Opinion
I.D. No. 9906019526
Date Submitted: February 8, 2001
Date Decided: March 21, 2001
ORDER
Upon review of Movant Terrnice Thompkins ("Movant")'s Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court:
1. Movant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 from a guilty plea to five counts of Theft-Felony and one count of Theft-Misdemeanor which arose from an embezzlement scheme she perpetrated on her employer.
2. Movant pled guilty on January 18, 2000. On March 17, 2000, Movant was declared an habitual criminal offender, and she was sentenced to seven years at Level V pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) for Theft-felony and incarceration was suspended for probation for the remaining charges. Movant was discharged from her Violations of Probation, which were admitted and pending, as unimproved from such probationary periods and her restitution obligation was converted to a civil judgment, along with restitution from the new charges.
3. In her motion, Movant asserts ineffective assistance of counsel as her grounds for relief Movant alleges that counsel was ineffective in not insuring the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of her plea. Movant also claims counsel was ineffective in addressing her habitual offender status during sentencing.
4. In reviewing motions for postconviction relief the Court must first determine whether a defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may consider the merits of the postconviction relief claim. Rule 61(i)(4) provides for summary dismissal by the Court "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion . . . and the record . . . that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal."
Bailey v State, Del. Supr. 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
5. The Defendant has the burden of showing in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that an attorney's conduct did not meet reasonable professional standards and that such conduct was prejudicial to him. The Defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective and unreasonable conduct by his attorney. Conclusory allegations are legally insufficient to substantiate the claim. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based solely on counsel's strategic choices made after a thorough investigation of law and facts is insufficient to prove the claim that counsel's professional performance was ineffective.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
Outten v. State, Del.Supr., 720 A.2d 547 (1998); Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (1996).
Duffy v. State, Del.Supr., No. 529, 1992, Horsey, J. (Jan. 27, 1993).
Strickland, 466 U.S. 66.
6. Movant's first ground alleges counsel was ineffective because counsel was deficient in how he advised Movant as to her guilty plea. Movant claims she entered into the guilty plea without being advised of the consequences of the plea. Movant claims that counsel insisted that she enter a guilty plea under the Habitual Offender Act, or she would be sentenced to life imprisonment. Movant asserts that she signed the plea agreement because she believed counsel had advocated for her to the standard required by the Sixth Amendment. She claims she was not properly advised of her rights, and entered into the plea without full knowledge of the consequences due to counsel's "erroneous advise."
The Court finds there is no merit to Movant's first claim. There is no evidence in Movant's motion or in the record that supports Movant's claim of misinformation by counsel. Movant gives no specific allegations in her motion to support this claim. Counsel met with Movant at the Woman's Correctional Institution, provided her with copies of and reviewed with her all the discovery materials provided by the State. These included the documents the State intended to offer into evidence at trial. Counsel reviewed each count of the indictment, as well as photographs taken while the checks at issue were being deposited. Counsel provided Movant with copies of the records of her three prior felony convictions. Counsel also reviewed the State's plea offer with her, and advised her of her trial rights.
Counsel wanted to carefully handle this case after he witnessed her publicly criticize her previous attorney in open Court. He reviewed all the evidence with the Movant and advised her of his opinion of her chances for a successful defense. He advised her to accept the State's plea offer. During the sentencing, Movant stated she was not happy with counsel's qualifying under Habitual Offenders Act are generally given this application." Movant does not support this claim with any evidence. Movant fails to demonstrate that she would not have been found to be a habitual offender, or that she would have received a different sentence but for counsel's representation.
8. Movant's contentions are conclusory and contrary to the evidence on record and therefore are without merit. Movant has failed to prove that counsel was ineffective under Strickland.
For the above stated reasons, Movant's motion for postconviction relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.