Opinion
ID No.: 1210015566 ID No.: 1305012960 ID No.: 1306006141
05-22-2015
STATE OF DELAWARE v. ADREIN U. TYLER, Defendant.
cc: Prothonotary (Criminal) Diana Dunn, Deputy Attorney General Matthew Frawley, Deputy Attorney General John A. Barber, Esquire
Upon Defendant's First Motion for Postconviction Relief - SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
1. On September 23, 2013, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of drug dealing, two counts of felony disregarding a police officer's signal, and one count of driving with a suspended license. The convictions stemmed from three arrests. The plea, which included Defendant's actual admission of guilt, was and remains knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
2. Defendant was sentenced on December 13, 2013 to a total of six years and 240 days in prison, followed by probation at decreasing levels. Defendant did not file a direct appeal challenging his guilty plea or sentencing.
3. Instead, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief on January 16, 2014. By mistake and in derogation of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(1), the motion was referred to the Criminal Administrative Judge. The motion should have been referred for preliminary review to the undersigned who accepted the guilty plea.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(1).
4. Procedurally, proper preliminary review would have shown that with Defendant's pleading guilty and not taking a direct appeal, appointed counsel was unnecessary. Nevertheless, on January 29, 2014, the court appointed counsel.
5. On March 14, 2014, the prothonotary made the proper referral for preliminary review. Appointed counsel filed an amended motion, including for withdrawal on January 20, 2015. Defendant was then given time to reply. And, while this motion was pending, Defendant filed an unsuccessful motion for a writ of mandamus.
In re Tyler, No. 83, 2015, 2015 WL 1013118 (Del. Mar. 6, 2015).
6. Defendant makes no claim of actual innocence. Defendant frames his first claim in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel, justifying an after-the-fact motion to suppress. But, Defendant cannot pass either of Strickland's tests. The record suggests that the challenged stop came after a high-speed chase and traffic violations. As to the latter, the traffic stop got Defendant arrested on an outstanding capias. So, Defendant was searched incident to arrest. The resulting seizures, therefore, were safe. Anyway, counsel was wise to focus more on securing the best plea, and less on counter-productive litigation.
7. Defendant's second claim capitalizes on the Office of Chief Medical Examiner's investigation. Defendant's position is not unique. It falls under Brown v. State and the growing host of cases following it.
Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201 (Del. 2015).
E.g., Carrero v. State, No. 218, 2014, - A.3d - , (Del. May 21, 2015). --------
8. While this decision does not rest on appointed counsel's motion to withdraw, (now GRANTED), the reasoning behind the motion to withdraw is in-line with this decision.
9. Finally, in passing, the court observes that as bad as Defendant thinks his sentence is, it likely would get worse if this motion were granted and this case were returned to the trial calendar. In that event, presumably the drugs, which Defendant told the court he believed were heroin, would finally be sent to a lab for testing. Also, the dropped charges would be revived. Unless his luck turns, Defendant would be convicted of more serious felonies and be sentenced to several consecutive, minimum/mandatory sentences. Anyway, as explained, Defendant is not entitled to try his luck.
10. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's January 16, 2014 Motion for Postconviction Relief, as amended on May 22, 2014, is SUMMARILY DISMISSED. The prothonotary SHALL notify Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: May 22, 2015
/s/ Fred S. Silverman
Judge
cc: Prothonotary (Criminal)
Diana Dunn, Deputy Attorney General
Matthew Frawley, Deputy Attorney General
John A. Barber, Esquire