Id. at 476. Defendant concedes that this court rejected his argument under Apprendi, summarized above, in State v. Terry, 333 Or. 163, 37 P.3d 157 (2001). In Terry, this court held that, "[b]ecause a sentence of death is not an enhancement under the aggravated murder scheme, [but instead is one of the statutory penalties for that crime,] the state is not required to allege in the indictment that the murder was committed deliberately."

Our evaluation of the parties’ arguments starts with the Oregon Constitution, which gives circuit courts "subject matter jurisdiction over all actions unless a statute or rule of law divests them of jurisdiction." State v. Terry , 333 Or. 163, 186, 37 P.3d 157 (2001), cert. den. , 536 U.S. 910, 122 S.Ct. 2368, 153 L.Ed.2d 189 (2002) ; see Or. Const., Art. VII (Original), § 9 ("All judicial power, authority, and jurisdiction not vested by this Constitution, or by laws consistent therewith, exclusively in some other Court shall belong to the Circuit Courts[.]"); Or. Const., Art. VII (Amended), § 2 ("The courts, jurisdiction, and judicial system of Oregon, except so far as expressly changed by this amendment, shall remain as present constituted until otherwise provided by law.").

The state argues that "a claim that a court does not have jurisdiction over a particular offender, because of personal or historic facts associated with that individual, is a matter of personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction." The state relies solely on this sentence from State v. Terry, 333 Or 163, 186 n 14, 37 P3d 157 (2001), cert den, 536 US 910 (2002): "Subject matter jurisdiction differs from personal jurisdiction, which governs the assertion over the person of the accused." The state concludes with its observation that a challenge to personal jurisdiction may be waived.

No one disputes that the district attorney properly initiated this case by filing an information charging defendant with possessing methamphetamine. Nor does this case require us to reconsider our decision in State v. Terry , 333 Or. 163, 186, 37 P.3d 157 (2001), in which we held that a defective accusatory instrument does not deprive a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant does not contend that the accusatory instrument in this case was defective in any respect.

Used one way, the term can refer to subject matter jurisdiction, which is the scope of proceedings that a court may hear and over which the court may exercise judicial power. See Multnomah County Sheriff's Office v. Edwards , 361 Or. 761, 777-78, 399 P.3d 969 (2017) (explaining that the term "jurisdiction" can refer to "subject-matter jurisdiction," which means that the court possesses " ‘judicial power to act’ " (quoting State v. Nix , 356 Or. 768, 780, 345 P.3d 416 (2015) )); State v. Terry , 333 Or. 163, 186, 37 P.3d 157 (2001) (explaining that questions about "the scope of proceedings that may be heard by a particular court" present questions about the court's "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction"). A court's order or judgment in a case falling outside the scope of the court's subject matter jurisdiction generally may be challenged "at any time and any place, whether directly or collaterally," because the parties cannot consent to (or waive) subject matter jurisdiction.

To qualify for plain-error review, three requirements must be met: (1) it must be an error of law; (2) the point must be obvious, i.e. , not reasonably in dispute; and (3) the error cannot require us to go outside the record or select among competing inferences. State v. Terry , 333 Or. 163, 180, 37 P.3d 157 (2001), cert. den , 536 U.S. 910, 122 S.Ct. 2368, 153 L.Ed.2d 189 (2002). If those requirements are met, it is a matter of discretion whether we will reverse on plain-error grounds.

We agree with that proposition as well. The key Supreme Court case is State v. Terry, 333 Or 163, 37 P3d 157 (2001), cert den, 536 US 910 (2002). The defendant in Terry was convicted of aggravated murder.

The former use of the term "jurisdiction"—subject matter jurisdiction—we said, is the authority to exercise judicial power; that authority is conferred by a statute or the state constitution. Id. (citing State v. Terry , 333 Or. 163, 186, 37 P.3d 157 (2001), cert. den. , 536 U.S. 910, 122 S.Ct. 2368, 153 L.Ed.2d 189 (2002) ). We noted that orders entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction may be attacked at any time, while orders entered by a court with subject matter jurisdiction require a preserved claim of error.

Preservation, however, is an issue that we have an obligation to examine sua sponte.State v. Wyatt, 331 Or. 335, 346-47, 15 P.3d 22 (2000). In light of the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in State v.Terry, 333 Or. 163, 37 P.3d 157 (2001), cert den, 536 U.S. 910 (2002), we have reexamined the proposition that a defendant may, for the first time on appeal, challenge a charging instrument on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute an offense. We conclude that our prior statements in that regard have been vitiated by the decision in Terry, and we therefore overrule our prior cases so holding to the extent that they are contrary to our decision here.

This court has rejected a similar argument. In State v. Terry, 333 Or 163, 185, 37 P3d 157 (2001), the defendant contended that an indictment in a death-penalty prosecution must charge that the defendant acted deliberately because the jury was asked during the penalty phase to determine "whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death of the deceased or another would result" (emphasis added). This court concluded that, under Apprendi, the failure to plead the element that a defendant committed a capital crime deliberately was not error. Terry, 333 Or at 186.