Nevertheless, the law at the time although not evolving with great clarity, was clearly as stated in the trial court's instruction. See State v. Thomas, 8 Wn. App. 495, 507 P.2d 153 (1973), for a discussion by James, J., of the evolution of the test. The critical distinction is that the test is now expressed in the disjunctive as it was originally stated in M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
As in the other cases cited, there was no discussion of the mental processes involved in knowledge or appreciation. State v. Thomas, 8 Wn. App. 495, 507 P.2d 153 (1973), a Court of Appeals decision cited by the prosecutor, holds that the M'Naghten rule as applied in this state requires the defendant to show both an inability to perceive the nature and quality of the act with which he is charged, and an inability to tell right from wrong with reference to such act. The court followed the precedents of this court with approval.
The ultimate question for decision is one of fact. State v. Thomas, 8 Wn. App. 495, 507 P.2d 153 (1973); State v. Reece, 79 Wn.2d 453, 486 P.2d 1088 (1971); State v. Johnson, 67 Wn.2d 671, 409 P.2d 655 (1965); State v. Putzell, 40 Wn.2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952). There is nothing in the record before us which indicates that the withdrawal of defendant's plea of guilty was necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
Since then, the appellate courts of the state have reaffirmed the M'Naghten rule as the correct rule to be applied in insanity cases. State v. Ferrick, 81 Wn.2d 942, 506 P.2d 860 (1973); State v. Boggs, 80 Wn.2d 427, 495 P.2d 321 (1972); State v. Reece, 79 Wn.2d 453, 486 P.2d 1088 (1971); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn. App. 495, 507 P.2d 153 (1973); State v. Myers, 6 Wn. App. 557, 494 P.2d 1015 (1972). The judgment is affirmed.
He further asserts that, in any event, the instruction given "erroneously articulated and applied the M'Naghten rule." In State v. Thomas, 8 Wn. App. 495, 507 P.2d 153 (1973), we pointed out that the Washington Supreme Court has consistently adhered to its interpretation of the M'Naghten rule and has consistently rejected the Durham and other "irresistible impulse" definitions of criminal insanity. In State v. Ferrick, 81 Wn.2d 942, 506 P.2d 860 (1973), the Washington Supreme Court again reiterated its commitment to its version of M'Naghten. The instruction given was a correct definition of criminal insanity in Washington.