Opinion
File No. 7317
Opinion filed January 15, 1953. Rehearing denied February 3, 1953
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Ward County, A. J. Gronna, Judge.
E. T. Christianson, Attorney General, C. E. Brace, Assistant Attorney General et al., for appellants.
A new act which covers the subject matter of an old act, and is intended to revise and take the place of the old act or a part thereof, repeals the old act or as much thereof as is affected. State ex rel. O'Donnel v. Flickering, 211 Ind. 361, 7 N.E.2d 192.
Provisions of a former statute, not inconsistent with a later dealing with the same subject matter, may be continued in force by express language. Olson v. State, 36 Ariz. 294, 285 P. 282.
The repeal and simultaneous re-enactment of substantially the same statutory provisions is construed, not as an implied repeal of the original statute, but as affirmance and continuation thereof. American Life Insurance Company v. State, 226 Ala. 383, 147 So. 168; Sullivan v. City of Omaha, 146 Neb. 297, 19 N.W.2d 510, also in 21 N.W.2d 510; Noonan v. City of Portland, 161 Or. 213, 88 P.2d 808; In re Willson's Estate, 102 Mont. 178, 56 P.2d 733; Brun v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 191 A. 240; Duggan v. Ogden, 278 Mass. 432, 180 N.E. 307; 50 Am Jur 538, Section 533.
In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative will is the all important and controlling factor. A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy, or defeat the intention of the legislature. 50 Am Jur 200, Section 223; State ex rel. Fargo v. Wetz, 40 N.D. 299, 168 N.W. 835; State v. Fargo Bottling Works, 19 N.D. 396, 124 N.W. 387.
A statute entitled to a liberal construction should be fairly or favorably construed, so as to give it, if possible, a beneficial operation and one which would tend to promote and effectuate justice in the interest of the public good. 50 Am Jur 401, Section 386; Fox Park Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736.
In determining whether one statute is impliedly repealed by another, it has been regarded as proper to take into consideration subsequent legislative action. 50 Am Jur 543, Section 538; Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 80 L ed 351, 56 S Ct 349.
Courts are averse to an implied repeal that may have the effect of unsettling rights to land. 50 Am Jur 548, Section 542; Doolittle v. Bryan, 14 How (US) 563, 14 L ed 543.
The fact that two statutes were passed at about the same time or at the same session of the legislature is strong evidence that they were intended to stand together. 50 Am Jur 543, Section 547.
If the objects of two statutes are not the same, the two statutes will be permitted to stand although they may refer to the same subject. U.S. v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546, 24 L ed 1082; McMillan v. Payne County, 14 Okla. 659, 79 P. 898.
It is the duty of the courts to harmonize conflicting statutory provisions as far as possible to the end that effect may be given to the legislative intent. City of Minot v. Amundson, 22 N.D. 236, 133 N.W. 551; International Rice Milling Co. v. N. L. R. B., 183 F.2d 21; Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. Robertson, 189 F.2d 405.
Nothing short of an irreconcilable conflict between two statutes works a repeal by implication. Charles Nelson Company v. Curtis, 1 F.2d 774; Oneida High School v. Board of Education, 145 Tenn. 306, 237 S.W. 52.
Courts usually will avoid interpreting a statute so as to render it ineffective, or to cause grave public injury, if there is a more reasonable interpretation that can rightfully be adopted. International Rice Milling Company v. N. L. R. B., 183 F.2d 21.
Where the wording of an act is somewhat obscure, the courts may seek the legislative intent as expressed by the author of the law, as a guide. Casserell v. U.S., 271 F 486 and 297 F 396.
Statutes should be interpreted in the light of the report of the committee which framed it. Norwille v. State Tax Commissioner, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937.
Cox, Cox, Pearce Engebretson, Bosard McCutcheon, Benson Swanson, for respondents.
The courts will not allow the legislature itself to interpret its prior acts. Baird v. Burle County, 53 N.D. 140, 205 N.W. 17.
In construing a statute the courts refuse to consider the testimony as to the intent of the legislature embodied therein by members of the legislature which enacted it. 2 Sutherland on Statutory Construction 504, Section 5013 and page 505; Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 65 L ed 349, 41 S Ct 172, 16 ALR 196.
The only proper way to construe a legislative act is from the language used in the act, and upon occasion, by resort to the history of the times when it was passed. U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290, 41 L ed 1007, 17 S Ct 540.
It (the doctrine of stare decisis) finds its support in the sound principle that when the courts have announced, for the guidance and government of individuals and the public, certain controlling principles of law, or have given a construction to statutes upon which individuals and the public have relied in making contracts, they ought not, after these principles have been promulgated and after the constructions have been published, to overrule them, thereby disturbing contracts rights that had been entered into and property rights that had been acquired upon the faith and credit that the principle announced or construction adopted in the opinion was the law of the land. 14 Am Jur 284, Section 60. See Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873; Kershaw v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 932, 47 N.W.2d 132; Kopplin v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 942, 47 N.W.2d 137.
This action was brought for the purpose of quieting title in Ward and Bottineau Counties in and to fifty per cent of the oil, natural gas, and minerals found on or underlying lands acquired by such counties by tax proceedings or otherwise and which lands have been or may be resold. The issue is whether this court should overrule and set aside its decisions in the following cases:
Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873;
Kershaw v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 932, 47 N.W.2d 132;
Kopplin v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 942, 47 N.W.2d 137.
The suit was tried to the court without a jury and resulted in a judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. From this judgment the plaintiffs have appealed.
The complaint, other than the formal allegations, alleges that Ward and Bottineau Counties own fifty per cent of the gas and oil rights in 51,000 acres of land pursuant to the reservation of mineral rights contained in Chapter 136 of the Session Laws of North Dakota for 1941. Then follows the particular description of the lands. The complaint further alleges that Chapter 286 of the Session Laws of 1941 was not intended by the Legislature to repeal Chapter 136, and that the court by its decisions in the cases above cited clearly thwarted the legislative intent and, in effect, promulgated judicial legislation in violation of Section 10, Article I of the Constitution of the United States; that a code commission, selected according to law and pursuant to authority, codified the laws of North Dakota in 1943, which codification was duly adopted by the Legislature, and wherein Chapter 136 of the Session Laws of 1941 appears as Section 11-2704, and after proclamation became a law of our state; that the matters involved in this action are of general interest and affect the welfare of all the people of the State of North Dakota in that the production of oil and gas will be an important source of revenue; that the title to all mineral rights reserved by Chapter 136 should be quieted in the owners thereof.
The answers generally deny the allegations of the complaint and then set forth the leasehold interests of the defendants.
The plaintiffs concede that the facts in the case are the same as in the Kershaw and Kopplin cases above cited with this exception: The plaintiffs have here offered the testimony of three members of the 1941 Legislature, who testified as to the intent of the Legislative Body in the passage of Chapters 136 and 286. That this testimony was incompetent for any purpose seems apparent. The plaintiffs have cited no authority to sustain the competency of this testimony. They admit that such evidence could not be offered to prove legislative intent or to aid in the interpretation of any Act or to aid in the reaching of any conclusion as to the meaning of any Act, but they argue that such evidence shows that the members of the Legislature did not discern any conflict between Chapters 136 and 286. Whether the members of the Legislature discerned a conflict is manifestly immaterial. The testimony of individual members of the Legislature is inadmissible, whether it pertains to legislative intention or motives of the members in enacting the law, the meaning of which is being determined. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., (Horack) Section 5013; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 41 L ed 1007, 17 Sup Ct Rep 540.
It is unnecessary to review the argument of counsel for plaintiffs in this case because it appears evident that the same argument was made in the Adams County, Kershaw and Kopplin cases. It is not disputed that this court considered all the issues raised in this case in the previous cases heretofore decided. The sole contention is that this court was wrong in its former decisions and therefore they should be overruled. There is no complaint that those former decisions were not carefully considered or that the conclusions were arrived at without the full expression of reasons. Only one inference can be drawn from a review of the former decisions announced by this court, and that inference is that they were arrived at after thorough deliberation. The decisions heretofore rendered by this court were reasoned conclusions backed by authority and considered with care. No cogent reason has been presented sustaining the plaintiffs' conclusion that the former decisions were erroneous.
There is a further reason why this court should not withdraw its approval of its former decisions. It is a matter of common knowledge that since these opinions were announced there has been in our state an enormous activity in the purchase, sale and leasing of mineral rights. The former decisions of the court have become a rule of property and under the doctrine of "stare decisis" should be adhered to. Horton v. Wright, Barrett Stilwell Co., 43 N.D. 114, 174 N.W. 67; Seibert v. United States, 129 U.S. 192, 32 L ed 645, 9 Sup Ct Rep 271; 14 Am Jur, Courts, Section 65; 15 CJ, Courts, Section 304; and 21 CJS, Courts, Section 187.
The judgment entered in the District Court dismissing plaintiffs' complaint is affirmed.
MORRIS, C. J., and GRIMSON, THOMAS J. BURKE and A. M. CHRISTIANSON, JJ., concur.
Mr. Justice SATHRE, being disqualified, did not participate, Hon. W. H. HUTCHINSON, Judge of Third Judicial District, sitting in his stead.