In discussing the first example, Justice Kennedy wrote that "there would be a plausible argument that experience cures some of the uncertainty surrounding the anonymity, justifying a proportionate police response." Id. at 275; see generally State v. Therrien, 110 N.M. 261, 264, 794 P.2d 735, 738 (Ct.App. 1990) (discussing the appropriate analysis of an anonymous tip for purposes of determining probable cause to support a warrant), overruled on other grounds by State v. Barker, 114 N.M. 589, 594, 844 P.2d 839, 844 (Ct.App. 1992). None of these alternatives are helpful in supporting the stop in this case.

See also Rule 5-211(E); State v. Turkal, 93 N.M. 248, 250, 599 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1979) (uncorroborated information supplied by an unidentified "concerned juvenile citizen" in an affidavit for issuance of a search warrant may be reliable if the information is otherwise corroborated); State v. Utterback, 485 N.W.2d 760, 768 (Neb. 1992) (enumerating ways in which reliability of an informant may generally be established). {12} Reliability of an informant may be established, among other ways, by showing that: (1) the informant has given reliable information to police officers in the past, State v. Cervantes, 92 N.M. 643, 647, 593 P.2d 478, 482 (Ct.App. 1979); (2) the informant is a volunteer citizen-informant, Hernandez, 111 N.M. at 228, 804 P.2d at 419; State v. Therrien, 110 N.M. 261, 263-64, 794 P.2d 735, 737-38 (Ct.App. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. Barker, 114 N.M. 589, 593, 844 P.2d 839, 843 (Ct.App. 1992); (3) the informant has made statements against his or her penal interest, Cordova, 109 N.M. at 218, 784 P.2d at 37; (4) independent investigation by police corroborates informant's reliability or information given; and (5) facts and circumstances disclosed impute reliability, Snedeker, 99 N.M. at 290, 657 P.2d at 617. {13} Seeking to counter the assertions of the Child that the affidavit lacked sufficient information to establish the veracity and basis of knowledge requirements recognized in Cordova, the State emphasizes that the informants referred to in the affidavit were described as "concerned citizens" and, thus, were presumed to be reliable and credible.

The arresting officer testified that the vehicle was stopped solely to investigate the tip. Our recent case of State v. Therrien, 110 N.M. 261, 794 P.2d 735 (Ct.App. 1990), contains applicable language. In Therrien, we reversed a conviction for marijuana possession because the affidavit used to secure the search warrant was insufficient.

State v. Herrera; State v. Baca. Without such facts, there is no substantial evidence that the evidence sought would be located in the trailer. The state also relies on our recent case of State v. Therrien, 110 N.M. 261, 263, 794 P.2d 735, 737 (Ct.App. 1990) (refusing to assume veracity of crimestopper's call; noting that reasons may exist to presume veracity of eyewitnesses and victims of crimes) to allege that Dolores Whatley, as the person providing the police with the information as to the location of the truck, and as an eyewitness to the assaults, carries sufficient credibility without any specific corroboration of reliability. While Therrien does note eyewitnesses and victims of crimes may not pose the reliability concerns posed by other types of informants, it also notes that tips are not to substitute for legitimate and proper police follow-up investigatory work.

[BIC 13-14] Like the district court, we are unpersuaded that those facts about an event that had occurred months earlier provided a substantial basis for assessing an anonymous informant's credibility with regard to unrelated events like the uncorroborated trafficking allegations described in the remainder of the affidavit. Compare St a t e v. Th errien , 1990-N M C A -060, ¶ 15, 110 N.M. 261, 794 P.2d 735 (noting that information corroborated was not incriminatory and was "so readily available to any member of the public that the [declarant's] accuracy in this regard was not probative of his accuracy regarding covert criminal activity"), wit h State v. Jones, 1981-NMS C-013, ¶ 4, 96 N.M. 14, 627 P.2d 409 (relying upon informant's disclosure of facts not publicly known); cf. State v. Bedolla, 1991-NM CA-002, ¶ 15, 111 N.M. 448, 806 P . 2d 588 (noting in the context of a warrantless stop that "the corroborated portions of the tip were readily available to any member of the public"). {¶8} Finally, the State suggests that the informant's veracity was established by the affidavit's recitation of "facts and circumstances" from which reliability could be imputed.

As we explained in our notice, our case law indicates this statement provided sufficient information to establish the credibility of the informant. See State v. Cordova, 1989-NMSC-083, ¶ 20, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (concluding that an affidavit was sufficient where it stated that the informant had provided information in the past that the affiant found to be true from personal knowledge and investigation); State v. Therrien, 1990-NMCA-060, ¶ 6, 110 N.M. 261, 794 P.2d 735 ("The New Mexico Supreme Court has approved an unadorned allegation that the informant had provided information in the past which the affiant did find to be true and correct from personal knowledge and investigation." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Barker, 1992-NMCA-117, ¶ 13, 114 N.M. 589, 844 P.2d 839; State v. Ramirez, 1980-NMCA-108, ¶ 4, 95 N.M. 202, 619 P.2d 1246 (concluding that credibility was established "by the statement in the affidavit that the affiant knows the informant to be reliable because he has provided him with reliable information concerning narcotics violations in the past"); State v. Cervantes, 1979-NMCA-029, ¶¶ 12-13, 92 N.M. 643, 593 P.2d 478 (concluding that the credibility of an informant was established by a statement in an affidavit, providing that the informant had provided information in the past week that had resulted in the recovery of stolen property).

Such generalized assertions of reliability and vague references to past involvement with law enforcement activities are insufficient to establish that the informant has actually given reliable information to police officers in the past. See State v. Therrien, 1990-NMCA-060, ¶ 6, 110 N.M. 261, 794 P.2d 735 (holding that a police officer's statement that he knew the informant to be reliable is insufficient to establish credibility), overruled on other grounds by State v. Barker, 1992-NMCA-117, ¶ 13, 114 N.M. 589, 844 P.2d 839; and see, e.g., State v. Vest, 2011-NMCA-037, ¶¶17-18, 149 N.M. 548, 252 P.3d 772 (observing that previous performance supports credibility only if the affidavit indicates that the informant actually provided accurate information to law enforcement in the past), cert. quashed, 2012-NMCERT-004, 293 P.3d 887. {14} With respect to the second factor, the CI was not a volunteer citizen-informant. Instead, the CI was seeking a monetary reward.

"Ex parte Hergott, 588 So.2d at 916 (emphasis added in Hull). Compare Reimnitz v. State's Attorney of Cook County, 761 F.2d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1985) (wherein the court assumed that an appellate court determination of a suppression issue has double jeopardy implications on retrial); United States v. McKim, 509 F.2d 769, 775-76 (5th Cir. 1975) (government estopped from asserting, in trial of accused for escape from jail in which he was incarcerated following arrest for possession of marijuana, that arrest was lawful, where lawfulness of arrest had already been litigated between same parties and decided in accused's favor on direct appeal of marijuana conviction); State v. Therrien, 110 N.M. 261, 265, 794 P.2d 735, 739 (App. 1990) (wherein the court assumed that, on retrial after reversal for insufficient search warrant affidavit, fruits of search were inadmissible); State v. Henderson, 109 N.M. 655, 664, 789 P.2d 603, 612 (1990) (when State failed to establish proof of statutory aggravating circumstance, double jeopardy clause barred State from `attempting to prove on remand that independent facts exist which support' the aggravating circumstance); State v. Post, 109 N.M. at 181-82, 783 P.2d at 491-92 (when conviction reversed for admission of confession in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, [ 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981),] confession was inadmissible on retrial and prosecution must introduce other evidence of guilt. `Whether the state can replace [the confession] with other evidence is not to be decided on this appeal'). "We find no discernible difference between the present case and Ex parte Hergott.

When the only basis for a warrant is hearsay from individuals like the victim, who are not law enforcement officers, the supporting affidavit should establish (1) the informant's veracity, (2) the informant's motive to lie, and (3) information that the allegations of criminality had been sufficiently corroborated. State v. Therrien, 110 N.M. 261, 262-263, 794 P.2d 735, 736-37 (Ct.App. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Barker, 114 N.M. at 594, 844 P.2d at 844. The report of the first investigating officer, who interviewed both Defendant and the victim on the day of the original report six weeks prior to the search, found that no evidence corroborated the victim's complaint.

The inclusion of the period from entry of Defendant's guilty plea to entry of the judgment and sentence is a new argument on appeal and as such will not be entertained. State v. Therrien, 110 N.M. 261, 265, 794 P.2d 735, 739 (Ct.App. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Barker, 114 N.M. 589, 593, 844 P.2d 839, 843 (Ct.App. 1992); State ex rel. Bardacke v. Welsh, 102 N.M. 592, 596, 698 P.2d 462, 466 (Ct.App. 1985); cf. State v. Clark, 1999-NMSC-035, ¶ 6, 128 N.M. 119, 990 P.2d 793. Further, this issue was not reserved in the conditional plea agreement.