State v. Thirdgill

10 Citing cases

  1. People v. Krezen

    427 Mich. 681 (Mich. 1986)   Cited 16 times
    In People v Krezen, 427 Mich. 681; 397 N.W.2d 803 (1986), this Court upheld an impoundment of a vehicle pursuant to an arrest.

    me of her arrest. State v Osborn, 426 So.2d 323 (La App, 1983) (impoundment unreasonable where vehicle parked in shopping center lot); Granville v State, 348 So.2d 641 (Fla App, 1977) (improper impoundment where vehicle parked in friend's driveway and defendant was arrested at a safe distance from the vehicle); Morton v State, 452 So.2d 1361 (Ala Crim App, 1984) (impoundment unreasonable where vehicle parked in service station); Weed v Wainwright, 325 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla App, 1976) (impoundment improper where arrestee's vehicle parked in store parking lot); Dixon v State, 23 Md. App. 19, 38-39; 327 A.2d 516 (1974) (necessity for impounding vehicle not demonstrated where vehicle was in public parking lot at time of arrest); State v Slockbower, n 24 supra, pp 11-13 (impoundment improper since vehicle could have been safely locked at scene of arrest); Kelly v State, 607 P.2d 706, 708 (Okla Crim App, 1980) (impoundment improper where vehicle parked in parking lot of business establishment); State v Thirdgill, 46 Or. App. 595, 599-600; 613 P.2d 44 (1980) (impoundment improper where vehicle was in restaurant parking lot); Rodriguez v State, 641 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex Crim App, 1982) (impoundment improper where no showing vehicle was illegally parked in an alley). Similarly see United States v Pappas, 735 F.2d 1232, 1234 (CA 10, 1984) (improper impoundment where vehicle was parked in parking lot of a club).

  2. United States v. Angell

    21-cr-168-PB (D.N.H. Jul. 11, 2022)

    se it “would have been easy prey for vandals” and “would have posed a safety threat”); see alsoCommonwealth v. Lugg, 84 Mass.App.Ct. 1127 (2013) (decision to impound a car with an open window legally parked along Revere Beach Boulevard reasonable because of the possibility of theft or vandalism); People v. Scigliano, 241 Cal.Rptr. 546, 54849 (Ct. App. 1987) (officer could impound a car with a missing windshield stopped in a restaurant parking lot because “there was no way to secure the vehicle” and personal valuables inside it were “visible and unprotected”); State v. Tully, 348 A.2d 603, 609 (Conn. 1974) (warrantless entry to retrieve for safekeeping a guitar from an unlocked vehicle parked in a vacant school parking lot reasonable in part because a missing vent window rendered it “incapable of being secured in its exposure to a genuine threat of vandalism”). But see State v. Thirdgill, 613 P.2d 44, 45-46 (Or. App. 1980) (without addressing the risk of vandalism or theft, finding impoundment unlawful where defendant's car with a broken-out window was parked in a restaurant parking lot).

  3. Commonwealth v. Brinson

    440 Mass. 609 (Mass. 2003)   Cited 40 times
    Finding impoundment of a car lawfully parked in a parking lot reasonable despite the absence of a request for removal from the lot owner where the public nature of the vehicle's location created potential for vandalism, the driver would not return soon, and no one at the scene of arrest was available to take custody of the vehicle

    Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (car left unattended after arrest insufficient reason to justify search); Dunkum v. State, 138 Ga. App. 321, 325 (1976) (police may not impound car not involved in drug deal and safely parked in commercial lot); Dixon v. State, 23 Md. App. 19, 38 (1974) (unlawful impoundment of car parked in lot in different location from arrest because there was no impediment to traffic or apparent danger to car); Lee v. State, 628 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Okla. 1981) (unlawful impoundment of car "in no way connected to the crime" and posed no traffic hazard); State v.Thirdgill, 46 Or. App. 595, 597 (1980) (police may not impound arrested individual's car parked in commercial lot because it was unrelated to crime, did not obstruct traffic, and lot owner did not request its removal). Here, the Subaru posed no public safety risk, and the record contains no evidence of threat of vandalism to justify impoundment.

  4. State v. Bridewell

    306 Or. 231 (Or. 1988)   Cited 89 times
    Permitting officers to perform warrantless caretaking functions with statutory authorization

    In State v. Fleming, 63 Or. App. 661, 665 P.2d 1235 (1983), the court held that police officers could not, pursuant to a community caretaking function, lift a folded-down back seat of an automobile that they had stopped and moved at the defendant's request. See also State v. Thirdgill, 46 Or. App. 595, 613 P.2d 44 (1980). There is no generic "community caretaking function."

  5. State v. Goff

    166 W. Va. 47 (W. Va. 1980)   Cited 38 times
    In Goff the defendant was arrested for breaking and entering into a used car dealership after his accomplice was discovered on the accompanying lot driving one of the dealership’s automobiles.

    It seems clear from Opperman and cases that proceeded and followed it, that the right to an inventory search begins at the point where the police have a lawful right to impound the vehicle. Brown v. Superior Court, 119 Ariz. 205, 580 P.2d 343 (1978); State v. Boster, 217 Kan. 618, 539 P.2d 294 (1975); Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1979); State v. McDaniel, 156 N.J. Super. 347, 383 A.2d 1174 (1978); State v. Thirdgill, 46 Or. App. 595, 613 P.2d 44 (1980); Annot. 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 551 (1973). This initial step must be taken otherwise there is no rationale for the inventory search since it is based on protection of the owner's property, as well as the police against claims that property has been lost or stolen from the vehicle, while it is in police custody.

  6. Commonwealth v. Dunn

    34 Mass. App. Ct. 702 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 22 times
    Holding it reasonable to impound vehicle where police were "responsible for pursuing the vehicle to a stop on private property and, by the arrest, leaving it driverless" to spare property owner burden of removal

    The cases cited as supporting the last proposition (3 LaFave, supra at 87 n. 55), however, seem to be mainly cases where the defendant had lawfully parked in a lot, such as that of a shopping mall, restaurant, or night spot, prior to his arrest on an offense not related to the use of the vehicle, and was reasonably expected to be able to remove the vehicle in the near future. See, e.g., State v. Bertram, 18 Ariz. App. 579 (1972); Weed v. Wainwright, 325 So.2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Dunkum v. State, 138 Ga. App. 321 (1976); Kelly v. State, 607 P.2d 706 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Thirdgill, 46 Or. App. 595 (1980); Riley v. State, 583 So.2d 1353 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). But see United States v. Hall, 565 F.2d 917, 921 (5th Cir. 1978) (automobile parked late at night in lot of closed service station, occupants arrested for public drunkenness); Biggers v. State, 162 Ga. App. 163, 164-165 (1982) (automobile parked in church lot, both occupants arrested; vehicle had expired dealer's plate).

  7. State v. Bridewell

    87 Or. App. 316 (Or. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 7 times

    See State v. Apodaca, 85 Or. App. 128, 133, 735 P.2d 1264 (1987).See also United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1125 (1st Cir 1978), cert den 440 U.S. 958 (1979); State v. Perry, 298 Or. 21, 26, 688 P.2d 827 (1984); State v. Davis, supra, 295 Or at 238; State v. Newman, supra; State v. Okeke, 82 Or. App. 393, 728 P.2d 872 (1986), rev allowed 303 Or. 261 (1987); State v. Fleming, 63 Or. App. 661, 665 P.2d 1235 (1983); State v. Walle, supra, 52 Or App at 967; State v. Thirdgill, 46 Or. App. 595, 613 P.2d 44 (1980); State v. Jones, 45 Or. App. 617, 620, 608 P.2d 1220, rev den 289 Or. 337 (1980); State v. Frink, 42 Or. App. 171, 176, 600 P.2d 456 (1979); State v. Plant, 28 Or. App. 771, 773, 561 P.2d 647 (1977); Crauthers v. State, 727 P.2d 9 (Alaska App 1986); see also, 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(c) (2d ed 1987). The validity of a warrantless search is tested against a standard of reasonableness.

  8. State v. Casteel

    392 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 3 times
    In Casteel, the court of appeals employed a type of "balancing test," between a defendant's expectation of privacy and the "safe keeping" purpose of the inventory, to assess the validity of the inventory search.

    F.2d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 1984) (improper impoundment where car was parked in parking lot of a club); Weed v. Wainwright 325 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla.App. 1976) (impoundment improper where arrestee's car parked in store parking lot); Dunkum v. State, 138 Ga. App. 321, 325, 226 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1976) (impoundment improper where arrestee's automobile parked in the parking lot of an unused nightclub); State v. Boster, 217 Kan. 618, 626-27, 539 P.2d 294, 301 (1975) (no legal justification for impounding car where alternative to impoundment exists); Dixon v. State, 23 Md. App. 19, 38-39, 327 A.2d 516, 527 (1974) (necessity for impounding car not demonstrated where car was in public parking lot at time of arrest); State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1, 11-13, 397 A.2d 1050, 1053-55 (1979) (impoundment improper since car could have been safely locked at scene of arrest); Kelly v. State, 607 P.2d 706, 708 (Okla.Crim. 1980) (impoundment improper where car parked in parking lot of business establishment); State v. Thirdgill, 46 Or. App. 595, 599-600, 613 P.2d 44, 46 (1980) (impoundment improper where car was in restaurant parking lot); Rodriguez v. State, 641 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex.App. 1982) (impoundment improper where no showing it was illegally parked in an alley). Because we find that the impoundment of Casteel's vehicle was unreasonable, the inventory search of the vehicle was unlawful and evidence obtained as a result thereof should have been suppressed.

  9. Morton v. State

    452 So. 2d 1361 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)   Cited 25 times
    In Morton, the defendant was arrested for two traffic violations after he had signed a summons to appear in court for the traffic violations.

    Although the many jurisdictions do not use uniform language or identical tests when resolving the issue of whether the impoundment of a vehicle was proper, the weight of authority makes it clear that the circumstances of each case must show that the impoundment was reasonable and necessary. See also Dunkum v. State, 138 Ga. App. 321, 226 S.E.2d 133 (1976); City of Danville v. Dawson, 528 S.W.2d 687 (Ky.Cr.App. 1975); State v. Thirdgill, 46 Or. App. 595, 613 P.2d 44 (1980); and Rodriquez v. State, 641 S.W.2d 955 (Tex.App. 1982). In Jones, supra, the driver of the vehicle had run away, the passenger was incoherent, and the vehicle was blocking a private drive.

  10. State v. Fleming

    63 Or. App. 661 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 9 times
    In State v. Fleming, 63 Or. App. 661, 665 P.2d 1235 (1983), the court held that police officers could not, pursuant to a community caretaking function, lift a folded-down back seat of an automobile that they had stopped and moved at the defendant's request.

    After a vehicle has been lawfully impounded, a warrantless inventory search of articles in plain view in the vehicle has been sustained. State v. Keller, 265 Or. 622, 510 P.2d 568 (1973); State v. Thirdgill, 46 Or. App. 595, 613 P.2d 44 (1980). The purpose of such a procedure is to protect the vehicle and the property in it and to safeguard the police from danger and from claims for lost possessions.