Opinion
No. 3-299 / 02-1305.
Filed June 25, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Palo Alto County, John P. Duffy, Judge.
Myrna Lyn Thornton appeals her conviction of manufacturing less than five grams of methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.
Catherine Levine, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter Hart, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.
Myrna Lyn Thornton appeals her conviction of manufacturing less than five grams of methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2001).
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The State's case against Thornton included evidence seized during a search of Thornton's rural Cylinder residence and her son, Joseph Thornton, Jr.'s, Algona apartment. These searches were conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a Palo Alto County magistrate. The warrant was issued based on the application on affidavit of a Palo Alto County deputy sheriff, Todd Suhr. The application included a tape-recorded interview of a named informant, Roger Clay, who implicated Thornton and her son, Joseph Thornton, Jr., in methamphetamine manufacturing.
Prior to trial, Thornton moved to suppress any evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant because it was issued without probable cause. She argued the record failed to show Clay possessed the requisite credibility to support issuance of the warrant, Deputy Sheriff Suhr provided false and misleading information, and Clay's information was stale. The trial court rejected all of Thornton's arguments and denied her motion to suppress. The pertinent part of the trial court's ruling provides:
The Court after having reviewed all the information available to Judge Bormann at the time he approved the search warrant, finds that he could find from a totality of the circumstances that there was sufficient evidence to find probable cause to issue this warrant. This Court finds that the sworn testimony supplied in support of the application established the credibility of the informant and the credibility of the information given by the informant.
Thornton was subsequently convicted and sentenced accordingly.
On appeal Thornton raises the following issues:
(1) The Trial court erred in denying [Thornton's] motion to suppress on the ground that no probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant because the informant lacked credibility.
(2) [Thornton's] trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to allege in the motion to suppress that the judge who signed the search warrant previously represented [Thornton] and her husband and, therefore, had a conflict of interest.II. Search Warrant.
Because Thornton's challenge to the validity of the search warrant at issue is based on constitutional grounds, our review is de novo. State v. Thomas, 540 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 1995).
A search warrant may be issued only upon a finding of probable cause by a judge. State v. Beckett, 532 N.W.2d 751, 753 (Iowa 1995). The test for determining whether probable cause supported the issuance of a search warrant is "whether a reasonable person would believe a crime was committed on the premises or that evidence of a crime could be located there." State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Iowa 1995).
The appellate court's job in reviewing a finding of probable cause to search is not to make an independent determination of probable cause, but only to determine whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. State v. Green, 540 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Iowa 1995). Reviewing courts give great deference to the issuing judge or magistrate's probable cause determination. Id. Doubtful cases are resolved in favor of finding that a search warrant was properly issued. State v. Myers, 570 N.W.2d 70, 73 (Iowa 1997).
The relevant search warrant was issued on the application of Palo Alto County Deputy Sheriff Todd Suhr. In his application and affidavit, Suhr claimed evidence including illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, and property related to the manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs could be found in and around Thornton's home. Suhr's application also included a tape recording of his interview of Roger Clay, an acquaintance of Thornton's son, Joseph. Suhr's affidavit states:
Mr. Clay told me that he knows for a fact that they manufacture methamphetamine at [Thornton's] residence at 3931 540th Avenue approximately 2 miles east of Cylinder, Iowa. Mr. Clay gave directions to that address to me. Mr. Clay told me that he had been there in the past few months and smelled what he thought was an hydrous ammonia in the garage. Mr. Clay said that Sara Grulke and Joseph Thornton, Jr. have told him they manufacture methamphetamine there. They have told him that they steal an hydrous at Cylinder and Whittemore.
In addition, Suhr's affidavit indicates that he independently corroborated Clay's claims concerning anhydrous ammonia thefts by contacting other law enforcement agencies and that an earlier search of Thornton's prior residence yielded illegal drugs.
Throughout these proceedings Clay has been correctly referred to as a citizen informant. See State v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1990) (citizen informant defined as person who witnessed or is a victim of a crime). Information furnished by a citizen informant is presumptively reliable. State v. Post, 286 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Iowa 1979). Although such information is presumptively reliable, the court is nevertheless required to make a common-sense analysis of the totality of the circumstances in assessing the reliability of the informant's information. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d at 189. Factors relevant to this determination include:
past reliability, the fact that the informant was named, whether the informant directly witnessed the crime or fruits of it in the possession of the accused, the specificity of the facts detailed by the informant, whether the information furnished is against the informant's penal interest, whether the informant was trusted by the accused, and whether the information was not public knowledge.
Id. at 190 (citing State v. Weir, 414 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa 1987)).
Thornton argues a common-sense analysis of the record leads to the opposite conclusion reached by the magistrate and the trial court concerning Clay's credibility. She cites evidence that Clay's relationship with Joseph Thornton, Jr. was hostile and he therefore had a motive to lie to investigators. Thornton also cites Suhr's lack of any informant experience with Clay as well as Clay's lack of direct knowledge concerning the details of Thornton's crimes and that most of Clay's knowledge about Thornton was hearsay. We disagree.
The trial court's ruling itemized twenty particulars in Suhr's application and affidavit that confirmed Clay's information implicating Joseph Thornton, Jr., in the manufacture, possession, and delivery of illegal drugs. We need not unnecessarily lengthen our opinion by repeating them here. It is sufficient to note these particulars include Joseph Thornton Jr.'s theft or purchase of methamphetamine precursors, possession of methamphetamine within one week of Clay's interview with Suhr, and Clay's history of providing reliable information to investigators. Contrary to Thornton's claims, we conclude that these particulars support the magistrate's finding that Clay's information that drugs were manufactured on or near Myrna Thornton's residence was credible. The magistrate accordingly had a substantial basis for his probable cause determination and resulting issuance of a search warrant for Myrna Thornton's residence. We affirm the trial court's ruling denying Thornton's motion to suppress.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Lastly, we preserve Thornton's ineffective assistance of counsel claims for possible postconviction proceedings. See State v. Bass, 385 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1986).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.