Opinion
No. 62066-5-I.
May 4, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 08-8-02166-3, Michael Hayden, J., entered July 15, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Appelwick, J., concurred in by Schindler, C.J., and Dwyer, J.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
A juvenile court found T.S.W. guilty of one count of possession of cocaine, a Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, and one count of making a false or misleading statement to police. T.S.W. appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her CrR 3.6 motion to suppress evidence. Because the officers had articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop T.S.W., we affirm.
FACTS
On May 7, 2008, two King County Sheriff's Office deputies were on duty performing a proactive patrol focused on King County Metro Transit bus zones. Both were in uniform. At 7 p.m., the deputies conducted an area check of a bus zone located just south of Bell Street on Second Avenue. This is an area with a high level of narcotics activity.
Deputy Pelczar observed three women standing in the bus zone. He saw an unidentified woman approach the group and give a woman in the group, Ms. Dorsey, money in exchange for something. Deputy Pelczar observed the unidentified women put the item in her mouth. He testified that this is common in drug transactions, so as to conceal the drugs. During the transaction, the women, including T.S.W., huddled together. A short time later, a man approached the group of three women. The man passed money to one of the woman in the group. But, the officers could not determine which woman received the money. The man appeared to receive something in return, although the officers also could not identify which woman gave it to him.
The officers believed the group saw them, and began to disperse. T.S.W. walked away. Officer Morris requested she stop, but T.S.W. did not initially comply. Officer Morris was able to detain T.S.W., and walk her back to the group. The women consented to a search of their persons. Nothing was found on T.S.W. The other two women were found to possess large amounts of cash. The money was folded in a manner consistent with drug dealing.
The officers asked the girls to identify themselves, in order to check the names against a database. T.S.W. initially gave the officers a false name. When confronted by the fact that the database did not turn up any record for that name T.S.W. gave her true name. T.S.W. admitted that she had a warrant out Page 3 for her arrest. After confirming the arrest warrant, T.S.W. was arrested and put into the back of a patrol car where she began hitting her head against the passenger side window bars. She was transported to Harborview Medical Center for medical evaluation. While at Harborview, Officer Morris saw T.S.W. spit out what he suspected was a piece of rock cocaine. A test confirmed that the suspected item was cocaine.
The State charged T.S.W. with one count of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act for possession of cocaine and one count of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant. T.S.W. filed a motion to suppress evidence. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Based on stipulated facts, the trial court found T.S.W. guilty. T.S.W. appeals.
DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 893, 168 P.3d 1265 (2007). As a general rule warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable and the State bears the burden of demonstrating the applicability of a recognized exception to the rule. Id. at 893-94. One such exception is that officers may briefly stop and detain a person they reasonably suspect is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal conduct. Id. at 895. This is often referred to as a " Terry stop." Id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
T.S.W. argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the police had articulable and reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.
Prior to Terry, it was generally understood that to stop and search an individual, police officers were required to have probable cause sufficient to arrest that person. Nonetheless, it was a time-honored procedure for police officers to stop suspicious persons for questioning and, occasionally, to search these individuals for dangerous weapons. 4 Wayne R. LaFave David C. Baum, Search and Seizure § 9.1(a), at 3-4 (3d 1996). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court squarely confronted the issue of whether such stops were constitutional. The Court held that a stop-and-frisk is a sui generis "rubric of police conduct" which is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if based upon the officer's reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. The Court subsequently applied the Terry standard to permit a "brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972).
A Terry stop is reasonable if the State can point to "`specific and articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.'" State v. Villarreal, 97 Wn. App. 636, 640, 984 P.2d 1064 (1999) (quoting State v. Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 10, 948 P.2d 1280 (1997)). This means the stop must be based on more than an officer's "`inarticulable hunch.'" State v. Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 597, 825 P.2d 749 (1992); State v. O'Cain, 108 Wn. App. 542, 549, 31 P.3d 733 (2001).
T.S.W. argues that the police lacked sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop her without a warrant, because nothing indicated she was engaged in criminal activity. She contends that the officers did not actually see anything beside the exchange of money, which is legal. T.S.W. relies on Armenta to argue that possession of money is insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In Armenta, two men asked a uniformed officer for help with their car. 134 Wn.2d at 4-5. The officer became suspicious, because the men had large amounts of cash and gave only sketchy accounts of their recent whereabouts. Id. at 5-6. The reviewing court held that a seizure occurred when the officer put their money in his patrol car. Id. at 16. The possession of large amounts of cash by a couple of Hispanic men was not, by itself, a reason to detain them. Id. at 13. This then vitiated their subsequent consent to be searched. Id. at 17-18.
But, Armenta is factually distinct from the stop of T.S.W. Here, the officers witnessed the three women huddling when a fourth woman approached and a hand to hand exchange of money and an unidentified item. Although the officer could not identify the item that was exchanged after the money transaction, the fourth woman put the item she received in her mouth. The officer testified that this was a common way to conceal narcotics. Shortly afterward, a man approached and the women again clustered in. Then, officers witnessed a second transaction, but were uncertain which woman in the group was involved in the exchange. The officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the women, including T.S.W.
But, T.S.W. argues that the officers did not identify her as the person engaged in these transactions, therefore her individual detainment was unconstitutional. Although police identified Dorsey as the individual involved in the first transaction, the officers were unable to identify who was involved in the second. Therefore, the officers had reasonable suspicion that T.S.W. was engaged in criminal activity.
Next, T.S.W. contends that even if the initial stop was proper, the officers exceeded their lawful authority by continuing the stop, even after finding no drugs or money on her. The lawful scope of a Terry stop may be enlarged or prolonged as needed to investigate unrelated suspicions that crop up during the stop. State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 785, 801 P.2d 975 (1990); State v. Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn. App. 326, 332, 734 P.2d 966 (1987). The officer may "`maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information.'" State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 737, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972)). But, to detain a suspect beyond what the initial stop demands, the officer must be able to articulate specific facts from which it could reasonably be suspected that the person was engaged in criminal activity. State v. Henry, 80 Wn. App. 544, 550, 910 P.2d 1290 (1995); State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn. App. 626, 629, 811 P.2d 241 (1991).
We judge the lawfulness of the conduct on the information known to the officer at the time. See, e.g., Armenta, 134 Wn.2d at 14. The action must be "`justified at its inception'" and "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances" that justified the interference. State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). Moreover, when a Terry stop is justified, an officer "may ask a moderate number of questions to determine the identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions without rendering the suspect `in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 219, 95 P.3d 345 (2004); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
Here, the officer's stopped T.S.W. in an area of high drug dealing activity, they had witnessed transactions that they believed involved narcotics, and T.S.W. had attempted to flee, even after police told her to stop. Given these facts the trial court's conclusion that the "basis for the stop still had context," was not an error. Moreover, asking T.S.W. to identify herself was not beyond the scope of the stop, because of her efforts to elude the officer's efforts to stop her.
T.S.W. argues that the trial court erred in concluding that as a matter of law the police could ask her name in order to obtain potential witnesses. She cites State v. Carney, 142 Wn. App. 197, 203-04, 174 P.3d 142 (2007), review denied, 164 Wn.2d 1009, 195 P.3d 87 (2008). Carney stands for the proposition that merely having information that may aid the police does not justify a Terry stop, unless the person is reasonably suspected to be involved in a crime. Id. Here, the officers continued to have reasonable suspicion that T.S.W. was involved in criminal activity and could therefore detain her.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR.