We answer questions of constitutional law "by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case." State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, 823 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Lee, 83 Haw. 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the "right/wrong" standard.
On appeal, Kauhi argues that he was subjected to a warrantless, non-consensual seizure when Officer Carreiro spoke with him on the door-step of 45-582 Paleka Road. Hence, concludes Kauhi, because the initial encounter was non-consensual, Kauhi's "consent" to speak with Detective Fitchett was "the fruit of the illegal encounter" and should have resulted in the suppression of Kauhi's statement to Fitchett. State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 925 P.2d 818 (1996). Alternatively, Kauhi argues that the statement must be suppressed because, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Kauhi was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of having been read his constitutional rights.
Accordingly the officer had no grounds for reasonably believing criminal activity was afoot. See, e.g., State v. Trainor, 83 Hawai'i 250, 256, 925 P.2d 818, 824 (1996) (ruling that "the police may temporarily detain an individual if they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot" (citation omitted)). Because such objective grounds were absent, no legal support existed for the stop.
. . . We answer questions of constitutional law "by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case." State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, 823 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Lee, 83 Haw. 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the "right/wrong" standard.
6. The police may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. State v. Trainor, 83 [Hawai`i] 250, 258, 925 P.2d 818, 826 (1996). The ultimate test in those situations is whether a man of reasonable caution would be warranted in believing that criminal activity was afoot and that the action taken was appropriate.
Article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution was designed, inter alia, to safeguard the privacy of individuals against arbitrary, oppressive, and harassing invasions by the police. State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 259, 925 P.2d 818, 827 (1996) (citation omitted). To ensure against such invasions, this court has applied an objective reasonable suspicion test in the event of an investigatory automobile stop by the police.
In the case of the consent exception, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. See State v. Trainor, 83 Hawai`i 250, 261, 925 P.2d 818, 829 (1996) ("`It is well-settled that when the prosecution seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, it has the burden of proving . . . that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.'" (Quoting State v. Patterson, 58 Haw. 462, 468, 571 P.2d 745, 749 (1977).) (Ellipsis points in original.). "[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances."
In its opinion, the ICA held in relevant part that a person "who has been seized is in custody." ICA's opinion at 4 (quoting State v. Blackshire, 10 Haw. App. 123, 135, 861 P.2d 736, 742 (App.), cert. denied, 75 Haw. 581, 863 P.2d 989 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). From this premise, the ICA reasoned that, inasmuch as Ah Loo was "seized" within the meaning of article 1, section 7, see, e.g., State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 256, 925 P.2d 818, 824 (1996) ("a person is `seized' in the constitutional sense if, from an objective standpoint and given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave"); State v. Kearns, 75 Haw. 558, 567, 867 P.2d 903, 907 (1994) ("a person is seized, for purposes of article I, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, when a police officer approaches that person for the express or implied purpose of investigating him or her for possible criminal violations and begins to ask for information"), he was "in custody" for purposes of triggering the procedural safeguards — i.e., the Miranda warnings — mandated by article I, section 10, see supra note 2, preconditioning any custodial interrogation. ICA's opinion at 6-7.
We review questions of constitutional law "by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case." State v. Rogan, 91 Haw. 405, 411, 984 P.2d 1231, 1237 (1999) (quoting State v. Arceo, 84 Haw. 1, 11, 928 P.2d 843, 853 (1996) (quoting State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, 823 (1996), and State v. Lee, 83 Haw. 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996)). Accordingly, we review questions of constitutional law de novo under the "right/wrong" standard.
[5, 6] This court answers questions of constitutional law by exercising its own independent judgment based on the facts of the case. State v. Trainor, 83 Hawai‘i 250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, 823 (1996). Questions of constitutional law are reviewed under the right/ wrong standard.