Opinion
No. 36887-1-II.
February 18, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 07-1-01339-5, Ronald E. Culpepper, J., entered September 28, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Hunt, J., concurred in by Houghton and Quinn-Brintnall, JJ.
Regan Dean Testerman appeals his jury trial conviction for forgery. He argues that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to convict him. We affirm.
FACTS I. Background
In early 2007, Regan Testerman received an e-mail dated January 6, 2007, with "subject, employmeny[sic]" in the subject field. He opened the e-mail, which contained multiple misspellings.
The e-mail claimed to be from an international company "Lemmens Crane System," which offered an opportunity to make money and required that he have a bank account and a mailing address. The e-mail referenced the company's Asian operations and said that working for the company consisted of (1) receiving money orders mailed by the company, (2) depositing them in one's bank account, (3) keeping 10 percent of the proceeds as commission, (4) obtaining a new money order with the remaining 90 percent of the proceeds, and (5) mailing the new money order to the company in Nigeria.
Before replying to the e-mail, Testerman visited the company's website, but only briefly scanned it. Although the e-mail domain noted on the website was different than the one used to send the e-mail, Testerman replied to the e-mail he had received, telling the sender he wished to work for the company.
An "e-mail domain" is the portion of the e-mail address after the @.
A short time later, Testerman received a Federal Express package sent from outside the United States containing five United States Postal Service (USPS) money orders appearing to be drawn on a post office in Vermont. This system did not arouse his suspicions, but it seemed suspicious to his friend, Chris Hanson. Hanson told Testerman that (1) the arrangement seemed "fishy" and "sounds too good to be true," RP at 264-265; (2) it did not make sense for a company to send USPS money orders to an American to be cashed; and (3) he should quit because the scheme did not seem legitimate.
Testerman deposited four of the money orders into an automated teller machine at his bank rather than depositing them with a bank teller. Testerman's bank rejected the money orders and mailed them back to him, advising him that it could not process them. Testerman did not go into his bank to ask why it would not process his money order.
Testerman then took one of the money orders to a post office, asked the window clerk to cash it, and asked if anything was wrong with it. The clerk immediately recognized the money order as counterfeit and approached her supervisor, who called the police.
II. Procedure
The State charged Testerman with one count of forgery. During the trial, the State called Christina Hammett, the postal clerk to whom Testerman had presented the money order. She testified that Testerman had attempted to cash the money order, which was clearly counterfeit.
Testerman testified in his defense that he did not know the money order was counterfeit. Testerman also called Chris Hanson, who testified about his having cautioned Testerman about the money order scheme. Specifically, Hanson testified that he did not understand why an international business would send USPS money orders from overseas to be deposited in someone's bank account in the United States, directing the proceeds to be mailed back overseas with a new money order. The jury found Testerman guilty as charged.
Testerman appeals.
ANALYSIS
Testerman argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of forgery because the State presented no direct evidence that he knew the money order was forged. We disagree.
It is undisputed that Testerman possessed a forged written instrument.
I. Standard of Review
In determining whether evidence is sufficient in a criminal case, we examine whether, after viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 220-22, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonably drawn inferences. State v. Theroff, 25 Wn. App. 590, 593, 608 P.2d 1254, aff'd, 95 Wn.2d 385 (1980). State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are not subject to review. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (citing State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990)). We must defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874-75 (citing State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 (1985)).
II. Sufficient Evidence Supports Forgery Conviction
Testerman contends the evidence is insufficient because there was no direct evidence of his knowledge of the forged nature of the money orders. This argument fails.
"A person is guilty of forgery, if with intent to injure or defraud . . . [h]e possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he knows to be forged." RCW 9A.60.020(1)(b). But direct evidence of Testerman's knowledge is not necessary to support his forgery conviction. On the contrary, a person acts with "knowledge" when he has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe facts exist that define an offense under a statute. RCW 9A.08.010(b)(ii). And both indirect and circumstantial evidence can, and do, prove this disputed element here. See State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).
A "written instrument" is "[a]ny paper, document, or other instrument containing written or printed matter or its equivalent; . . . or any access device, token, stamp, seal, badge, trademark, or other evidence or symbol of value, right, privilege, or identification." RCW 9A.60.010(1).
At the outset, we note that the jury watched and heard Testerman on the witness stand. Clearly they found incredible his denial of knowledge that the money orders were forged. We do not invade this exclusive province of the jury.
Next, we hold that there was sufficient indirect and circumstantial evidence that Testerman should have known the money orders were forged. First, Testerman's bank had refused the money orders, advising him that they could not process them. This fact alone would put a reasonable person on notice of the suspect nature of the money orders; at the very least, a reasonable person would have inquired further to learn about the bank's reasons for rejecting the money orders before presenting and trying to cash others.
Second, the domain of the e-mail Testerman received did not match the domain on the company's website. This discrepancy would have made a reasonable person at least suspicious of the legitimacy of the company and its business.
Third, the company paid Testerman for essentially no work at all: the cashing of money orders. Under reasonable person in this situation would wonder about the legitimacy of the money orders, which purported to provide him with ready cash in return for nothing.
Fourth, viewing the same facts, Testerman's friend Chris Hanson concluded that something was amiss and told him so. Hanson exemplified a reasonable person, who, based on the circumstances under which the company was providing the money orders to Testerman, concluded that the money orders were likely not legitimate: Specifically, Hanson found the following circumstances troubling: (1) an international company mailing USPS money orders from overseas to people in the United States, (2) an international company paying 10 percent of the value of the money orders to the United States resident for nothing more than depositing them in the United States resident's bank account and mailing the remaining 90 percent, via a new money order purchased by the United States resident, back to the company in Nigeria.
Based on this circumstantial evidence, a reasonable person with Testerman's information would have concluded that the money orders were forged. This evidence, thus, meets the statutory definition of "knowledge" under RCW 9A.08.010(b)(ii), in spite of the lack of direct evidence that Testerman actually knew the money orders were forged.
Interpreting the facts in favor of the State, as we must in a challenge to the sufficiency evidence, we hold that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Testerman knowingly put off as true a document that he knew was forged and, therefore, sufficient evidence supports Testerman's conviction of forgery.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HOUGHTON, P.J. and QUINN-BRINTNALL, J., concur.