ct. No. 88-852, at *3, 455 N.W.2d 301. The court of appeals concluded that Langdeaux's trial counsel's actions were reasonable and within the range of normal competency and denied Langdeaux's claims.

As discussed in the following analysis, the record does not adequately present the issues in this case and the case is more properly addressed in a postconviction relief hearing. See State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 1987). 1. Failure to Perform an Essential Duty

As discussed above, the defendant need only generate a jury question on four specific factors in order to meet the requirements for a spoliation inference. If substantial evidence has been introduced on each element, then, as we said in State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa 1987), a spoliation instruction "should be given." Our conclusion that spoliation instructions should be given when supported by the record is particularly appropriate given the potential for constitutional due process implications arising from the State's intentional destruction of evidence.

The primary distinction is that Stoen's prior violations were convictions, not deferred judgments. See State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa 1987) (distinguishing Soppe on the basis that its "holding was . . . anchored on the peculiar and evaporating nature of a deferred judgment"). Stoen points to no statute analogous to the deferred judgment sentencing statute that expressly extinguishes or expunges OWI convictions older than six years from a defendant's record.

Defendant argues three errors of defense counsel render his assistance ineffective and constitutionally deficient: (1) Counsel failed to cross-examine eyewitnesses concerning inconsistencies in their identification of the defendant; (2) counsel failed to object to the admission of a video tape of the robbery; and (3) counsel failed to inform defendant of the deadline for disclosure of the name of prospective witnesses. Issues of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally reserved for postconviction relief proceedings; however, where an adequate basis for a decision is present in the record, they will be decided on direct appeal. State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996); State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 1987); State v. Hildebrant, 405 N.W.2d 839, 840 (Iowa 1987). For Sixth Amendment claims, a reviewing court must perform "an independent evaluation of the relevant circumstances . . . equivalent to a de novo review." Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Iowa 1984).

Because he did not raise these arguments, he waived them. See State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 552 n. 2 (Iowa 1987) (on appeal defendant attempted to argue that he was denied due process because the district court refused to give a spoliation instruction; because defendant did not raise the due process argument in the district court, he waived such argument on appeal). VII.

We generally reserve ineffective assistance of counsel claims for postconviction proceedings. State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 1987). We will resolve the claim on direct appeal, however, when the record adequately presents the issues.

Usually we reserve ineffective assistance of counsel claims for post-conviction proceedings. State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 1987). However, we will resolve such a claim on direct appeal when the record adequately presents the issues.

Ineffective assistance claims are generally reserved for postconviction proceedings but can be resolved on direct appeal when, as here, the record adequately presents them. State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 1987); State v. Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Iowa 1981). Our ultimate concern is with "the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged."