The record reflects that, during the state's six week investigation into Rivera's suspected narcotics trafficking enterprise, neither the defendant nor Espino had ever come to the attention of the police. In support of his legal claim, the defendant relies on the literal language of Summers , which repeatedly uses the term "occupant" to describe those persons subject to the exception, as well as other sources of authority favoring a restrictive definition of "occupant," including the views of Professor Wayne R. LaFave and this court's decision in State v. Torres , 197 Conn. 620, 625, 500 A.2d 1299 (1985), in which we questioned the applicability of the Summers exception. The defendant's position is that Summers does not apply under these circumstances, regardless of his geographic location at the time of his detention.

That only occupant detentions fall within Summers's safe harbor, however, does not imply nonoccupants may never be detained without probable cause during a search. (See 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, supra, § 4.9(e), p. 311 [concluding Summers does not, "by negative implication, prohibit application of Terry to uphold a detention on reasonable suspicion, based on the facts of the particular case, of someone present where a search warrant is to be executed"]; accord, State v. Torres (1985) 197 Conn. 620 [ 500 A.2d 1299, 1301] [ Terry applicable to nonoccupants]; U.S. v. Reid (D.C. Cir. 1993) 997 F.2d 1576, 1579 [302 App.D.C. 374] [detention reasonable even though defendant not within Summers's "bright line" rule for occupants].) As we have previously noted, when defendant was detained, he was in the process of entering the premises through a gate leading into the backyard.

The court agrees with the State that defendant's admission that he had a knife and marijuana on his person was properly obtained given the reasonable safety concerns the officers faced. See State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 628 (1985); Also, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 2.

These factors justified further detention of the defendant. State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 628 (1985). While the evidence varied somewhat regarding a precise description of the windbreaker or jacket, the court finds that the different descriptions were sufficiently similar to warrant a continued detention of the defendant.

In determining whether this standard has been satisfied by the prosecution, a court will look to the totality of the surrounding factual circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 227, 248 (1973); State v. Reagan, 209 Conn. 1, 7-8 (1988); State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 627 (1985); State v. Zindros, 189 Conn. 228, 244 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984); State v. Adams, 176 Conn. 138, 141 (1978). Whether consent to search was voluntary is a factual question, to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.

Third, the state cases cited by Professor LaFave involve situations in which the defendant was clearly a casual visitor to the residence. See State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 500 A.2d 1299 (1985) (visitor to apartment); Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1984) (seen walking to the house on several occasions). Thus, these courts did not have occasion to consider the situation in which a non-resident is present in the searched residence at the time of the officers' entry.

2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(e). Courts have noted this distinction. See United States v. Reid , 997 F.2d 1576,1579 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (government's reliance on Summers rejected, as defendant "was not a resident of the apartment which was to be searched under the warrant" but only a visitor) (emphasis in original); State v. Torres , 197 Conn. 620, 500 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1985) (Summers not applicable, as "the defendant was a visitor to [the residence subject to search warrant] and not an ‘occupant’ "); Commonwealth v. Catanzaro , 441 Mass. 46, 803 N.E.2d 287, 291–92 (2004) (woman detained had previously asserted "[t]hat's my apartment," and thus sufficient showing she was an occupant, meaning one "who has possessory rights in, or control over, certain property"). We decline to expand the meaning of "occupants" under Summers to a person approaching the premises as a visitor.

When considering the impact of a defendant's presence in a high crime area as a factor in a Terry stop analysis, this court previously has relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), the facts of which are similar to the present case. See, e.g., State v. Mikolinski, 256 Conn. 543, 549, 775 A.2d 274 (2001); State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 195, 527 A.2d 1168, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927, 108 S.Ct. 293, 98 L.Ed.2d 252 (1987); State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 626, 500 A.2d 1299 (1985); State v. Scully, supra, 195 Conn. 673. In Brown, two police officers conducted a Terry stop of a defendant whom they observed walking in the opposite direction of another man in an alley located in an area known for drug trafficking.

First, it is the function of this court to determine whether the trial court's underlying factual findings were clearly erroneous. State v. Cofield, 220 Conn. 38, 44, 595 A.2d 1349 (1991); State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 625, 500 A.2d 1299 (1985); Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). Second, "[t]he trial court's conclusions must stand unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with the facts."

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 625, 500 A.2d 1299 (1985), citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981). If a visitor is not considered an "occupant," as the term is used in Summers, however, the detention of an individual still may be justified under Terry as long as there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.