Certainly this is the most often quoted articulation of probable cause in Hawaiian case law. See, e.g., State v. Gustafson, 55 Haw. 65, 69, 515 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1973); State v. Delmondo, 54 Haw. 552, 554, 512 P.2d 551, 552 (1973); State v. Chong, 52 Haw. 226, 231, 473 P.2d 567, 571 (1970); State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142, 433 P.2d 593, 597 (1967). Though the subjective mental state of probable cause is inherently incapable of precise and mathematical definition, we are not without guidelines in determining when, under particular circumstances, the constitutionally accepted minimums of probable cause have been established.
So we reason independently, untethered from the Supreme Court’s analysis of the United States Constitution. State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n.2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n.2 (1967). Hawai‘i’s people "are entitled to an independent interpretation of State constitutional guarantees."
So we reason independently, untethered from the Supreme Court’s analysis of the United States Constitution. State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n.2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n.2 (1967). Hawai‘i’s people "are entitled to an independent interpretation of State constitutional guarantees."
55 Haw. at 96, 516 P.2d at 69-70. Also, in State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 433 P.2d 593 (1967), this court upheld a warrantless arrest based upon an informant's telephone call because "there was both verification of every fact the informer communicated to [the] officer . . ., and a history of past reliability. Id. at 141, 433 P.2d at 596.
Nevertheless, this court has always been mindful of its obligation to "afford defendants the minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment to the Federal Constitution. . . ." State v.Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 (1967). Accordingly, inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court has deemed the right of self-representation to be implicit in the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and the sixth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, it therefore follows, and we so hold, that the same right is guaranteed by article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution.
In State v. Tsukiyama, 56 Haw. 8, 12, 525 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1974), we stated that "[i]n order to determine if the defendant's liberty was restrained and he was, therefore, seized, we must evaluate the totality of the circumstances and decide whether or not a reasonably prudent person would believe he was free to go." In State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 (1967), we acknowledged that "[a]s long as we afford defendants the minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, we are unrestricted in interpreting the constitution of this state to afford greater protection." Thus, we decline to adopt the definition of seizure employed by the United States Supreme Court in Hodari D. and, instead, choose to afford greater protection to our citizens by maintaining the Mendenhall standard.
$10,447.00, 104 Hawai`i at 331, 89 P.3d at 831 (quoting Detroy, 102 Hawai`i at 18, 72 P.3d at 490); see also State v. Brighter, 63 Haw. 95, 101, 621 P.2d 374, 379 (1980) (stating that probable cause "requires more than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty"); State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142, 433 P.2d 593, 597 (1967) ("It is clear that the term probable cause, according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). "Certainty," of course, is considerably greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence, which means that the existence of a fact is more likely than not. This court's formulation of the quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause is thus more demanding than that suggested by the ICA, which would lower the bar for the presence of probable cause to less than a preponderance of the evidence as a per se matter.
State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 533, 480 P.2d 148, 152 (1971). Accord State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 (1967) ("we [must] afford defendants the minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment to the [f]ederal [c]onstitution"). See also State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 265, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (1971).
[14] Although we are not bound by federal court interpretations of federal constitutional analogs when interpreting our state constitution, we can consider federal interpretations of similar language "with reference to the wisdom of adopting those interpretations for our state." State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n.2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n.2 (1967). We note that multiple courts within the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s geographical jurisdiction have specifically held that, where chattels are vital to the survival of houseless individuals, they are undoubtedly "property" within the meaning of the federal due process clause.
As long as we afford defendants the minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, we are unrestricted in interpreting the constitution of this state to afford greater protection. State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n.2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n.2 (1967).