Opinion
ID No. 0510016383.
Date Submitted: May 17, 2007.
Date Decided: May 29, 2007.
Upon Consideration of Motion for Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
ORDER
This, 29th day of May, 2007, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, it appears that:
1. Prentice Triplett ("Triplett") has filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. For the reasons set forth below, Triplett's Motion is DENIED.
2. On January 13, 2006, Triplett pled guilty to one count of Trafficking in Heroin (2.5 to 10 grams).
3. Triplett was sentenced on January 13, 2006 to six years at Level V, suspended after three years, followed by eighteen months at Level III. The time at Level V is mandatory.
4. Triplett did not appeal his plea and conviction. On February 28, 2006, Triplett filed a Motion for Modification which the Court denied on March 6, 2006. Following the Court's denial, Triplett filed this Motion for Postconviction Relief on September 8, 2006.
5. Triplett contends that he should be afforded post-conviction relief based on three grounds. He first asserts that he was illegally detained by probation officers. His second and third grounds are based on ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. On the day he was arrested, probation and parole officers arrived at a home where they were going to conduct a home visit on probationer Tyree Johnson. Triplett was observed sitting on steps near the home. As the officers approached the home, Triplett ran inside with both hands under his shirt, closed and locked the door behind him. The officers spoke with a woman at the residence who gave them permission to enter and search. While speaking to the woman, officers heard activity on the roof. Triplett was then observed coming down the stairs inside the home. Officers noticed that he had changed his clothing. He was detained and questioned by officers as to his name and probation status. Triplett indicated that he was on Level III probation. He was taken into custody and placed in handcuffs until his probation officer arrived. In the meantime, officers searched the home. On the roof they found a bag containing hair clippers. In and around the bag were a total of 141 bags of heroin. Triplett was arrested and was later interviewed by the officers. He made post-Miranda statements indicating that the bag on the roof and the clippers were his. Triplett explained that he was at the home to cut Tyree Johnson's hair and had no idea how the heroin got inside his bag or how the bag got onto the roof. He was charged with Trafficking Heroin. It should also be noted that Triplett has a history of drug related arrests and felony convictions. In 2004, Triplett was arrested for Possession with Intent to Deliver heroin and pled guilty to the felony offense of Possession of Heroin within 1000 Feet of a School. In 2001, he was arrested with cocaine and heroin. He pled guilty to Maintaining a Vehicle to Keep Controlled Substances. Also in 2001, he was arrested for Possession with Intent to Deliver Heroin and pled guilty. On the same date, he pled guilty to Possession of a Deadly Weapon during the Commission of a Felony stemming from an arrest in 2000.
6. Before addressing the merits of any postconviction relief claim, the Court must determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. To protect the integrity of Delaware's procedural rules, the Court will not consider the merits of a postconviction claim if defendant's claims are procedurally barred. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: 1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final order of conviction; 2) any ground for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding is thereafter barred; 3) any ground for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; 4) any ground for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction. The Postconviction Relief Motion is timely filed and not repetitive. The Court will, therefore, consider the merits of the Motion.
7. Triplett first argues that probation and parole officers lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain him. This illegal detention claim was not raised in the proceeding leading to Triplett's conviction. Therefore, this ground is barred under 61(i)(3) unless Triplett can show: (a) cause for relief from this procedural default and (b) prejudice from a violation of his rights. The bars to relief, however, do not apply "to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." The State asserts that Triplett fails to establish cause because he offers no explanation why this claim was never raised prior to the entry of his plea. Nevertheless, the State addresses his false arrest claim and argues that as a Level III probationer, Triplett had diminished rights at the time of his contact with probation officers. The State also argues that Triplett was in violation of a condition of his probation that he not interact with other probationers. Further, the State notes that upon seeing probation officers approach, Triplett ran into the home with both hands under his shirt, then closed and locked the door behind him. While inside, Triplett changed his clothing. The State argues that Triplett's behavior raised the officers' suspicions and led to his detention while he was questioned about his identity and probation status. The State contends that regardless of Triplett's initial detention, he was subject to arrest for the heroin that was found on the roof that day because he had no expectation of privacy at a home he neither lived in nor owned. Further, the heroin was no longer in his possession and was abandoned. In addition, the initial detention did not produce any evidence that was seized from his person that would have been subject to suppression. The State concludes that Triplett has not shown cause why this claim was not made below and cannot establish prejudice from the failure to raise the claim prior to entry of his plea; therefore, his claim is procedurally barred. However, the Court finds that Triplett raises a "colorable claim" regarding ineffective assistance of counsel as it relates to the illegal detention claim.
8. Triplett's first, second, and third grounds are, thus, based on ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. Under Strickland v. Washington, and Flamer v. State the test for ineffective assistance of counsel is (1) whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability, that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Additionally, there is a strong presumption that legal representation is professionally reasonable. To withdraw a plea after sentence has been imposed, the defendant must show either that his plea was not voluntarily entered or that it was entered because of misapprehension or mistake as to his legal options. A defendant is bound by the statements he made on the signed Plea Form and during the in-court colloquy unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court held in Dorsey v. State that, "To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must show that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on proceeding to trial."
9. Triplett argues that if his attorney had raised the claim of illegal detention, he would not have pled guilty. However, the Court finds that Triplett fails to support his claims with sufficient evidence. On December 19, 2005, Triplett's counsel did in fact file a Motion to Suppress his post-Miranda statements, arguing that probation officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. Further, Triplett's attorney explained to Triplett that the pending Motion to Suppress his incriminating statements was not case dispositive and that the State could prosecute the case fully. More importantly, Triplett's attorney explained that once Triplett entered his plea, the Motion to Suppress that was pending would become moot. After making Triplett aware of these circumstances, Triplett freely and voluntarily pled guilty to Trafficking in Heroin. In doing so, he signified that he understood the constitutional rights that he was relinquishing. He indicated to the Court that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation and that his attorney had fully advised him of his rights. Thus, Triplett's claims regarding illegal detention and ineffective assistance of counsel have failed.
10. Triplett's second claim is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel as it relates to evidence in the case. He suggests that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because of an error which occurred "during early stages of his plea negotiation". Triplett states that his lawyer "refused to acknowledge the evidence on his behalf in which the State did not have the set of hair clippers that they stated they found inside of the black bag and the drug (sic) they found on the roof . . .". Triplett, however, pled guilty prior to trial. Therefore, the State was never required to produce any evidence to prosecute him. Triplett also states that the heroin found in the bag "could have been placed there by anybody with access to the rooftop". While this may have been true, it is an argument that would have been made at trial had he elected not to plead guilty to reduced charges. Instead, Triplett pled guilty and acknowledged that his plea was knowing and voluntary. The Court finds that Triplett cannot show that his lawyer was ineffective or that but for his lawyer's conduct the outcome would have been different.
11. Triplett's third claim is that his attorney was ineffective for failing "to investigate mitigating evidence that would have supported the Defendant's case" during his sentencing. On the contrary, Triplett received the minimum mandatory sentence of three years incarceration. Further, Triplett has a history of felony convictions and heroin related arrests. Considering his criminal history, the nature of his arrest, and the evidence against him, the plea agreement Triplett accepted significantly outweighed the risks posed by going to trial. There was nothing more his attorney could have done to mitigate the sentence on the charge he pled guilty The Court finds that counsel took professionally reasonable steps to address Defendant's concerns regarding the evidence. Nothing supports the contention that Triplett either failed to understand, or disagreed with, the aspects of his plea agreement.
12. Based upon the above reasoning, Triplett's Motion for Postconviction Relief is, hereby, DENIED.
State's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. at 1-2.
State's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. at n. 1.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Id.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Triplett told officers that he was at the home to cut probationer Tyree Johnson's hair. State's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. at 1.
State's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. at 4-5.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
585 A.2d 736 (Del. 1990).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694.
Flamer, 585 A.2d at 753-54.
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
Smith v. State, 1990 WL 1475, at *1 (Del.Supr. 1990).
2006 WL 889364 (Del.), at *2.
The heroin recovered by probation officers was not found on Triplett's person but on the roof of the house that Triplett neither owned nor resided in. Because Triplett had no expectation of privacy in the house where the drugs were found, a motion to suppress the drug evidence was not appropriate. Aff. of Bradley V. Manning in Resp. to Mot. at 2.
Aff. of Bradley V. Manning in Resp. to Mot. at 2-3.
Aff. of Bradley V. Manning in Resp. to Mot. at 3 and State's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. at 4-6.
Aff. of Bradley V. Manning in Resp. to Mot. at 4 and State's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. at 6.
IT IS SO ORDERED.