Opinion
No. 60404-0-I.
July 7, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 05-8-01674-4, Richard J. Thorpe, J., entered July 12, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
The crime of vehicular assault requires the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant operated or drove a vehicle either recklessly under the influence of drugs or alcohol or with disregard for the safety of others and that such conduct resulted in substantial bodily harm to another. Here, the juvenile court held T.M. guilty of vehicular assault after finding he had driven with disregard for the safety of others and that his conduct was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Elizabeth Brown. Because the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
T.M. was speeding through a suburban residential neighborhood in Edmonds around 10:30 p.m. on August 18, 2005. There was minimal traffic, the weather was clear, and the roads were dry. T.M. had two friends as passengers and was driving a black 1996 Nissan Altima westbound on 200th Street S.W. The posted speed limit on the two lane road was 25 m.p.h.
Robert Brown drove himself and his wife, Elizabeth, home that night in their silver colored 1996 Mercury Tracer station wagon. Brown was driving in the opposite direction as T.M., eastbound, on 200th Street S.W., with the headlights turned on. Before turning left onto their home street, 81st Place West, Brown paused and then, estimating that he had sufficient time to make the turn before T.M. reached the intersection, turned left.
T.M. saw the Browns' vehicle turn in front of him and he braked heavily and sounded his horn. The cars collided, the front end of T.M.'s Nissan striking the rear passenger side of the Browns' Tracer, with Elizabeth Brown seated in its front seat.
The Edmonds Police Department responded to the accident. Officer Timothy Dreyer testified that he smelled a faint odor of alcohol on T.M. and that his eyes were bloodshot and watery. T.M. denied having consumed alcohol that night but testified that his friends had, possibly explaining the smell of alcohol. Complaining of neck pain, T.M. was taken to the hospital, where he was advised he was under arrest for driving under the influence. Upon the advice of family members, T.M. declined to take a blood test until their family attorney could be reached. A breath test was not available, though T.M. offered to submit to such a test. Robert Brown admitted to having consumed alcohol earlier in the evening, but the responding police officers did not see any signs indicating he was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
Elizabeth Brown repeatedly asked one of the responding police officers, "what happened?" after the accident and complained of neck pain. Her nose was bleeding and the skin on her neck was badly scratched. She was soon transported to Stevens Hospital and then later to Harborview Hospital where she was diagnosed as having fractured multiple vertebrate. Prior to trial, the defense stipulated that Elizabeth Brown suffered substantial bodily harm from the accident.
Officer Shane Hawley took measurements of the collision scene that night. The point of impact was easily determinable from yaw marks and debris on the ground. Officer Hawley found that T.M.'s car had left approximately 100 feet of skid marks leading up to that point. He also recorded that T.M.'s partially crumpled Altima had come to a stop after spinning counter-clockwise a full 71 feet away from the collision's point of impact, leaving another 32 feet of skid marks in the street.
Detective Harry Kenneth Crystal returned to the scene of the accident the following day to investigate. He had experience and training in accident reconstruction, though he was not a certified specialist. He calculated that T.M. was driving over 50 m.p.h., conservatively estimating that he was going 56 m.p.h. when his brakes locked up based on measurements of the skid marks left on the pavement.
T.M. was charged with one count of vehicular assault under RCW 46.61.522. T.M. was tried without jury in juvenile court. Initially, by oral ruling, the court found T.M. not guilty as the court did not believe the State had presented sufficient evidence to prove that T.M. was intoxicated or that he was driving in a reckless manner. Upon reconsideration, the court ruled that T.M. was guilty as charged, finding that he had driven with disregard for the safety of others. T.M. was sentenced within the applicable standard range to nine days' confinement and six months' community supervision. T.M. timely appeals.
The parties stipulated to extend the juvenile court's jurisdiction over T.M. pursuant to RCW 13.40.300.
Apparently, the trial court made its initial oral ruling of not guilty based on the belief that the State must prove either that T.M. was driving recklessly or that he was under the influence of intoxicants. In 2001, the Legislature amended the vehicular assault statute to include the third prong of driving or operating a vehicle with disregard for others. RCW 46.61.522; see comment to 11A Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal (WPIC) 91.02, at 76 (2005 Supp.).
ANALYSIS
T.M. was found guilty of vehicular assault under RCW 46.61.522, which provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of vehicular assault if he or she operates or drives any vehicle:
(a) In a reckless manner and causes substantial bodily harm to another; or
(b) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502, and causes substantial bodily harm to another; or
(c) With disregard for the safety of others and causes substantial bodily harm to another.
(Emphasis added.)
(Emphasis added.)
The State bears the burden of proving every element of the crime to the trier of fact, here, the juvenile court, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not this court's role to reweigh the evidence but rather to merely determine whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the court finding each required element of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence is deemed sufficient if it and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed as is most favorable to the State, allows any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty as charged. Should a reviewing court find substantial evidence supports the findings below, the inquiry then becomes whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law and judgment.
State v. Teal, 152 Wn.2d 333, 337, 96 P.3d 974 (2004).
See State v. Tocki, 32 Wn. App. 457, 461, 648 P.2d 99, review denied, 98 Wn.2d 1004 (1982).
State v. Joy, 121 Wn.2d 333, 339, 851 P.2d 654 (1993).
Landmark Dev. Inc. v. City of Roy, 138 Wn.2d 561, 573, 980 P.2d 1234 (1999) (citing Willener v. Sweeting, 107 Wn.2d 388, 393, 730 P.2d 45 (1986)).
T.M. contends that the State has failed to meet its burden of proving two different elements of the crime charged: that T.M. was driving with disregard for the safety of others and that his conduct was the proximate cause of Elizabeth Brown's injuries.
Conscious Disregard for the Safety of Others
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that T.M. was driving with a disregard for the safety of others. Several Edmonds police officers testified at length about the accident, including regarding the statements made to them by T.M. and the Browns. Plus, all three presented their recollection of that night's events in-person, giving the juvenile court an opportunity to evaluate their credibility. Detective Crystal testified as to the 100 feet of skid marks left by T.M.'s braking that led to his calculation that T.M. was driving well over 50 m.p.h. and probably at least 56 m.p.h. The State admitted extensive documentary evidence, including numerous photographs of the scene of the accident. An eyewitness, Chelsea Purcella, a passenger in the vehicle trailing that of the Browns, testified that T.M. was definitely speeding prior to the crash. The juvenile court's finding that T.M. was driving well over, even more than double, the 25 m.p.h. posted speed limit in a residential neighborhood at night in disregard for the safety of others is well supported by the evidence presented at T.M.'s trial.
Proximate Causation
Before criminal liability may be imposed for a crime that by definition requires "specific conduct resulting in a specified result, the defendant's conduct must be the `legal' or `proximate' cause" and the "actual cause" of the result. Vehicular assault is such a crime. Prior to trial, T.M. stipulated that the collision resulted in substantial bodily harm to Elizabeth Brown. T.M. contends, however, that Brown's failure to yield the right of way to T.M. was an illegal act that was an intervening cause of the collision and thus T.M.'s conduct in driving his vehicle, no matter how fast, was not the collision's proximate cause. We disagree.
State v. Rivas, 126 Wn.2d 443, 453, 896 P.2d 57 (1995) (citing 1 Wayne R. LaFave Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 390 (1986).
See RCW 46.61.185.
Robert Brown's left turn may be characterized as a concurrent cause of the collision but it is not an intervening cause that absolves T.M. from legal liability. An intervening cause is "`a force that actively operates to produce harm to another after the actor's act or omission has been committed.'"
State v. Souther, 100 Wn. App. 701, 710, 998 P.2d 350 (2000) (quoting Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 117 Wn.2d 1, 17 n. 7, 810 P.2d 917 (1991) (alteration in original); see also State v. McAllister, 60 Wn. App. 654, 806 P.2d 772 (1991) (reversing a defendant's conviction for vehicular homicide by intoxication because the deceased's own negligent conduct was a superseding cause of death).
An act or omission is an intervening cause only if it occurs later in time.
As the Supreme Court explained in State v. Souther:
"Intervening" is used in a time sense; it refers to later events. If a defendant sets a fire with a strong wind blowing at the time, which carries the fire to the plaintiff's property, the wind does not intervene, since it was already in operation; but if the fire is set first, and the wind springs up later, it is then an intervening cause.
100 Wn. App. at 710 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 44, at 301 (5th ed. 1984)).
100 Wn. App. at 710 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 44, at 301 (5th ed. 1984)).
In Souther, the defendant was charged with vehicular homicide for the death of a motorcyclist with whom he collided while driving under the influence of alcohol. Both vehicles were opposite each other at an intersection and had a green light. The defendant attempted to make a left turn and collided with the motorcycle as it proceeded through the intersection. The Souther court held that even if the victim was exceeding the speed limit and displayed a turn signal at the time of the collision, these actions existed before the defendant's act and could not be considered intervening causes. But here, while T.M. may have been speeding before Brown turned, T.M. was still speeding during and after the time the turn was initiated. After all, T.M.'s speed at the time of impact was approximately 56 m.p.h. When the victim's conduct is at most a concurrent cause of the injuries, evidence of that conduct is irrelevant in prosecutions for vehicular assault. Such is the case here. The crime of vehicular assault simply does not require sole proximate causation.
Souther, 100 Wn. App. at 710; see also State v. Roggenkamp, 115 Wn. App. 927, 946-47, 64 P.3d 92 (2003), affirmed, 153 Wn.2d 614, 106 P.3d 196 (2005).
Roggenkamp, 115 Wn. App. at 946-47; State v. Hursh, 77 Wn. App. 242, 245, 890 P.2d 1066 (1995).
Further, T.M.'s characterization of the left turn as sudden and unforeseeable is misleading. The left turn would not have been sudden and unexpected from T.M.'s perspective had T.M. been driving at or even anywhere near the legal speed limit. Regardless of any conduct by Brown, but for T.M.'s speeding well over twice the posted limit, the collision and Elizabeth Brown's injuries would not have occurred.
Juvenile's Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
T.M. contends he was deprived of his right to a jury trial under both the federal and state constitutions. The Washington Supreme Court recently addressed and rejected the same arguments raised by T.M. on this issue in State v. Chavez, holding that a juvenile has no constitutional jury trial rights.
See U.S. Const. amend. IV, XIV; Wash. Const. art. I, §§ 21, 22.
163 Wn.2d 262, 272, 180 P.3d 1250 (2008); RCW 13.04.021(2).
We affirm.