State v. Thompson

7 Citing cases

  1. State v. Roquette

    290 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1980)   Cited 9 times

    The right of the defendant to remain silent is a right which must be scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1977). An essential element of the right to remain silent is the right to cut off questioning. The United States Supreme Court recognized this in the following passage from Miranda, supra 384 U.S. at 473-474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628:

  2. State v. Lawrence

    282 Conn. 141 (Conn. 2007)   Cited 154 times
    Assuming arguendo validity of studies that “reflect a national trend concerning the undue weight afforded to false confession evidence by juries generally”

    State, 283 So. 2d 553, 554 (Fla. 1973); Guliey v. State, 271 Ga. 337, 339-40, 519 S.E.2d 655 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1172, 120 S. Ct. 1199, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1102 (2000); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 685, 85 P.3d 656 (2004); People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 501, 670 N.E.2d 606 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1105, 117 S. Ct. 1110, 137 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1997); State v. Rank, 214 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Iowa 1974); State v. White, 275 Kan. 580, 597, 67 P.3d 138 (2003); Baynor v. State, 355 Md. 726, 729 n. 1, 736 A.2d 325 (1999); People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704, 754-55, 365 N.W.2d 648 (1984); State v. Pitcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991); State v. Olds, 569 S.W.2d 745, 751 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); State v. LaFrenier, 163 Mont. 21, 27-28, 515 P.2d 76 (1973); State v. Irwin, 191 Neb. 169, 186, 214 N.W.2d 595 (1974); Quiriconiv. State, 96 Nev. 766, 772, 616 P.2d 1111 (1980); State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 298, 901 P.2d 708 (1995); State v. Johnson, 304 N.C. 680, 684-86, 285 S.E.2d 792 (1982); State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706, 709-10 (N.D. 1977); State v. Arrington, 14 Ohio App. 3d 111, 114, 470 N.E.2d 211 (1984); Hawkins v. State, 891 P.2d 586, 594 (Okla. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977, 116 S. Ct. 480, 133 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1995); State v. Stevens, 311 Ore. 119, 137, 806 P.2d 92 (1991) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 163, 709 A.2d 879 (1998); State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54, 56, 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 30-31 (S.D. 2002); State v. Stamper, 863 S.W.2d 404, 405-406 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992); State v. Caron, 155 Vt. 492, 501-503, 586 A.2d 1127 (1990); Witt v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 670, 674, 212 S.E.2d 293 (1975); State v. Braun, 82 Wash. 2d 157, 162, 509 P.2d 742 (1973); State v. Vance, 162 W. Va. 467, 470-72, 250 S.E.2d 146 (1978); State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 181-82, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999); Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 308-309 (Wyo. 1977); see also People v. Markham, supra, 49 Cal. 3d 65, 71 (article I, § 28, subdivision [d] of California c

  3. State v. Pickar

    453 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1990)   Cited 19 times

    We will reverse only if the trial court's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d at 84; Discoe, supra at 468; State v. Carlson, 318 N.W.2d 308 (N.D.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040, 103 S.Ct. 456, 74 L.Ed.2d 609 (1982); State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1980); State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1977). A confession is voluntary if it is the product of the defendant's free choice, rather than the product of coercion.

  4. State v. Dilger

    338 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1983)   Cited 22 times
    In State v. Dilger, 338 N.W.2d 87, 92 (N.D. 1983), we determined no speedy trial violation occurred, noting the trial court had established bail conditions that the defendant did not meet. "[Defendant] has not demonstrated that the delay caused any evidence or testimony to be lost, or impaired his defense in any other way."

    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, reh'g denied sub nom. California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966). In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress a defendant's statements, we said, in State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706, 710 (N.D. 1977), quoting State v. Nagel, 75 N.D. 495, 28 N.W.2d 665, 677 (1947): "`As to whether a confession is voluntarily or involuntarily made is a matter to be determined in the first instance by the court.

  5. State v. Discoe

    334 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 1983)   Cited 28 times
    Recognizing that a district court is in a superior position to determine the weight to give a witness's testimony

    Recognizing that a trial court is in a much better position to judge the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, we show great deference on appeal to the trial court's determination of voluntariness by refusing to reverse its decision unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Carlson, supra; Roquette, supra; State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1977). See also Walker v. State, 386 So.2d 762 (Ala.Cr. App. 1980); People v. Aldridge, 37 Ill.Dec. 286, 79 Ill.2d 87, 402 N.E.2d 176 (1980); People v. Martin, 99 Mich. App. 570, 297 N.W.2d 718 (1980).

  6. State v. Packineau

    270 N.W.2d 336 (N.D. 1978)   Cited 13 times   2 Legal Analyses

    A summary of decisions of this court on these matters as of March, 1977, may be found in Gerhardt v. Fleck, 251 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1977). Since that time, more of these decisions have been issued. See, e. g., Halverson v. Pet, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 11 (N.D. 1977); State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1977); State v. Paulson, 256 N.W.2d 556 (N.D. 1977). There can be no doubt that the court favors a decision of an appeal on its merits [ LeFevre Sales, Inc. v. Bill Rippley Construction, Inc., 238 N.W.2d 673 (N.D. 1976)], but this will not always be an overriding factor.

  7. Halverson v. Pet, Inc

    260 N.W.2d 11 (N.D. 1978)   Cited 6 times

    In an effort to encourage compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure in the past, we have assessed costs against the party failing to comply with them. State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1977); Gerhardt v. Fleck, supra, LeFevre Sales, Inc. v. Bill Rippley Construction, supra; Nodak Mutual Ins. Co. v. Loeffler, supra. Assessing costs against Pet, Inc., is justified in this case.