The prosecutor or the court should have placed on record any evidence relied on to show that acts of defendant caused harm to the house, so that defendant might have the opportunity to contest the causation issue. Cf. State v. Tuma, 292 Or. 194, 637 P.2d 614 (1981) (resentencing required where evidence is lacking on an element of restitution). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for resentencing after such further hearing as the court deems necessary.

TANZER, J. In this case, State v. Eastman/Kovach, 292 Or. 184, 637 P.2d 609 (1981), and State v. Tuma, 292 Or. 194, 637 P.2d 614 (1981) (decided this date), we examine the nature and scope of restitution as authorized for criminal sentences by ORS 137.103 to 137.109. Each case presents different aspects of restitution. THE FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The issue presented by these two consolidated cases is whether a defendant convicted of leaving the scene of an accident without performing statutory duties may be sentenced to pay restitution for damages resulting from the accident. We granted the state's petition for review in this case, along with petitions in State v. Dillon, 292 Or. 172, 637 P.2d 602 (1981) and State v. Tuma, 292 Or. 194, 637 P.2d 614 (1981), in order to clarify the circumstances in which a sentence of restitution is authorized. Defendant Eastman's car collided with a motorcycle at an intersection.

Although the damages incurred by the victim here are significantly greater than in Louden, the same principle governs. The victim suffered more than an "inconvenience," see State v. Tuma, 292 Or. 194, 196, 637 P.2d 614 (1981), or a temporary restriction on its work activities. See State v. Heath, supra n 2.

Under ORS 137.106(1), a defendant's potential liability for restitution is limited to pecuniary damages resulting from his criminal activities. State v. Tuma, 292 Or. 194, 637 P.2d 614 (1981); State v. Eastman/Kovach, 292 Or. 184, 637 P.2d 609 (1981); State v. Dillon, 292 Or. 172, 637 P.2d 602 (1981); State v. Sellers, 76 Or. App. 552, 709 P.2d 768 (1985). Defendant does not argue that the insurer was not a "victim" or that the losses it suffered were not "pecuniary damages."

The average cost of supervisory time committed to the protest action does not constitute an actual expense incurred as a result of defendants' protest actions either. If a victim suffers inconvenience, but no financial loss attributable to the crime, then no pecuniary damage exists. State v. Tuma, 292 Or. 194, 196, 637 P.2d 614 (1981). Willamette Industries would have had to pay its supervisors the same average hourly rate whether they had dealt with the protest or not. It experienced the inconvenience of not having its supervisors available for other work while dealing with the protest, with the consequent diversion of paid-for effort, but the inconvenience does not amount to pecuniary damage.