Opinion
Nos. 1 CA-CR 22-0538 1 CA-CR 23-0228
05-30-2024
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jorge TRINIDAD, Jr., Appellant.
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, By Eliza Ybarra, Counsel for Appellee Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix, By Jennifer Roach, Counsel for Appellant
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County, No. CR2021-100433-001, The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge. AFFIRMED
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, By Eliza Ybarra, Counsel for Appellee
Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix, By Jennifer Roach, Counsel for Appellant
Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.
OPINION
WEINZWEIG, Judge:
¶1 Arizona law directs a hospital worker to "immediately notify" law enforcement of injuries "which may have resulted from a fight, brawl, robbery or other illegal or unlawful act." See AR.S. § 13-3806. We must decide whether criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to confront hospital workers who report injuries under this mandatory reporting statute. They do not. Section 13-3806 ensures that evidence is collected from hospital workers and preserved if a criminal prosecution transpires. It does not compel hospital workers to investigate the injury or determine its source. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding a jury verdict. McFarlin v. Hall, 127 Ariz. 220, 224, 619 P.2d 729, 733 (1980).
¶3 Defendant Jorge Trinidad punched his girlfriend Jane (a pseudonym) in the face and broke her nose. He also punched her in the hands, forearms, stomach, ribs and forehead. Jane drove herself to the emergency room, where she told a physician’s assistant (the "hospital PA") that Trinidad had punched her in the nose. The hospital PA examined Jane and recommended a C.T. scan. He observed knots on her forehead, bruises on her lateral chest wall and a black eye. A hospital radiologist read the C.T. scan and wrote a report. The hospital PA then diagnosed Jane with a broken nose based on the radiologist’s report and the hospital PA’s examination.
¶4 The hospital contacted the police to report Jane’s injuries under a mandatory reporting statute, A.R.S. § 13-3806, which requires hospital workers to notify police of any injury that may have arisen from illegal conduct. Police interviewed Jane at the hospital, and she reiterated her account of the incident. Trinidad was later arrested.
¶5 After his arrest, Trinidad frequently called Jane from jail, pressuring her to exonerate him by telling police that her injuries were caused by a fall during the fight. Jane succumbed and recanted. She drafted and signed a statement that expressed uncertainty on how she broke her nose. Adding that she fell during the fight with Trinidad, Jane speculated that the fall broke her nose. Jane cautioned, however, that she could not "say anything with total 100% confidence." She read the statement to Trinidad over the telephone on a recorded call. Appeased, Trinidad directed Jane to have it notarized and provide copies to the court, defense counsel and the prosecutors.
¶6 The State called Jane to testify at trial and resolve the discrepancies between her two accounts. Jane conceded her original account was accurate. She testified that she lied in her notarized statement because she still loved Trinidad. On cross-examination, Trinidad impeached Jane with her notarized statement, but did not move to admit the statement into evidence.
¶7 The jury also heard testimony from the hospital PA about Jane’s injuries based on his physical examination and the radiologist’s report. But the radiologist did not testify, so Trinidad objected to this testimony as hearsay and violative of the Confrontation Clause. That objection was denied. At trial’s end, Trinidad requested a jury instruction on proximate cause due to Jane’s inconsistent accounts of how her injuries occurred. The superior court denied the requested jury instruction as not "supported by the evidence."
¶8 The jury found Trinidad guilty of aggravated assault, two counts of misdemeanor assault and one count of criminal damage. Trinidad unsuccessfully moved for a new trial and timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. AR.S. §§ 12420.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A).
DISCUSSION
I. Confrontation Clause
¶9 Trinidad first argues his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the hospital radiologist did not testify at his criminal trial because (1) the radiology report was testimonial, and (2) the hospital PA acted as a conduit for the radiologist who created the radiology report. Because Trinidad objected at trial, we review de novo his constitutional argument for harmless error. State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, 485-86, ¶¶ 33, 38, 189 P.3d 403, 412-13 (2008); State v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, 580, ¶ 39, 12 P.3d 796, 805 (2000).
[1, 2] ¶10 The federal Confrontation Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of out-of-court testimonial evidence unless the defendant has a chance to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Confrontation Clause does not exclude non-testimonial evidence. Id. [3–5] ¶11 The test for testimonial evidence is whether it was created for the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011). On the other hand, evidence is not testimonial if created primarily to provide medical care. State v. Hill, 236 Ariz. 162, 167, ¶ 22, 336 P.3d 1283, 1288 (App. 2014). To determine the primary purpose of creating a medical report, Arizona courts assess "where the examination took place, the victim’s medical condition, whether law enforcement officers were present and the formality of the exchange." Id. at 166, ¶ 15, 336 P.3d at 1287.
[6] ¶12 Applied here, the radiologist’s report was not testimonial because it was created to provide medical care to Jane after she arrived at the emergency room, where she arrived with a black eye, broken nose and bruising on her forehead, cheek and chest. The hospital PA ordered a C.T. scan on Jane’s arrival. The radiologist then read and authored a radiology report based on that C.T. scan.
¶13 The radiology report was not created to accuse "a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct," Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 82, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012), or to "establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution," Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S; 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). The record shows no investigative purpose. It does not show that police requested a C.T. scan or radiology report. It does not even show the radiologist knew that police would later investigate Jane’s injuries.
Mandatory. Reporting Statute
[7] ¶14 Still, Trinidad argues that a mandatory reporting statute—AR.S. § 13-3806—rendered the radiologist’s report testimonial. Section 13-3806 requires hospital workers to "immediately notify" the police of any injury that may have arisen from illegal conduct. Trinidad contends this statute creates a superseding primary purpose to collect information for law enforcement, and that all evidence collected from hospital workers under the mandatory reporting statute is testimonial.
[8] ¶15 We are not persuaded. Section 13-3806 mandates that hospital workers notify the police of certain injuries. It does not compel them to investigate the reported injury or determine its source. See People v. Cage, 40 Cal.4th 965, 988, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205 (2007) (holding a doctor’s status as a mandatory reporter did not render statements to him testimonial because the reporting statute does not require a doctor to investigate whether the statements are true). It does not deputize hospital workers to police Arizona’s criminal laws. See, e.g., State v. Spencer, 339 Mont. 227, 231, ¶ 19, 169 P.3d 384 (2007) (holding that a mandatory reporting statute was not "intended to deputize th[e] litany of professionals and individuals into law enforcement"); Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 154, 282 S.W.3d 778 (2008) (holding that a social workers duty to report child abuse did not automatically render the child victim’s statements testimonial); People v. Phillips, 315 P.3d 136, 165-66, ¶¶ 135-41 (Colo. App. 2012) (holding that teachers’ duty to report child abuse did not make them "agents of law enforcement," so statements to them were not necessarily testimonial).
¶16 Because the radiologist’s report was not testimonial, we need not address Trinidad’s conduit argument.
II. Causation Jury Instruction
[9, 10] ¶17 Trinidad next argues the superior court should have instructed the jury on proximate cause based on Jane’s inconsistent accounts concerning the cause of her broken nose. We review the decision whether to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 343, ¶ 60, 111 P.3d 369 (2005), but review de novo whether a given instruction correctly states the law, Bocharski, 218 Ariz… at 487, ¶ 47, 189 P.3d 403, 414.
[11–13] ¶18 Parties are generally entitled to jury instructions "on any theory reasonably supported by the evidence," but not to instructions "adequately covered by other instructions." State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 61, ¶ 16, 961 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1998). Courts should reject instructions that might mislead or confuse the jury. State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 479, ¶ 32, 65 P.3d 420, 428 (2003). Closing arguments may be considered when assessing the adequacy of jury instructions. State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 546, 931 P.2d 1046, 1056 (1997).
¶19 The court instructed the jury that aggravated assault required the State to prove that Trinidad "did cause physical injury" to Jane and that the assault "was committed by any means of force that caused … [the] nasal bone fracture." Trinidad argues the instruction was inadequate, and the court should have instructed that aggravated assault required the State to prove that the fracture "was proximately caused by" Trinidad’s acts, defined as "a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the [fracture], and without which the [fracture] would not have occurred."
¶20 Trinidad has shown no error. Each party presented an independent cause for Jane’s injuries at closing arguments—either Jane broke her own nose by "face planting" or Trinidad broke it with his fist. The instructions for aggravated assault directed the jury to determine whether Trinidad caused the Jane’s broken nose. So too, the credibility instructions directed the jury to consider whether Jane’s notarized statement contradicted her testimony, with the contradiction being her cause of injury. The superior court instructed the jury on all the elements of the charged crimes, including causation, so the jury was adequately instructed.
III. New Trial
¶21 Trinidad’s last argument is the superior court erred by denying his motion for new trial because the jury instructions were erroneous. As discussed above, we find the superior court properly instructed the jury, so a new trial was not required.
CONCLUSION
¶22 We affirm.