Id. When asked to interpret two statutes that deal with similar subject matter, we construe them so that they do not contradict each other and so that they lead to a reasonable result and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statute. State v. Taylor, 152 N.H. 719, 720, 886 A.2d 1012 (2005). RSA 159:3 provides that a person is guilty of a class B felony if he "[o]wns or has in his possession or under his control, a pistol, revolver or other firearm" and has been convicted of certain classes of felonies.
Cotton, 535 U.S. at 634. The defendant argues that, based on our decisions in State v. Taylor, 152 N.H. 719, 720, 886 A.2d 1012 (2005), and State v. Henderson, 154 N.H. 95, 96, 907 A.2d 968 (2006), the trial court's error satisfies the final two prongs of the plain error rule. We disagree.
The damages award in this case, therefore, cannot stand. See State v. Taylor, 152 N.H. 719, 721, 886 A.2d 1012 (2005) (fourth prong of plain error test satisfied because sentence imposed by trial court was illegal in that it violated pertinent statute). The petitioner argues that the trial court's error does not satisfy the fourth prong because the respondent did not bring the error to the trial court's attention.
We have looked to the federal courts' standards for the application of the federal plain error rule to inform our application of the state rule. State v. Emery, 152 N.H. 783, 786, 887 A.2d 123 (2005); State v. Taylor, 152 N.H. 719, 720-21, 886 A.2d 1012 (2005).On the first criterion, the State concedes that it was error to admit the cross-examination at issue.
Omega contended, however, that we should review them under our plain error rule, which allows us to consider an error that affects substantial rights even though not raised by either party. See State v. Taylor, 152 N.H. 719, 720, 886 A.2d 1012 (2005); Sup. Ct. R. 16-A.Under our plain error rule, we consider the following four elements: (1) there must be an error; (2) the error must be plain; (3) the error must affect substantial rights; and (4) the error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
New Hampshire adopted a plain error rule, effective November 1, 2004, after the decision in Zwicker case issued in June of 2004. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 2005 WL 3043687, at *1 (N.H. Nov. 15, 2005). The warden contends that Zwicker's speedy trial claim has been procedurally defaulted.
To meet the third prong of the plain error test, the error must affect substantial rights. State v. Taylor, 152 N.H. 719, 720, 886 A.2d 1012 (2005). Generally, to satisfy the burden of demonstrating that an error affected substantial rights, the defendant must show that the error was prejudicial, i.e., that it affected the outcome of the proceeding.
To meet the third prong of the plain error test, the error must affect substantial rights. State v. Taylor, 152 N.H. 719, 720, 886 A.2d 1012 (2005). Generally, to satisfy the burden of demonstrating that an error affected substantial rights, the defendant must demonstrate that the error was prejudicial, i.e., that it affected the outcome of the proceeding.
One of the elements of the crime is that the defendant "[o]wns or has in his possession or under his control, a . . . firearm . . . or other deadly weapon . . . ." RSA 159:3, I(a). Certainly there are cases in which a defendant is convicted under RSA 159:3 and sentencing under RSA 651:2, II-g is not applicable. See State v. Taylor, 152 N.H. 719, 721, 886 A.2d 1012 (2005) (vacating the sentence because defendant was found to have firearms under his control under RSA 159:3 but not in his possession as required by RSA 651:2, II-g). However, unlike Taylor, the indictments in this case alleged that the weapons were in the defendant's "possession"; they did not allege, in the alternative, that the weapons were under his "control."
Because the sentence is illegal to the extent that it imposes a term of probation exceeding five years, the third and fourth elements of the plain error rule have been satisfied. See State v. Taylor, 152 N.H. 719, 721 (2005). The defendant next argues that the trial court also committed plain error by extending his probation beyond the four years initially imposed at sentencing on the underlying charge, even if that extension ultimately results in the defendant serving no more than five years probation.