Opinion
No. 4D16-277
05-10-2017
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. JOHN TELUCIEN, Appellee.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Matthew Steven Ocksrider, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Roger Cabrera of Roger Cabrera, P.A., Miami, for appellee.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Raag Singhal, Judge; L.T. Case No. 15-10630 CF10A. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Matthew Steven Ocksrider, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Roger Cabrera of Roger Cabrera, P.A., Miami, for appellee. PER CURIAM.
The state appeals from a final order granting the defendant's motion for speedy trial discharge. The state argues that the defendant's motion for continuance on a misdemeanor charge waived his right to a speedy trial on the felony charge filed after the expiration of the speedy trial period. We disagree and affirm the discharge order.
The defendant was arrested on July 30, 2014, on a complaint charging him with one count of felony child abuse and one count of misdemeanor battery. The charges stemmed from his texting relationship and physical contact with a minor who attended the summer camp where he was a counselor. On August 27, 2014, the state filed a "no information" on both charges. Then, on October 27, 2014—just one day before the expiration of the speedy trial period for a misdemeanor—the state filed an information as to the misdemeanor charge.
On January 29, 2015, 93 days after the speedy trial period expired for a misdemeanor and eight days after the period expired for a felony, the trial court granted a defense continuance on the misdemeanor charge.
On August 18, 2015, 384 days after the defendant's initial arrest, the state "up-filed" or amended its information, charging the defendant with a felony count of lewd and lascivious conduct. This new felony charge arose from the same conduct for which the defendant was initially arrested, but it was not filed until 209 days after the speedy trial period for a felony had expired. About a month later, the state entered a nolle prosequi on the misdemeanor charge.
The defendant moved for a speedy trial discharge on the felony charge, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a). The state opposed the motion, arguing that the defendant's prior continuance and speedy trial waiver in the misdemeanor case waived his speedy trial rights in the felony case as well. The trial court, however, ruled that, because the defendant did not waive his speedy trial rights until after the 175-day speedy trial period for a felony had expired, the post-expiration continuance was a nullity. Accordingly, the court granted the motion for speedy trial discharge. We agree with the trial court's reasoning and ruling in the well-written order below:
The quoted version of the trial court's order contains minor edits and formatting alterations. --------
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISCHARGE
. . .
The applicable speedy trial rule provides that a defendant must be brought to trial within ninety (90) days of being arrested if the crime charged is a misdemeanor, and within 175 days of being arrested if the crime charged is a felony. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a). If the defendant is not tried within these time frames, he is entitled to enforce his speedy trial right by filing a notice of expiration of speedy trial. This triggers the requirement that the court hold a hearing on the notice within five (5) days. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(h) and (p)(3). If the court determines that none of the reasons set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(j) exist to justify the delay in bringing the defendant to trial, the court must order that the defendant be brought to trial within ten (10) days. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3). Failure of the State to bring the defendant to trial within the recapture period entitles defendant to discharge from the crime. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3) . . .
The Florida Supreme Court in State v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993), addressed the effect of a nolle prosequi on the speedy trial requirements. The court noted that allowing the State to unilaterally toll the running of the speedy trial period by entering a nolle prosequi, would eviscerate the speedy trial rule. It would make it possible for a prosecutor with a weak case to enter a nolle prosequi while strengthening the case and refiling the "charges based on the same criminal episode months or even years later, thus effectively denying an accused the right to a speedy trial." Id. at 475. The court held that "when the State enters a nol pros (sic), the speedy trial period continues to run and the State may not refile charges based on the same conduct after the period has expired." Id.
The holding in Agee was extended to situations in which the State has announced a "no action" rather than a nolle prosequi. In Genden v. Fuller, 648 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1994), the Florida Supreme Court held that the speedy trial period "continues to run when the State voluntarily terminates prosecution before formal charges are filed and the State may not file charges based on the same conduct after the speedy trial period has expired." Id. at 1185. The court further found that there is no legally cognizable difference between the situation in Agee where the State voluntarily terminated prosecution after formally charging the defendant and the situation in Genden where the State terminated prosecution before filing an information. Id. (citing Fuller v. Genden, 630 So. 2d 1150, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)).
The underlying principle in Agee and Genden was further extended by the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2001), to circumstances where the State failed to act until after the speedy trial period expired. The court found that there was no legally cognizable difference between the State announcing a "no action," and the State failing to act until after the expiration of the speedy trial period. Id. at 1091 (citing Williams v. State, 774 So. 2d 23, 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)). The court concluded that "[a]s in Genden, the State was not entitled to a recapture period under rule 3.191." Id.
In all three cases, the State's failure to file charges prior to the expiration of the speedy trial period prevented the
defendant from filing a notice of expiration pursuant to rule 3.191(p)(2). Because the State's right to recapture is linked to a defendant's ability to exercise the right to file a notice of expiration when the speedy trial period has run, the State was not given the benefit of the recapture period either in Agee, Genden, or Williams. As explained by the court in State v. Clifton, 905 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), the rationale behind the rule adopted in Agee and extended to Genden and Williams is "based on fairness to the accused and preservation of the integrity of the speedy trial rule." To allow the State to proceed with prosecution in cases in which it announces a nolle prosequi or no action or where it does nothing to initiate prosecution before a defendant can exercise his speedy trial rights, would circumvent the purpose of the speedy trial rule. Id. at 177.
In the instant case, the State signaled its intent to terminate its prosecutorial efforts as to both the misdemeanor and the felony charge when it filed a "no information" on August 27, 2014. The State then timely filed an information charging Defendant with one count of misdemeanor battery. However, the State clearly abandoned its prosecutorial efforts as to the felony charge by failing to formally charge the Defendant with a felony during the speedy trial period. Only after 209 days from the expiration of the speedy trial period for a felony (384 days after arrest) did the State up-file an information in circuit court charging Defendant with a second degree felony.
The State argues that the continuance granted to Defendant constituted a waiver of his speedy trial rights in the misdemeanor case that carried over to the felony refile. See State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570, 580 (Fla. 2010) ("a continuance that is chargeable to the defense and made after the expiration of the speedy trial period but before a defendant files a notice of expiration waives a defendant's speedy trial rights under the default period of the rule"), and Palmer v. State, 76 So. 3d 1016, 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (approving the trial court's determination that under Nelson, Palmer's post-expiration continuance operated as a waiver of his speedy trial rights and that the waiver carried over to newly filed felony charges which arose from the same incident).
This case, however, is distinguishable from Nelson and
Palmer. The defendant in Nelson was charged in delinquency proceedings with grand theft and carrying a concealed firearm, and was granted a continuance shortly after the expiration of the juvenile trial period to engage in discovery. Nelson, 26 So. 3d at 572. A few days after the expiration of the felony speedy trial period, the State filed an information in felony court charging Nelson with the same counts as those contained in the juvenile petition and entered a nolle prosequi of the juvenile charges. Id. Nelson filed motions for discharge in the felony cases. Id. The Defendant in Palmer was charged with misdemeanor battery. After the expiration of the speedy trial period for the misdemeanor but prior to the expiration of the speedy trial period for a felony, Palmer was granted a continuance. The State entered a nolle prosequi of the misdemeanor case and filed an information charging Palmer with felony battery on a law enforcement officer prior to the expiration of the 175-day speedy trial period. Subsequently, Palmer filed a motion to dismiss the felony battery charge based on the expiration of the speedy trial period.
Unlike the defendants in Nelson and Palmer, the . . . instant case was not [a situation where the Defendant received] a post-expiration continuance in the misdemeanor case, engaged in further discovery, and then tried to avail himself of the speedy trial rule after the expiration of the felony speedy trial period. Instead, Defendant took the continuance ninety-three (93) days after the expiration of the speedy trial period for a misdemeanor and eight (8) days after the expiration of the speedy trial period for a felony. Furthermore, the State filed the felony charge 209 days after the expiration of the speedy trial period. Therefore, Defendant's post-expiration continuance was a nullity because the State failed to refile the felony charge within the 175-day speedy trial period. Nelson, 26 So. 3d at 578 (discussing State v. Leslie, 699 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)); see also State v. Naveira, 873 So. 2d 300, 305 (Fla. 2004) ("We confirm that the State may file a charging document at any time within the applicable speedy trial period. Under Williams, however, the State cannot charge the defendant after that period expires. Essentially, then, the speedy trial deadline also acts as the deadline for charging the defendant.").
The facts of this case present a scenario similar to that in Agee, Genden, and Williams, in which the State lulled the
Defendant into believing that it was unnecessary for him to file a notice of expiration of speedy trial after the 175-day speedy trial period for a felony had passed. Thus, the State is not entitled to the recapture period. Fairness to the accused and the need to preserve the speedy trial rule require that this Court grant Defendant's Motion for Discharge, as it was the State's action that deprived the Defendant of the possibility to file a notice of expiration of speedy trial as to the felony charge. This Court notes that the outcome would have been different had the State not entered a nolle prosequi of the misdemeanor charge, because that charge was timely filed and the Defendant requested a continuance prior to filing a notice of expiration of the applicable speedy trial period.
Based on the above, we affirm the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for discharge.
Affirmed. TAYLOR, LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.