Opinion
I.D. No. 92007513DI
Submitted: April 10, 2002
Decided: May 24, 2002
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF. SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
Upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, it appears to the Court:
(1) On March 17, 1993, the Defendant, Walter John Trala, pled guilty to one count of Burglary Second Degree, DEL. C. ANN. tit. 11 § 825 (1974). Trala had also been charged with two counts of Felony Second Degree, two counts of Misdemeanor Criminal Impersonation, Misdemeanor Theft and Misdemeanor Criminal Mischief. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State nolle processed the remaining counts of the indictment. On May 14, 1993, the Court sentenced Trala to Level V, suspended after two years for three years at Level IV, Glass House inpatient treatment. Trala did not appeal his conviction or sentence. On November 7, 1995, following a violation of probation, Trala's probation was revoked and he was resentenced to Level V for a period of 30 days.
On February 28, 1995, the Court amended the sentence to state "after serving two years, the sentence is suspended for two years at Level IV, inpatient treatment program."
(2) Trala filed this motion on March 27, 2002. In support of the motion, Trala alleges (1) that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered into and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel, contending that his counsel did not advise him that he had a right to a preliminary hearing.
(3) Under Delaware law, this Court must first determine whether Trala has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may consider the merits of his postconviction relief claim. Under Rule 61(i)(1), postconviction claims for relief must be brought within three years of the conviction becoming final. As set forth above, Defendant's conviction became final on May 14, 1993, over nine years ago. The Court finds that Defendant's motion is procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(1).
Bailey v. State, 588 DEFENDANT.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); Younger v. State, 580 DEFENDANT.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
(4) The Court finds that Defendant has not shown that the procedural time bar is inapplicable under Rule 61(i)(5). Subsection (i)(5) provides an exception to the time bar set forth in subsection (i)(1) where there is a claim that "the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." The exception is narrow "and has only been applied in limited circumstances, such as when the right relied upon has been recognized for the first time after the direct appeal."
Id. at 555.
(5) In order to prevail on his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary due to his attorney's improper advice, Trala must show that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Trala's claim fails under this standard. The record, including the transcript of the plea colloquy, reveals no error on the part of Trala's counsel and no indication that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary. In addition, none of Trala's claims were raised at the plea, sentencing or on direct appeal.
The transcript of the plea colloquy provides:
THE COURT: Have you freely and voluntarily decided to plea guilty to the one charge in your plea agreement which I'm holding up?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I see a signature of Walter J. Trala, Jr.
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Is that your signature?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand the contents of the plea agreement?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And I'm holding up the guilty plea form, and I see the same signature in the bottom right of that corner. Is that also your signature?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you understand all the questions on the guilty plea form?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you answer them truthfully?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
Transcript of Plea Colloquy, dated March 17, 2002, at 4 (hereinafter "Trans. at ___.").
The record clearly shows that the defendant executed the plea agreement in his own handwriting.
(6) As to Trala's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in order to prevail on such a claim, defendant must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. Trala must show that his counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
(7) After reviewing the record in this case, including the transcript of the March 17, 1993 plea colloquy, it is abundantly clear that Trala has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claim that his attorney was ineffective. This Court will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated. Defendant had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of his plea agreement. He was adequately advised in a timely and appropriate manner of the conditions of his plea, and he is bound by his written plea agreement and by his statements that he understood the plea which he agreed.
On the issue of voluntariness, the transcript provides, in pertinent part:
THE COURT: I asked if Mr. Otlowski or the State or anybody has forced or coerced you into pleaing (sic) guilty today.
DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Are you doing so, sir, of your own free will?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. * * *
THE COURT: Are you entering your plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntary?
DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions?
DEFENDANT: No, sir. Trans. at 7.
(8) Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(4) provides that if it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of the proceedings that the movant is not entitled to relief, the court may enter an order for its summary dismissal. Defendant does not present the Court with any evidence that his counsel's conduct fell below that of reasonable professional standards or that he was prejudiced as a result of his attorney's conduct. Furthermore, Defendant has not shown that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Therefore, Defendant has failed to demonstrate to this Court that his counsel was ineffective under Strickland.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
(9) For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the grounds upon which Defendant bases his Motion are without merit. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.