It is noteworthy that the same type of discovery sought here has been denied under Rule 16. See State v. Thompson, 11 Terry 456, 134 A.2d 266. Generally speaking, Rule 17(c) may be properly invoked only for the procurement of documentary evidence and for the production of documents which are admissible in evidence at the trial.

Jencks was not put on constitutional grounds, for it did not have to be; but it would be idle to say that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the surface of the decision; indeed, the Congress recognized its constitutional overtones in the debates on the statute." Mabry v. State, 40 Ala. App. 129, 110 So.2d 250; Williams v. State of Maryland, 226 Md. 614, 174 A.2d 719; State v. Kelly, 249 Iowa 1219, 91 N.W.2d 562; Erving v. State, 174 Neb. 90, 116 N.W.2d 7; Anderson v. State, 239 Ind. 372, 156 N.E.2d 384; People v. Wolff, 19 Ill.2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197; State v. Gilliam, Mo., 351 S.W.2d 723; State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1; State v. LaVallee, 122 Vt. 75, 163 A.2d 856; State v. Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 354 P.2d 1002; Gaskin v. State of Texas, 172 Tex.Crim. R., 353 S.W.2d 467; State v. Shouse, Fla. App., 177 So.2d 724; State v. Cocheo, 24 Conn. Sup. 377, 1 Conn. Cir. 610, 190 A.2d 916; State v. Hill, Kan., supra; and State v. Robinson, 61 Wn.2d 107, 377 P.2d 248. Compare State v. Thompson, 11 Terry 456, 134 A.2d 266, and the majority opinion in Commonwealth v. Smith, 417 Pa. 321, 208 A.2d 219, which tends to interpret Jencks as involving Constitutional principles. United States v. Spangelet, 2d Cir., 258 F.2d 338; United States v. De Lucia, 7th Cir., 262 F.2d 610, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000, 79 S.Ct. 1136, 3 L.Ed.2d 1029; Riser v. Teets, 9th Cir., 253 F.2d 844.

Prosecution discovery is viewed as so controversial that the failure of the statute or court rule to specifically authorize a particular type of disclosure is taken as indicating the rulemakers did not intend to allow the prosecution such discovery. Accord, State v. Whitaker, 202 Conn. 259, 520 A.2d 1018, 1022-23 (1987); Richardson v. District Court, 632 P.2d 595, 600 (Colo. 1981); People v. Williams, 87 Ill.2d 161, 429 N.E.2d 487 (1981); State v. Sandstrom, 225 Kan. 717, 595 P.2d 324, 331-32 (1979); Moore v. State, 105 Ariz. 510, 467 P.2d 904, 907-08 (1970); State v. Thompson, 134 A.2d 266, 268 (Del.Super.Ct. 1957); see generally Annot., Right of Prosecution to Discovery of Case-Related Notes, Statements, and Reports — State Cases, 23 A.L.R.4th 799, 809-13 (1983); but see Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 776-77 (Alaska 1974). The courts adopting the majority view conclude that a rule that allows a trial court discretion to expand or restrict the scope of discovery on a case-by-case basis is inconsistent with the purpose of the criminal discovery rules.

Since a major portion of police investigatory work is contained in police reports, a defendant has no due process right to discovery of police reports made in the course of criminal investigations. State v. Thompson, Del.Super., 134 A.2d 266, 267-268 (1957). Indeed, it is settled law in Delaware that a defendant cannot compel discovery of a police officer's notes which reflect that officer's recollection of a conversation with the defendant or a third person, Smith v. State, Del.Supr., 317 A.2d 20, 22 (1974) or of police investigatory reports.

It is clear, however that this right does not arise until the time of trial and that pre-trial disclosure for impeachment purposes should not be directed. See Wisniewski v. State, Del., 138 A.2d 333; State v. Thompson, Del.Super., 134 A.2d 266; compare Jencks v. U.S., 353 U.S. 657, 77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.2d 1103 (underlining added). 138 A.2d at 346.

It has now become well-settled in many jurisdictions that trial courts have broad discretionary power to order the prosecution to disclose to the defendant any relevant information in the possession or control of the prosecution. Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 510, 78 S.Ct. 1297, 1301, 2 L.Ed. 1523, 1529 (1958); State v. Thompson, 11 Terry 456, 134 A.2d 266, 268 (Del. 1957); Commonwealth v. Bartolini, 299 Mass. 503, 13 N.E.2d 382, 386 (1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 565, 58 S.Ct. 950, 83 L.Ed. 1531 (1938); State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E.2d 334, 340-341 (1964). Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622, 627 (3d Cir. 1963); People v. Hoffman, 32 Ill.2d 96, 203 N.E.2d 873 (1965).

" There may be many good reasons why the State should be provided with limited discovery rights but in an area as potentially volatile as that here involved "* * * we think it inadvisable to enlarge existing practice and procedure, which is limited by a specific Rule, by the exercise of inherent power on a case-to-case basis. * * *" State v. Thompson, 50 Del. 456, 134 A.2d 266. Opening pre-trial discovery to the State involves many possible pitfalls.

In People v. Riser,supra [ 47 Cal.2d 566, 305 P.2d 13], the defendant was charged with murder and before trial applied to inspect statements made by the state's prospective witnesses, Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel. His application was denied. See State v.Williams, 46 N.J. Super. 98 ( Cty. Ct. 1957); State v.Thompson, Del. Super, 134 A.2d 266 ( Super. Ct. 1957). At the trial Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel testified.

The thrust of that opinion, as we understand it, is that the defendant is entitled to any statements made by a government witness for the purpose of discrediting that witness, after the credibility of the witness shall have been put in issue. This exact question was raised and determined in the Superior Court in the case of State v. Thompson, 11 Terry 456, 134 A.2d 266, in which that Court for the reason heretofore set forth refused to order the production of statements and other papers prior to trial. We approve of that decision.

The Thompson case relied upon heavily by the State itself states that one can assume the inherent power of the Court to order discovery. It goes on to indicate that sufficient reason needs to exist to exceed items specified in, for instance, Rule 16. That is exactly the texture and composition of discretion. State v. Thompson, Del. Super., 134 A. 2d. 266 (1951). The State, however, argues that the Rule 26.2 requirement, by intent and by practice, decrees that no such disclosure may be ordered at any other time. That, the State asserts, is the present procedure, which provides clarity and predictability.