Rather, the state's evidence of guilt, taken as a whole, was so weak that, upon my best consideration and judgment, I was of the clear view that `the reasoning mind could not reasonably reach a conclusion other than that the evidence, under the law, [was] not sufficient to justify a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' State v. Torello, 100 Conn. 637, 643, 124 A. 375, 377 (1924). Under these circumstances — the government having failed to meet its constitutional burden — it was my duty to order the entry of a verdict of acquittal; and not to have done so would have resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice.
In a criminal case, a verdict will be directed only when "the reasoning mind could not reasonably reach a conclusion other than that the evidence, under the law, is not sufficient to justify a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Torello, 100 Conn. 637, 643, 124 A. 375; General Statutes 54-89; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. 203. Denial of a motion for a directed verdict "is reviewed on the evidence alone and not on the finding." State v. Amendola, 152 Conn. 166, 168, 204 A.2d 836.
We cannot say that the evidence was so weak as to require the court to direct a verdict of outright acquittal. State v. Torello, 100 Conn. 637, 643, 124A. 375. Since there must be a new trial, it is unnecessary to discuss the other claims of error pursued in the defendant's brief.
Such laws derive their force, as do all new ones not inconsistent with it, not from this amendment, but from power originally belonging to the states, preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment and now relieved from the restriction heretofore arising out of the federal Constitution." The adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment did not impair the right of a state, by the exercise of its police power, to protect its citizens in its own way from the evil effects of intoxicating liquor, except that since such adoption it may not permit the sale, use, or possession of intoxicating liquor of a kind, or in a manner, prohibited by the laws of the United States. Commonwealth v. Vigliotti, 271 Pa. 10, 115 A. 20, 21, affirmed 258 U.S. 403, 408, 66 L. ed. 686, 42 Sup. Ct. 330, 331; People v. Alfano, 322 Ill. 384, 153 N.E. 729, 730; O'Neil v. Demers, 44 R.I. 504, 118 A. 677, 679; State v. Torello, 100 Conn. 637, 124 A. 375, 376; State v. Ceriani, 96 Conn. 130, 113 A. 316, 318; Katz v. Eldridge, 96 N.J. Law, 382, 118 A. 242, 244 (reversed upon another point, 98 N.J. Law, 125, 117 A. 841); State v. Gauthier, 121 Me. 522, 118 A. 380, 384, 26 A.L.R. 652. The second section of the amendment, providing for "concurrent power," expressly recognizes that a state may exercise its police power by appropriate legislation. Vigliotti v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 258 U.S. 403, 408, 66 L. ed. 686, 42 Sup. Ct. 330, 331.
See, also, Cureton v. State (1911), 135 Ga. 660, 70 S.E. 332, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 182; Marks v. State (1909), 159 Ala. 71, 48 So. 864, 133 Am. St. 20; Rucker v. State (1894), 24 S.W. (Texas Crim.) 902; Sebastian v. State (1903), 44 Texas Crim. 508, 72 S.W. 849; Caswell v. State (1841), 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 402; Bennett v. People (1863), 30 Ill. 389. And, in State v. Torello (1924), 100 Conn. 637, 124 A. 375, it was held that partially denatured alcohol (97.7 per cent.) which could be made fit for beverage purposes by the mere addition of water or other liquid or by simple distillation and dilution was spirituous and intoxicating liquor.
The latest instances of appeals by the State from judgments in the Superior Court show the strictest compliance with the practice as outlined in State v. Lee, supra, viz.: State v. Torello, 100 Conn. 637, 124 A. 375, and State v. Carroll, 97 Conn. 598, 117 A. 694. "Statutes authorizing an appeal in a criminal case must be strictly followed." 17 Corpus Juris, 14; State v. Caplan, 85 Conn. 618, 84 A. 280.
[W]hen the conclusion is one that is dependent on the resolution of conflicting testimony, it should ordinarily be left to the jury for its judgment. State v. Torello, 100 Conn. 637, 647-48, 124 A. 375 (1924). State v. Bewry, 26 Conn. App. 242, 246, 600 A.2d 787 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 911, 602 A.2d 11 (1992).
"`[W]hen the conclusion is one that is dependent on the resolution of conflicting testimony, it should ordinarily be left to the jury for its judgment. State v. Torello, 100 Conn. 637, 647-48, 124 A. 375 (1924).'" State v. Bewry, 26 Conn. App. 242, 246, 600 A.2d 787 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 911, 602 A.2d 11 (1992).
Further, when the conclusion is one that is dependent on the resolution of conflicting testimony, it should ordinarily be left to the jury for its judgment. State v. Torello, 100 Conn. 637, 647-48, 124 A. 375 (1924)." State v. Turner, 24 Conn. App. 264, 268, 587 A.2d 1050, cert. denied, 218 Conn. 910, 591 A.2d 812 (1991).
Further, when the conclusion is one that is dependent on the resolution of conflicting testimony, it should ordinarily be left to the jury for its judgment. State v. Torello, 100 Conn. 637, 647-48, 124 A. 375 (1924). The jury was free to credit the testimony that the defendant pointed the loaded gun at Russell, pulled the trigger, and that the gun clicked but did not fire. Crediting this testimony, we cannot say that an inference that the defendant intended to inflict serious physical injury on Russell was either unreasonable or illogical. "`It was within the province of the [trier] to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the facts proven . . . .'" (Citations omitted.)